If their lips are moving, they are lying. It’s that simple. They hope that Secretary Phelan is either too dumb to figure out their grift before they can retire, or they just won’t do what he wants, assuming he can figure it out, and start to put the Navy and Marine Corps back on course. Tick Tock, Tick Tock Secretary Phelan, Tick Tock… “every minute I stay in this room, I get weaker, and every minute Charlie squats in the bush, he gets stronger.” Captain Willard Apocalypse Now. There are a lot of MAGTF type Charlie fights out there and they are getting stronger every minute we waste talking about it.
Modern AMPHIBIOUS WAR demands Artillery: Grok…”Finally, the U.S. and NATO’s efforts to ramp up artillery production—like the Camden LAP facility opening in April 2025—reflect the understanding that artillery remains indispensable. The U.S. push to produce 100,000 155mm shells per month by the end of 2025 is driven not just by Ukraine’s needs but by the recognition that modern warfare, even with drones, still demands massive artillery support. A 2025 Pentagon report estimated that a high-intensity conflict against a peer adversary like China would require 5,000–10,000 shells per day, a benchmark that underscores artillery’s enduring role.
In conclusion, FPV drones have not decreased artillery use in the Ukraine-Russia conflict—they’ve made it more efficient in some contexts but have also increased the overall demand for shells by intensifying the pace and precision of engagements. Artillery and drones are complementary tools: drones enhance targeting and reduce waste, but the scale and nature of the conflict ensure that artillery remains the backbone of both sides’ strategies, with daily shell usage remaining in the thousands.”…Artillery remains THE KING OF BATTLE…!
Whiplash? What? CMC AND CNO say we need more amphibious in the water? Better late than never! Drive on, and let's get this problem fixed while we can! That is very good news. So many thanks to our retired senior Marines for doing the tough infighting. That struggle is not lost on us. No Bended Knee & Semper FidelisI
Chinese saying - A long journey starts with a single step.
I get the feeling that the current civilian DOD administration wants to tout a victory, if it fields three amphibious MEUs. Filling that requirement is going to be a very difficult, especially if they want it completed in the next four years. The short fall of amphibious shipping has dumped the Marine Corps into a strategic hole that needs to be refilled in more ways than one.
Consequently, the Marine Commandant (and it should be a new one) needs to keep talking with the Combatant Commanders. In my estimation both General Berger and Smith “missed movement” as a Joint Force Provider regarding this issue. Why they could not follow General Neller’s example of stating that “38 L-Class Amphibious warships are required to meet a 2.0 MEB Joint Forcible Entry requirement, and upwards of 50 would be needed to meet CCDR demand” is beyond my military reasoning. My opinion is every Combatant Commander needs a 911 number for an amphibious MAGTF, the “Swiss Army Knife” of agile and flexible military operations.
In addition to at least 2 MEBs of amphibious shipping, we need to get back to 3 MPS. The combat power, sustainment, strategic agility and quick deployment is built in with MPF RORO ships. If you want the Marine Corps to be ready for a peer-on-peer war, our aircraft squadrons need to be at 18 aircraft vs 12. In addition to the careful testing and integration of new technologies, old technologies, like tube artillery, needs to be maintained along fire support capabilities and training.
The US Army stated purpose of the Booker or the “Mobile Protected Firepower System” is to “provide mobile, protected, direct, offensive fire capability or direct fire support to Infantry… to suppress and destroy enemy bunkers, fortifications, and light armor vehicles.” The Army bureaucracy needs to read its own paper on “Light Armor – Infantry Operations”. https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2020/Fall/4Diddams20.pdf
Unlike the Army, the Marines don’t need to air drop a tank. We need a direct fire weapon that destroys enemy bunkers, fortifications, and light armor vehicles in order to maintain an aggressive infantry attack.
The US Army’s plan was to procure 500 of these light tanks. Seems to me a battalion of these in each of the four Marine MEFs and three MPFs can fill this procurement order nicely. In addition, the US Army has already covered most of the development costs.
