Force Design 2030 – The Long-Pole is Logistics

Rediscovering the Power of the MAGTF

Force Design 2030 – The Long-Pole is Logistics

Rediscovering the Power of the MAGTF

The Marine Air Ground Task Force, the MAGTF, embarked aboard Navy amphibious ships is a logistically sustainable force. In fact, logistics is such a strength of the MAGTF, it should be called the ‘MAGLTF’ the Marine Air Ground Logistics Task Force.  Unfortunately, this critical function appears to have been overlooked in the development of FD 2030 and the Stand-in Force concept.

Recently, an active duty logistics officer, Major Daniel Katzman, writing in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette, took time to provide some logistics estimates for the sustainability of FD 2030, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), and Stand-In Forces. His article is alarming. The article deserves the attention of Marine leaders across the Corps, and officials in the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense. At the beginning of the article, the author writes,

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In a modern, high-end conflict, EABO is not logistically supportable given the need to persist and operate within the enemy’s weapons engagement zone at a significant distance from friendly support bases. EABs used for fires in support of sea control or forward arming and refueling points (FARP) provide the required sustainment scope to appreciate the logistics dilemma. When these EABs operate simultaneously to realize operations at scale, a logistics distribution challenge arises that is greater than the Marine Corps or joint force can support.

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The author goes on to review the estimated logistics requirements for both a fires vignette and a FARP vignette.

Fires vignette requirements:

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When scaled to the Lombok Strait and surrounding passages, the associated set of EABs would require a total of 63 shooting platforms, 84 supply vehicles, 63 security vehicles, and 630 personnel. For sustainment, the fires EAB vignette requires 37,800 pounds per day of subsistence, 69,673 pounds per day of fuel, and 7,048 pounds of ordnance per salvo or more likely 21,144 pounds per engagement with a 3-ship surface action group. Assuming one engagement per day, this vignette requires approximately 65 short tons per day of sustainment delivered to the 7 geographically separated sites.

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FARP vignette requirements:

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When you combine the support to Marine Corps and Navy aircraft, the subsistence requirement remains the same at 88,700 pounds per day, assuming supported aircraft crews require no subsistence. On a daily basis, the fuel requirement aggregates to 1,014,213 pounds while the total ordnance requirement is approximately 623,096 pounds. Therefore, the complete daily support for FARP EABs would be 863 tons.

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What happens when the fires vignette and FARP vignette are combined?

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As described, the proposed vignettes will each require significant logistical support to provide an enduring presence. Furthermore, the anticipated scale of EABO means simultaneous execution of the vignettes. The result is that their logistics requirements are additive, there is no economy of scale to be gained, and they will likely compete for priority of logistics support. The vignettes’ combination results in a daily sustainment requirement of 928 tons, establishing the logistics requirement for EABO.

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The author concludes his discussion of the two vignettes:

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While not all-inclusive, these selected functions demonstrate more competition for logistics priority within EABO. These competing logistics priorities are subject to the same distribution complexity resulting from inefficient distribution networks, losses to enemy actions, and unforecasted requirements. Moreover, logistics support will compete with the movement and maneuver operational function for the same surface or air assets. These factors only further complicate the daily challenge of distributing 928 tons of supplies, making EABO at scale unsupportable in a modern, high-end conflict.

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These are only excerpts from the article. The entire article is worth study because it brilliantly captures the extremely challenging problem of sustaining Stand-in Forces operating over extended distances in the Western Pacific. To date, the Marine Corps has not found solutions to this important problem, thus, it is the “long-pole” in the tent.  Without that “pole” EABO and Stand-in Forces are not viable concepts.  Certainly, senior Marine Corps leaders should not make irreversible decisions on force structure before they can solve this serious problem.

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Compass Points salutes the author for his analysis and insights about the logistical challenges of EABO and encourages others to undertake similar examinations of additional aspects of FD 2030.

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Marine Corps Gazette (mca-marines.org) December 2022

Sustaining Stand-In Forces

By Major Daniel Katzman

https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Sustaining-Stand-in-Forces.pdf