Compass Points - Woeful Wargames
Systems Command needs the facts.
Compass Points - Woeful Wargames
Systems Command needs the facts.
March 1, 2024
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Marine Corps Systems Command deals with facts, not theories. It has to. It must acquire new, functioning gear, and get it to the field quickly. If Systems Command is fooled, it means trouble for the Marine Corps.
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The Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) is the acquisition command of the United States Marine Corps, made up of Marines, sailors, civilians and contractors. As the only systems command in the Marine Corps, MCSC serves as lead Contracting Authority for all Marine Corps ground weapon and information technology programs. MCSC is headquartered at Marine Corps Base Quantico.
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A Marine Corps Systems Command article quotes the PM for Wargaming.
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“Wargaming is crucial at every step of the mission, from both a tactical and operational perspective. It’s a process that guides us in how to use our current capabilities to successfully execute the mission.”
Wargaming is also important because it allows Marine Corps leadership to justify its spending to Congress and the taxpayer.
"Wargaming serves as a robust validation tool for our force design and future spending. It’s how we provide Congress with concrete data, supporting our requests for specific capabilities. In essence, wargaming enables us to not only fine-tune our military strategy but also justify the resources needed to bring that strategy to life,” she added.
-- PM Wargaming Capability, as quoted in "Wargaming Towards Victory in the Indo-Pacific" 09/07/2023 By Johannes Schmidt, MCSC Office of Public Affairs.
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Back in the summer of 2019, in his Commandant's Planning Guidance, the now former CMC, promised to use wargames in a genuine effort to pursue knowledge. The Commandant said,
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This wargaming effort will be the centerpiece of my effort to generate reliable knowledge upon which to base force design and combat development.
-- Commandant's Planning Guidance 2019 (p.19)
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Apparently, MCSC has been led to believe the Force Design wargames actually were a genuine, "effort to generate reliable knowledge" and were a "robust validation tool for our force design and future spending." Sadly, the Force Design wargames provided no guidance, no justification, and no validation for the extreme destruction of Marine Corps capabilities. As author and Marine, Gary Anderson has said, "I always tell the students in my red teaming classes that wargames don’t validate anything. At best, they can identify potential problems with a plan and its assumptions. This is one of the bedrocks of war gaming theory."
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The more the suspect Force Design wargames are examined, the more the defects are revealed.
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Dr. R. Scott Moore, PhD, a retired Marine and former head of wargame analysis at the Marine Corps Wargaming Center at Quantico, Virginia, from November 2016 to April 2021 knows more about the Force Design wargames than anyone. He spoke up at the time and he is still speaking up today.
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Dr. Moore relates how the wargames, instead of dealing with realistic battlefield conditions and challenges, accepted untested assumptions. Among the underlying suppositions, the following appear most startling:
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-- Each FD2030 wargame examining the operational concepts, or the force structures underpinning them, began with substantial Marine forces either already deployed to the operating area or able to do so before hostilities began. Enemy forces offered no opposition to these deployments nor conducted any pre-emptive strikes to prevent them. This is a critically unrealistic and biased assumption.
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-- Wargame designs ensured Marine forces could maneuver largely unhindered on land and sea when operating in the littorals. This is a critically unrealistic and biased assumption.
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-- Despite modern intelligence systems possessed by potential adversaries, the enemy was generally prevented from locating Marine forces, whose ability to disperse, move, and remain hidden largely went unchallenged. This is a critically unrealistic and biased assumption.
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-- No wargame adequately assessed what might happen if the newly structured Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) and its subordinate elements were located and engaged first. This is a critically unrealistic and biased assumption.
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-- Marine forces operating ashore in the littorals rarely confronted a ground threat larger than local guerrillas or enemy special forces. This is a critically unrealistic and biased assumption.
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-- Roads and bridges were considered passable to military vehicles, whatever the terrain or local conditions, and were seldom interdicted by enemy fires or forces. This is a critically unrealistic and biased assumption.
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-- Nations in the area of operations allowed pre-conflict positioning of supplies and were capable of and willing to provide host-nation logistics support. This is a critically unrealistic and biased assumption.
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At the conclusion of the wargames, key members of the Wargaming Center ignored inconvenient outcomes that might undermine the basic Force Design 2030 concept. One damning conclusion stated that the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR)—the bedrock of Force Design 2030—provided lesser capabilities than those provided by other services such as the more robust US Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force. Moreover, the Army’s maritime interdiction and air defense capabilities were assessed as exceeding those of the proposed MLR and could be as readily deployed before hostilities began. In fact, wargames found that the MLR did not necessarily provide a unique capability to the joint force or the combatant commander.