This reminds me of the Marine “Ontos” story that mounted six 106 Recoilless Rifles. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M50_Ontos The Army developed the Ontos but then didn’t want it and the Marine Corps wasn’t going to miss a freebee. Years later, because of the need of an direct fire anti-tank weapon, we turned in the Ontos for the US Army “Mule” to carrier the Infantry Battalion’s eight 106 Recoilless Rifles. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M274_%C2%BD-ton_4%C3%974_utility_platform_truck The Mule was designed to go “anywhere” but with a mounted 106 Recoilless Rifle that design requirement was definitely challenged. S/F
-Just when I think I am out, they pull me back in...
1) M1A1 FEP was an outstanding piece of heavy armor that had been heavily refined for USMC purposes. No finer Combined Arms Command and Control / FIST platform. Excellent, effective MG. The premier assault machine gun platform. Cross country mobility was breathtaking. Ground Pressure was workable. We had the logistics worked out...but not the 'sour grapes' because it required logistics. Was it heavy? Yes. Used gas, yes. Highly effective, yes. Breathe through a snorkel so it could be deployed across the surf zone by a LST*, or ford deep water? Yes. (*-edit: by LST, I am referring to any bow ramp, tank capable boat)
2) The Booker was the wrong platform. A 105 Tank Main Gun is simply not going to cut it. Heavy enough to stress the chassis, but too small to really bring the CE (explosive filler / shaped charge cross section / Anti Personnel Package) the NATO 120mm standard does. IF you want a large bore main gun for infantry support...there simply is no exception to picking a M256 / Nato 120 compatible gun. Otherwise, something from the 30mm - 50mm Bushmaster family (or comparable) is a better solution, especially in lighter vehicles. The Booker had other shortcomings as well. It would be an albatross for the USMC at this point. If you hate heavy armor, you'll really hate light armor with a little gun (relative). Stop trying to make the 105 a thing again.
3) Why Heavy Armor? there are environments, where there simply is no replacement for armor protected firepower and crew survivability. Replace Heavy Armor with Low/No Armor and assume risk with respect to capability.
4) Between 30 and 40 tons seems to be the threshold for the low end of tank / Mobile Gun weight with decent performance. And despite my love for the M1 capability per pound, I get the distaste for going over 35-40 tons with respect to bridges and roads world wide. Surprisingly, the Bradley, which is in this realm, has done very well in modern combat (Pentagon Wars notwithstanding). I've often thought that the Bradley is probably the closest to a modern Sherman for the USMC. For a Light Armor Mobile Gun, nothing beats the CV90-120. And if you don't like the CV90-120, there are other proven versions....the CV9030 is a fantastic vehicle. I am not a Hagglunds shill...rather, I had my eyes opened during Battle Griffin 99 with respect to the CV90's capability. Hagglunds has been aggressive leaning into digital / UAS integration.
5) Do we need a tank that can jump or swim? Sure. Can we actually make a decent tank that can jump or swim? No. Stop barking up that tree outside of RnD. The Army proofed the LAV again for Air Delivery in 2018-2020. They were running with it. Then disbanded their LAV unit to wait for the MGS (Booker). The jokes write themselves.
6) One thing I've noticed in the critique of the M1- series. "Too heavy, uses too much gas". However, no one asks :"what is our metric to evaluate?". Yes, it is heavy and uses more fuel than a LAV or ACV/AAV. It also will outstrip both cross country. Do we have a logistics constraint? What exactly is it (space, weight...what)? All the bitching I ever heard about the M1 weighing too much was always subjective. If the USMC could identify the actual constraints and restraints with respect to weight / POL / mobility support / maintenance support, it would make the choice easier. If you can only accept something that weighs as much as a JLTV with a 30mm on it....guess what you are getting. Not that the JLTV-30 is bad...I think for purpose and fit it has huge potential...though it'll suck a little when they discover that everyone shoots at the vehicle with a big auto cannon poking out. Also, when they discover that in lieu of any other assault gun or Tank, the job goes to the next closest thing.
