The Battle of Mogadishu, Black Hawk Down, was between a small force of Rangers without support. No artillery, tanks, or air support beyond helicopters. It was decided by a president, who never served, that that type of support wasn't needed. Are we headed for another disaster like that. A small unit, without support, and in a remote location? Another Wake Island, Guam, or Bataan.
The time to rebuild is now, not after the next war starts. Otherwise when it does start the will be other small units of Marines fighting without support, enough ammo, or even food. There'll be no cavalry this time, no horses to eat.
It was reported in the Dispatch that the Marine Corps has a two or three-man assessing the lessons from Ukraine. It would seem to me that a couple of teams in Ukraine evaluating the drone and counterdrone activities as well as the use of artillery and armor as a means to justify the bringing back tube artlliery, engineering resources, and armor. I feel we are wasting a "Lessons Learned" opportunity.
Concur … and, who are they? Our USMC observer of Yom Kippur ‘73, is instructive: one very seasoned & combat experienced Marine. His report was magnificent! So, who we send is very important. Question: is there a role for an MCU observer/researcher on this mission? Semper Fi!
And Polarbear has some questions. “The Navy's competing budget priorities and an antiquated procurement process leaves the Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) – The Marine Corps Pacific prizefighter – without their prime movers, further depriving MLRs’ ability to gain advantages through maneuver”. I thought the “Navy’s prizefighter” is still in training attempting to work out its logistics? In the same sentence the MLR is declared the Navy’s “prize fighter” they admit it has no ability to maneuver. “However (the LSM), the first of 18 - 35 ships will not arrive until the mid-2030s leaving the MLRs high and dry”. Again, no maneuver.
“Right now, MLRs serve as the Joint Force’s tripping wire, providing early warning detection and decision-making space as a type of Joint Force quarterback.” Can the MLR cover all the gaps in the first island chain? Can we really call the MLR the “Joint Force quarterback”? When it comes to Joint Force “eyes and ears” early warning what does the MLR give the force that satellites can’t provide?
”By deepening partnerships with industry innovators developing multi-domain platforms available in 2026 instead of 2036, the Corps can hedge against fragile, budget greedy, multi-decade ship-building programs and focus on its own, truly organic mobility formation.” This is the US Navy’s problem to solve and they been looking at work arounds instead of solving the problem for the last 4-5 years. Note that none of the work arounds seem to solve the problem before 2027 (CCP take control of Taiwan goal) or by the 2030 time frame. The SECNAV admitted the Navy’s amphibious ship neglect to the congressional over sight committee over a year ago. Isn’t the real solution here to solve the Navy’s ship building and maintenance problem?
“Enter the case of wing-in-ground effect (WIGE), where recent technological advancements have transformed a 1960s concept of transportation into commercially viable littoral mobility options. This tech has the Marine Corps attention. Within two years this innovative capability enabled by advanced technologies will provide MLRs with the speed and stealth required to gain time and space advantages in the FIC. ” WIGE”, really? and in two years? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground-effect_vehicle.
“…the Corps must leverage the ingenuity of its Marines and Sailors already operating in the FIC by testing, procuring, and employing its own mobility platforms that enable maritime domain awareness operations.” The Marine Corps FD 2030 problem is not going to be solved by our Marines and Sailors ingenuity. This problem rests with the top of the chain of command.
After reading this PRO MLR article, I have the vision of two Commandant’s standing in a dry corner holding wet paint brushs.
The Battle of Mogadishu, Black Hawk Down, was between a small force of Rangers without support. No artillery, tanks, or air support beyond helicopters. It was decided by a president, who never served, that that type of support wasn't needed. Are we headed for another disaster like that. A small unit, without support, and in a remote location? Another Wake Island, Guam, or Bataan.
The time to rebuild is now, not after the next war starts. Otherwise when it does start the will be other small units of Marines fighting without support, enough ammo, or even food. There'll be no cavalry this time, no horses to eat.
History repeats itself. We should learn from it.
Amen! Let our history temper our judgment.
Another lesson from history we fail to learn.
It was reported in the Dispatch that the Marine Corps has a two or three-man assessing the lessons from Ukraine. It would seem to me that a couple of teams in Ukraine evaluating the drone and counterdrone activities as well as the use of artillery and armor as a means to justify the bringing back tube artlliery, engineering resources, and armor. I feel we are wasting a "Lessons Learned" opportunity.
Concur … and, who are they? Our USMC observer of Yom Kippur ‘73, is instructive: one very seasoned & combat experienced Marine. His report was magnificent! So, who we send is very important. Question: is there a role for an MCU observer/researcher on this mission? Semper Fi!
I just caught this article on RCP-Defense: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/10/04/rocking_the_boat_to_make_littoral_mobility_the_next_offset_1062908.html
And Polarbear has some questions. “The Navy's competing budget priorities and an antiquated procurement process leaves the Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) – The Marine Corps Pacific prizefighter – without their prime movers, further depriving MLRs’ ability to gain advantages through maneuver”. I thought the “Navy’s prizefighter” is still in training attempting to work out its logistics? In the same sentence the MLR is declared the Navy’s “prize fighter” they admit it has no ability to maneuver. “However (the LSM), the first of 18 - 35 ships will not arrive until the mid-2030s leaving the MLRs high and dry”. Again, no maneuver.
“Right now, MLRs serve as the Joint Force’s tripping wire, providing early warning detection and decision-making space as a type of Joint Force quarterback.” Can the MLR cover all the gaps in the first island chain? Can we really call the MLR the “Joint Force quarterback”? When it comes to Joint Force “eyes and ears” early warning what does the MLR give the force that satellites can’t provide?
”By deepening partnerships with industry innovators developing multi-domain platforms available in 2026 instead of 2036, the Corps can hedge against fragile, budget greedy, multi-decade ship-building programs and focus on its own, truly organic mobility formation.” This is the US Navy’s problem to solve and they been looking at work arounds instead of solving the problem for the last 4-5 years. Note that none of the work arounds seem to solve the problem before 2027 (CCP take control of Taiwan goal) or by the 2030 time frame. The SECNAV admitted the Navy’s amphibious ship neglect to the congressional over sight committee over a year ago. Isn’t the real solution here to solve the Navy’s ship building and maintenance problem?
“Enter the case of wing-in-ground effect (WIGE), where recent technological advancements have transformed a 1960s concept of transportation into commercially viable littoral mobility options. This tech has the Marine Corps attention. Within two years this innovative capability enabled by advanced technologies will provide MLRs with the speed and stealth required to gain time and space advantages in the FIC. ” WIGE”, really? and in two years? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground-effect_vehicle.
“…the Corps must leverage the ingenuity of its Marines and Sailors already operating in the FIC by testing, procuring, and employing its own mobility platforms that enable maritime domain awareness operations.” The Marine Corps FD 2030 problem is not going to be solved by our Marines and Sailors ingenuity. This problem rests with the top of the chain of command.
After reading this PRO MLR article, I have the vision of two Commandant’s standing in a dry corner holding wet paint brushs.
Excellent comparison and a fair, objective judgment about the FD2030 insanity and its devastating impact on our MAGTF capabilities!