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The results of Force Design 2030 wargames do not support claims by Marine Corps leaders that the wargames validated divestitures of significant warfighting capabilities, such as cannon artillery, tanks, heavy engineers, military police, and helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft. In fact, the wargames did not examine the employment of cannon artillery or heavy armor and thus provided no findings or recommendations to support significant reductions in these capabilities.
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Only one wargame report expressed any concern that, in a conventional land fight, these capabilities would be necessary to a balanced Marine force. Helicopter and tiltrotor squadrons were also mentioned as essential to the conduct of dispersed littoral operations. Support units, such as heavy engineer and law enforcement battalions, were likewise assessed to be crucial, especially to ensure rear area security and logistics support. Yet, all these capabilities were cut in the Marine Corps’ rush to implement Force Design 2030.
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The wargame timeline shows the Marine Corps had already started to divest capabilities before the wargames took place. And when the wargames were held, they did not even explore the crucial options and dangers. The wargames did not validate anything. The wargames provide no foundation for Force Design. As time has gone by and the cracks in Force Design have grown into fissures, Congress is beginning to ask questions.
-- Compass Points, "Wargame Timeline"
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The Marines, sailors, civilians, and contractors at Marine Corps Systems Command work hard to build the Marine Corps of the future. Unfortunately, system command like so many on active duty have been misled that the Force Design wargames "validated" the drastic cuts of Marine Corps capabilities. Back in 2019, the Commandant's planning guidance claimed the, "wargaming effort will be the centerpiece of my effort to generate reliable knowledge upon which to base force design." Sadly, the wargames were not the centerpiece of knowledge; the wargames were used as a smokescreen of misinformation. Perhaps the reason participants were required to sign non-disclosure agreements was all to hide the disreputable wargames. The whole deception is now getting out. Congress has demanded and is waiting for a special briefing on Force Design and what it has done to the Marine Corps.
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What needs to be done now to get past the defective wargames and get the Marine Corps back on a better path? Author and Marine, Gary Anderson, has his own ideas.
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First, I want a congressionally mandated review of Force Design 2030 by an impartial organization to determine if it is really a concept that contributes to national defense. Although such a study has been mandated by the current Defense Authorization Act, the Devil is in the execution. Any competent review should include war games conducted and analyzed by a legitimately neutral third party. The Red Team should be one that understands Chinese strategy, operational art, and tactics. The Blue Team should include the people who devised FD 2030 (to include General Berger if he is willing). The game designers and analysts should be from a legitimately neutral third party. If the analysis shows that FD 2030 indeed has merit, I will shut up. I'm confident enough to put my reputation that it will not by offering to play on the Red Team pro bono.
Second, if the study finds FD 2030 to be the fraud that I believe it to be, there should be a congressionally mandated Force Structure Study Group conducted to recommend to the Marine Corps actions that will correct FD 2030 "reforms”. The members of this study should include active duty officers, senior retired officers with combat and joint experience, and recognized senior civilians with defense experience. It should also include representatives from the theater combatant commands to ensure that the Marine Corps can meet its legal mandate to support them effectively. If the FD 2030 concept, comes through that experience unscathed, I'll be glad to sit down and shut down; but I am confident that it will not.
-- Gary Anderson
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Compass Points salutes Congress for requiring a full report on Force Design and salutes all those who, like Gary Anderson, are working to get the Marine Corps on a better path.
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Wargaming Towards Victory in the Indo-Pacific
By Johannes Schmidt - 09/07/2023
Office of Public Affairs - Marine Corps Systems Command
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Compass Points - Wargame Timeline
No validation, no foundation
February 1, 2024
https://marinecorpscompasspoints.substack.com/p/compass-points-wargame-timeline
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The Defense Post - 01/12/2024
Does the Marine Corps Need Course Correction? Congress Wants to Know
By Gary Anderson
https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/01/12/marine-corps-fd-2030-study/
Heard an active duty senior leader speak just last month of the open and public debate they experienced as a young Lt when FMFM-1 was introduced. Granted, Maneuver Warfare was an additive philosophy, not a reorganization, repurposing, and divestment, but this article makes it seem possible that we might have that kind of debate again, without NDAs. Hopefully Gary Anderson and LtGen Van Riper can team up and present a real, thinking enemy, like the one MCDP-1 references.
The gross lack of integrity across various high levels of the USMC leadership spectrum are not confined to the manipulations of simulations. They extend to the F-35, MV-22, ship to shore assault vehicles, the amphibious connectors, recruit training standards, the value of armor, tube artillery, combat engineer assets and sadly, even to the alleged successes of recruiting. Each of the above, to one degree or another involve deception, deceit by omission and “spin” so widespread in message manipulation. This erosion of truth has a severe impact on the Corps’ ethos, institutional synergy and trust.