7) In closing, with respect to PB's Ontos parable, some leftover M3 Bradley's could be pretty good, and fit with existing USMC systems, as far as weapons. They would dovetail with Army logistics and maintenance programs. This would be a lot better than the Bookers. No, they don't provide a good Heavy MG like the M1A1 FEP did, but Mars gives, and Mars takes away.
LOL…Yep cfrog, I thought I would get your attention. I would be surprised if you didn’t reply to my light tank idea. In my comment I recreated the Army’s mistake of calling the Brooker a light tank instead of a “Mobile Protected Firepower System”. The Booker was developed as an infantry support vehicle for the Army infantry brigades. I would call it an infantry “assault gun” with a secondary antitank mission. I have to wonder if the reason the Army stated calling it a light tank was to dump it. In WW2 the German Army pick up on the assault gun idea from the Russians and they use their assault guns extensively in infantry assaults.
Agree the M1A1 is probably the best tank available but the Marines don’t have any. My thinking is a light tank/assault gun is better than no tank. I agree, the M1 is the best antitank weapon on today’s battlefield. During Desert Storm (1990) I watch Army M1’s take out dug-in Iraqi tanks at a distance of two miles. When I question those Iraqi tank crews, they thought they were taken out by stealth aircraft vs M1 tanks…very impressive. The M1, at least for the Marine Corps, had a secondary mission to support infantry assaults. The Army’s Bradley with its 25mm seems to be filling the infantry support role nicely with good reports coming out of the Ukraine war. IMHO there is still a need for the Marine Infantry Battalion and Company Commanders to have a “mobile, protected, direct fire, offensive capable vehicle”.
The problem with the Booker that I did not discuss was training and logistics. If the Army adopted the Booker then the Marine Corps could have tapped into the Army school and logistics systems. Again, letting the US Army absorb the setup costs for training and logistics.
I do like your idea of the CV90-120. At 38 tons it is a light tank and its 120mm cannon provides the fancy and flexible ammo needed on the modern battlefield. We also need to take a look at how General Gray managed to adopt the LAV.
I was certainly not advocating for the Ontos, it had its own problems, and I would not call it a parable, but a lesson learned. The primary problem was a crew member had to leave the vehicle to reload the six 106s. Despite its primary anti-tank mission, we use the Ontos in Viet Nam as an assault gun (until we ran out of spare parts the US Army gave us). We did keep the 106s and its three rounds of HEAT, HEMP and the neat anti-personnel Beehive (you could control the flechette blast out to 1200m). S/F
PS: Let me know the next time you pass thru and we can break bread again.
This is the same thing that happened with the Stryker. It became too heavy to airland in a C130. The Marine Corps had better make the correct choice for its next tank.
Cfrog, you've hit a bulls eye! On target! I also agree with your about the CV90-120. What is your opinion of the OTO Melara Centauro 120 for the Marine Corps? To me either one would be a good system.
Centauro 120 could be a viable option, at least on paper. I have zero hands on experience or familiarity with the system. It does have a proven NATO service history for the 105 version and Leonardo Defense seems to be doing a good job with the 120 turret system (digital, good CROWS for the Heavy Machine Gun). It's a relatively light system (24 tons), so does well on that front. The soft recoil 120 gives access to the current range of Chemical Energy (explosive)rounds, so you get the full 'Kindergarten Cop party pooper' effect. I will say, I understand the rationale for wheeled systems and tracked systems. The big factor is ensuring that it can hold up to the training/exercise/operations cycle. This is what sunk the Stryker-MGS and some other similar platforms. For the given usage we are speaking to, my opinion is that a tracked vehicle is preferable. Tracks can be a real PITA, but they work so well in so much varied/broken terrain. With a larger gun, tracks have some real advantages for long term hull durability. However, competent crews can do amazing things with a platform; that is the saving grace of the ACV right now.
I read that about the M10. I guess the Army has problems also. With the M10 cancelation and the Stryker 105 MGS a joke, I wonder what they will do for their Light Divisions? They do not know what will happen to the 80 that have been bought. But, this is part of a larger problem for the Army. They are also scaling back production of the AMPV (Amored Multi Purpose Vehicle: replacement for the M113 APC), stopping production of the JLTV and the Stryker. Some are saying the Army wants to focus more on the Pacific. I hope they don't become too China centric. We should pay attention.
The comments made by CMC Smith at the Modern Day Marine Expo almost sounds like a mission statement for the MAGTF/MEU. The strategic priority of the Marine Corps cannot be both missile force and a strategic crisis response, naval expeditionary force. To become a missile force, the Marine Corps has divested too much of its core capabilities to be an effective crisis response force. However, as a military "Swiss Knife" the MEU can still have the assets of a missile force in its tool box. The MEU is a reinforced infantry battalion. It can have armor, artillery, aviation, and also missile assets. In the IndoPac theater, instead of loading out with tanks, the MEU can carry HIMARs for missile raids/anti ship strikes. MEUs have gone to sea without tanks in the past. In the Med or Middle East a MEU can carry tanks and leave the missiles behind. Additionally, the HIMARS is a multi-purpose weapon, in that it can fire numerous types of missiles. It can carry the PrSM to hit moving targets/ships. I do not think this is true of the NSM/NMESIS. A Marine missile force can only do that one mission effectively. However, as a pre-FD combined arms naval expeditionary force, it can be an expeditionary force with the added assets of a missile unit. It all depends on the loadout of the MEU! The Army just now admitted to a mistake in their development of the M10 Booker light tank. Lets not let the Marine Corps continue down this mistake with FD. The Marine Corps has always been a naval expeditionary force. Lets keep it that way.
If their lips are moving, they are lying. It’s that simple. They hope that Secretary Phelan is either too dumb to figure out their grift before they can retire, or they just won’t do what he wants, assuming he can figure it out, and start to put the Navy and Marine Corps back on course. Tick Tock, Tick Tock Secretary Phelan, Tick Tock… “every minute I stay in this room, I get weaker, and every minute Charlie squats in the bush, he gets stronger.” Captain Willard Apocalypse Now. There are a lot of MAGTF type Charlie fights out there and they are getting stronger every minute we waste talking about it.
Modern AMPHIBIOUS WAR demands Artillery: Grok…”Finally, the U.S. and NATO’s efforts to ramp up artillery production—like the Camden LAP facility opening in April 2025—reflect the understanding that artillery remains indispensable. The U.S. push to produce 100,000 155mm shells per month by the end of 2025 is driven not just by Ukraine’s needs but by the recognition that modern warfare, even with drones, still demands massive artillery support. A 2025 Pentagon report estimated that a high-intensity conflict against a peer adversary like China would require 5,000–10,000 shells per day, a benchmark that underscores artillery’s enduring role.
In conclusion, FPV drones have not decreased artillery use in the Ukraine-Russia conflict—they’ve made it more efficient in some contexts but have also increased the overall demand for shells by intensifying the pace and precision of engagements. Artillery and drones are complementary tools: drones enhance targeting and reduce waste, but the scale and nature of the conflict ensure that artillery remains the backbone of both sides’ strategies, with daily shell usage remaining in the thousands.”…Artillery remains THE KING OF BATTLE…!
Whiplash? What? CMC AND CNO say we need more amphibious in the water? Better late than never! Drive on, and let's get this problem fixed while we can! That is very good news. So many thanks to our retired senior Marines for doing the tough infighting. That struggle is not lost on us. No Bended Knee & Semper FidelisI
Chinese saying - A long journey starts with a single step.
I get the feeling that the current civilian DOD administration wants to tout a victory, if it fields three amphibious MEUs. Filling that requirement is going to be a very difficult, especially if they want it completed in the next four years. The short fall of amphibious shipping has dumped the Marine Corps into a strategic hole that needs to be refilled in more ways than one.
Consequently, the Marine Commandant (and it should be a new one) needs to keep talking with the Combatant Commanders. In my estimation both General Berger and Smith “missed movement” as a Joint Force Provider regarding this issue. Why they could not follow General Neller’s example of stating that “38 L-Class Amphibious warships are required to meet a 2.0 MEB Joint Forcible Entry requirement, and upwards of 50 would be needed to meet CCDR demand” is beyond my military reasoning. My opinion is every Combatant Commander needs a 911 number for an amphibious MAGTF, the “Swiss Army Knife” of agile and flexible military operations.
In addition to at least 2 MEBs of amphibious shipping, we need to get back to 3 MPS. The combat power, sustainment, strategic agility and quick deployment is built in with MPF RORO ships. If you want the Marine Corps to be ready for a peer-on-peer war, our aircraft squadrons need to be at 18 aircraft vs 12. In addition to the careful testing and integration of new technologies, old technologies, like tube artillery, needs to be maintained along fire support capabilities and training.
The Marine Corps also needs a light tank. The M1A is too heavy and its absents creates an unacceptable hole in combat power. The US Army debacle of the M10 Booker light tank that is too heavy to be air dropped presents an opportunity. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/m10-booker-tank-cancelled/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=mil-ebb
The US Army stated purpose of the Booker or the “Mobile Protected Firepower System” is to “provide mobile, protected, direct, offensive fire capability or direct fire support to Infantry… to suppress and destroy enemy bunkers, fortifications, and light armor vehicles.” The Army bureaucracy needs to read its own paper on “Light Armor – Infantry Operations”. https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2020/Fall/4Diddams20.pdf
Unlike the Army, the Marines don’t need to air drop a tank. We need a direct fire weapon that destroys enemy bunkers, fortifications, and light armor vehicles in order to maintain an aggressive infantry attack.
The US Army’s plan was to procure 500 of these light tanks. Seems to me a battalion of these in each of the four Marine MEFs and three MPFs can fill this procurement order nicely. In addition, the US Army has already covered most of the development costs.
This reminds me of the Marine “Ontos” story that mounted six 106 Recoilless Rifles. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M50_Ontos The Army developed the Ontos but then didn’t want it and the Marine Corps wasn’t going to miss a freebee. Years later, because of the need of an direct fire anti-tank weapon, we turned in the Ontos for the US Army “Mule” to carrier the Infantry Battalion’s eight 106 Recoilless Rifles. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M274_%C2%BD-ton_4%C3%974_utility_platform_truck The Mule was designed to go “anywhere” but with a mounted 106 Recoilless Rifle that design requirement was definitely challenged. S/F
-Just when I think I am out, they pull me back in...
1) M1A1 FEP was an outstanding piece of heavy armor that had been heavily refined for USMC purposes. No finer Combined Arms Command and Control / FIST platform. Excellent, effective MG. The premier assault machine gun platform. Cross country mobility was breathtaking. Ground Pressure was workable. We had the logistics worked out...but not the 'sour grapes' because it required logistics. Was it heavy? Yes. Used gas, yes. Highly effective, yes. Breathe through a snorkel so it could be deployed across the surf zone by a LST*, or ford deep water? Yes. (*-edit: by LST, I am referring to any bow ramp, tank capable boat)
2) The Booker was the wrong platform. A 105 Tank Main Gun is simply not going to cut it. Heavy enough to stress the chassis, but too small to really bring the CE (explosive filler / shaped charge cross section / Anti Personnel Package) the NATO 120mm standard does. IF you want a large bore main gun for infantry support...there simply is no exception to picking a M256 / Nato 120 compatible gun. Otherwise, something from the 30mm - 50mm Bushmaster family (or comparable) is a better solution, especially in lighter vehicles. The Booker had other shortcomings as well. It would be an albatross for the USMC at this point. If you hate heavy armor, you'll really hate light armor with a little gun (relative). Stop trying to make the 105 a thing again.
3) Why Heavy Armor? there are environments, where there simply is no replacement for armor protected firepower and crew survivability. Replace Heavy Armor with Low/No Armor and assume risk with respect to capability.
4) Between 30 and 40 tons seems to be the threshold for the low end of tank / Mobile Gun weight with decent performance. And despite my love for the M1 capability per pound, I get the distaste for going over 35-40 tons with respect to bridges and roads world wide. Surprisingly, the Bradley, which is in this realm, has done very well in modern combat (Pentagon Wars notwithstanding). I've often thought that the Bradley is probably the closest to a modern Sherman for the USMC. For a Light Armor Mobile Gun, nothing beats the CV90-120. And if you don't like the CV90-120, there are other proven versions....the CV9030 is a fantastic vehicle. I am not a Hagglunds shill...rather, I had my eyes opened during Battle Griffin 99 with respect to the CV90's capability. Hagglunds has been aggressive leaning into digital / UAS integration.
5) Do we need a tank that can jump or swim? Sure. Can we actually make a decent tank that can jump or swim? No. Stop barking up that tree outside of RnD. The Army proofed the LAV again for Air Delivery in 2018-2020. They were running with it. Then disbanded their LAV unit to wait for the MGS (Booker). The jokes write themselves.
6) One thing I've noticed in the critique of the M1- series. "Too heavy, uses too much gas". However, no one asks :"what is our metric to evaluate?". Yes, it is heavy and uses more fuel than a LAV or ACV/AAV. It also will outstrip both cross country. Do we have a logistics constraint? What exactly is it (space, weight...what)? All the bitching I ever heard about the M1 weighing too much was always subjective. If the USMC could identify the actual constraints and restraints with respect to weight / POL / mobility support / maintenance support, it would make the choice easier. If you can only accept something that weighs as much as a JLTV with a 30mm on it....guess what you are getting. Not that the JLTV-30 is bad...I think for purpose and fit it has huge potential...though it'll suck a little when they discover that everyone shoots at the vehicle with a big auto cannon poking out. Also, when they discover that in lieu of any other assault gun or Tank, the job goes to the next closest thing.
7) In closing, with respect to PB's Ontos parable, some leftover M3 Bradley's could be pretty good, and fit with existing USMC systems, as far as weapons. They would dovetail with Army logistics and maintenance programs. This would be a lot better than the Bookers. No, they don't provide a good Heavy MG like the M1A1 FEP did, but Mars gives, and Mars takes away.
LOL…Yep cfrog, I thought I would get your attention. I would be surprised if you didn’t reply to my light tank idea. In my comment I recreated the Army’s mistake of calling the Brooker a light tank instead of a “Mobile Protected Firepower System”. The Booker was developed as an infantry support vehicle for the Army infantry brigades. I would call it an infantry “assault gun” with a secondary antitank mission. I have to wonder if the reason the Army stated calling it a light tank was to dump it. In WW2 the German Army pick up on the assault gun idea from the Russians and they use their assault guns extensively in infantry assaults.
Agree the M1A1 is probably the best tank available but the Marines don’t have any. My thinking is a light tank/assault gun is better than no tank. I agree, the M1 is the best antitank weapon on today’s battlefield. During Desert Storm (1990) I watch Army M1’s take out dug-in Iraqi tanks at a distance of two miles. When I question those Iraqi tank crews, they thought they were taken out by stealth aircraft vs M1 tanks…very impressive. The M1, at least for the Marine Corps, had a secondary mission to support infantry assaults. The Army’s Bradley with its 25mm seems to be filling the infantry support role nicely with good reports coming out of the Ukraine war. IMHO there is still a need for the Marine Infantry Battalion and Company Commanders to have a “mobile, protected, direct fire, offensive capable vehicle”.
The problem with the Booker that I did not discuss was training and logistics. If the Army adopted the Booker then the Marine Corps could have tapped into the Army school and logistics systems. Again, letting the US Army absorb the setup costs for training and logistics.
I do like your idea of the CV90-120. At 38 tons it is a light tank and its 120mm cannon provides the fancy and flexible ammo needed on the modern battlefield. We also need to take a look at how General Gray managed to adopt the LAV.
I was certainly not advocating for the Ontos, it had its own problems, and I would not call it a parable, but a lesson learned. The primary problem was a crew member had to leave the vehicle to reload the six 106s. Despite its primary anti-tank mission, we use the Ontos in Viet Nam as an assault gun (until we ran out of spare parts the US Army gave us). We did keep the 106s and its three rounds of HEAT, HEMP and the neat anti-personnel Beehive (you could control the flechette blast out to 1200m). S/F
PS: Let me know the next time you pass thru and we can break bread again.
This is the same thing that happened with the Stryker. It became too heavy to airland in a C130. The Marine Corps had better make the correct choice for its next tank.
Cfrog, you've hit a bulls eye! On target! I also agree with your about the CV90-120. What is your opinion of the OTO Melara Centauro 120 for the Marine Corps? To me either one would be a good system.
Centauro 120 could be a viable option, at least on paper. I have zero hands on experience or familiarity with the system. It does have a proven NATO service history for the 105 version and Leonardo Defense seems to be doing a good job with the 120 turret system (digital, good CROWS for the Heavy Machine Gun). It's a relatively light system (24 tons), so does well on that front. The soft recoil 120 gives access to the current range of Chemical Energy (explosive)rounds, so you get the full 'Kindergarten Cop party pooper' effect. I will say, I understand the rationale for wheeled systems and tracked systems. The big factor is ensuring that it can hold up to the training/exercise/operations cycle. This is what sunk the Stryker-MGS and some other similar platforms. For the given usage we are speaking to, my opinion is that a tracked vehicle is preferable. Tracks can be a real PITA, but they work so well in so much varied/broken terrain. With a larger gun, tracks have some real advantages for long term hull durability. However, competent crews can do amazing things with a platform; that is the saving grace of the ACV right now.
Cfrog, looks like you started a good but neded discussion.
I read that about the M10. I guess the Army has problems also. With the M10 cancelation and the Stryker 105 MGS a joke, I wonder what they will do for their Light Divisions? They do not know what will happen to the 80 that have been bought. But, this is part of a larger problem for the Army. They are also scaling back production of the AMPV (Amored Multi Purpose Vehicle: replacement for the M113 APC), stopping production of the JLTV and the Stryker. Some are saying the Army wants to focus more on the Pacific. I hope they don't become too China centric. We should pay attention.
https://open.substack.com/pub/cpldanusmcret764175/p/heaf-implementation?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=ohc7t
MAGTF that could be implemented immediately
BFT! Hope someone is listening.
The comments made by CMC Smith at the Modern Day Marine Expo almost sounds like a mission statement for the MAGTF/MEU. The strategic priority of the Marine Corps cannot be both missile force and a strategic crisis response, naval expeditionary force. To become a missile force, the Marine Corps has divested too much of its core capabilities to be an effective crisis response force. However, as a military "Swiss Knife" the MEU can still have the assets of a missile force in its tool box. The MEU is a reinforced infantry battalion. It can have armor, artillery, aviation, and also missile assets. In the IndoPac theater, instead of loading out with tanks, the MEU can carry HIMARs for missile raids/anti ship strikes. MEUs have gone to sea without tanks in the past. In the Med or Middle East a MEU can carry tanks and leave the missiles behind. Additionally, the HIMARS is a multi-purpose weapon, in that it can fire numerous types of missiles. It can carry the PrSM to hit moving targets/ships. I do not think this is true of the NSM/NMESIS. A Marine missile force can only do that one mission effectively. However, as a pre-FD combined arms naval expeditionary force, it can be an expeditionary force with the added assets of a missile unit. It all depends on the loadout of the MEU! The Army just now admitted to a mistake in their development of the M10 Booker light tank. Lets not let the Marine Corps continue down this mistake with FD. The Marine Corps has always been a naval expeditionary force. Lets keep it that way.