-Good article...the rebuttal and conclusion are solid, and good to see a quality takedown of the issue in the Gazette. As an aside, I really like that the author extrapolated fires requirements for the precision anti ship mission and didn't just fairy dust that it will be less because 'precision'...it's still heavy, too heavy for even me to fin with in my prime. I'd hate to be in the Littoral Logistics Battalion trying to piecemeal connectors from banca boats. Best line in the article: "Likewise, future capabilities may prove successful in meeting the distribution challenge, but they do not exist yet. Using these assumed logistics capabilities and capacity for planning before they are tested would be premature as they are too uncertain to be considered reliable.".
-I was concerned so I gave a call to a friend who is very senior and working on this. I said "this is a lot of support that has to happen over a large, possibly contested maritime environment. We haven't even talked about the self support needed to make it happen. It just seems like it's going to be very challenging problem and difficult to solve.". He laughed, and said "actually, it's going to be super easy...barely an inconvenience...in the future" and then he mumbled something about unmanned stuff, Machine learning, and hung up. I haven't been able to reach him since.
Yes, the long pole is definitely logistics yet there are other long poles: Overreliance on technology, overreliance on wargaming for analysis, and overreliance on long range precision fires from fixed positions (e.g. an island).
Early in this debate the response to the lack of ability to support resulted in a hip shot from HQMC that Marines would forage. The tyranny of time and distance is total. I knew right then and there that the concept was bankrupt. The fact that it survived one minute longer was an indication of delusional expectations.
A well thought through , detailed and damming forecast of the failed FD 2030 concept logistically along with a call to re-think this upcoming disaster in the making !
Logisticians are a sad and embittered race of men who are very much in demand in war, and who sink resentfully into obscurity in peace. They deal only in facts but must work for men who merchant in theories. They emerge during war because war is very much a fact. They disappear in peace because peace is mostly theory. The people who merchant in theories, and who employ logisticians in war and ignore them in peace, are generals.
Generals are a happy blessed race who radiate confidence and power. They feed only on ambrosia and drink only nectar. In peace, they stride confidently and can invade a world simply by sweeping their hands grandly over a map, point their fingers decisively up terrain corridors, and blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their hands. In war, they must stride more slowly because each general has a logistician riding on his back and he knows that, at any moment, the logistician may lean forward and whisper: "No, you can't do that." Generals fear logisticians in war and, in peace, generals try to forget logisticians.
Romping along beside generals are strategists and tacticians. Logisticians despise strategists and tacticians. Strategists and tacticians do not know about logisticians until they grow up to be generals—which they usually do.
Sometimes a logistician becomes a general. If he does, he must associate with generals whom he hates; he has a retinue of strategists and tacticians whom he despises; and, on his back, is a logistician whom he fears. This is why logisticians who become generals always have ulcers and cannot eat their ambrosia.
-Good article...the rebuttal and conclusion are solid, and good to see a quality takedown of the issue in the Gazette. As an aside, I really like that the author extrapolated fires requirements for the precision anti ship mission and didn't just fairy dust that it will be less because 'precision'...it's still heavy, too heavy for even me to fin with in my prime. I'd hate to be in the Littoral Logistics Battalion trying to piecemeal connectors from banca boats. Best line in the article: "Likewise, future capabilities may prove successful in meeting the distribution challenge, but they do not exist yet. Using these assumed logistics capabilities and capacity for planning before they are tested would be premature as they are too uncertain to be considered reliable.".
-I was concerned so I gave a call to a friend who is very senior and working on this. I said "this is a lot of support that has to happen over a large, possibly contested maritime environment. We haven't even talked about the self support needed to make it happen. It just seems like it's going to be very challenging problem and difficult to solve.". He laughed, and said "actually, it's going to be super easy...barely an inconvenience...in the future" and then he mumbled something about unmanned stuff, Machine learning, and hung up. I haven't been able to reach him since.
Yes, the long pole is definitely logistics yet there are other long poles: Overreliance on technology, overreliance on wargaming for analysis, and overreliance on long range precision fires from fixed positions (e.g. an island).
Early in this debate the response to the lack of ability to support resulted in a hip shot from HQMC that Marines would forage. The tyranny of time and distance is total. I knew right then and there that the concept was bankrupt. The fact that it survived one minute longer was an indication of delusional expectations.
A well thought through , detailed and damming forecast of the failed FD 2030 concept logistically along with a call to re-think this upcoming disaster in the making !
We all know the importance of logistics. Wars/battles have been lost due to the lack of well thought supply chains.
Examples:
Napoleon against Russia
Germany against Russia
More recently, Israeli Defense Force against Hizbollah in 2006
FD2030 doesn’t address logistics enough to convince me that their strategy against China is going to work!
The Logistician
Unknown Author
Logisticians are a sad and embittered race of men who are very much in demand in war, and who sink resentfully into obscurity in peace. They deal only in facts but must work for men who merchant in theories. They emerge during war because war is very much a fact. They disappear in peace because peace is mostly theory. The people who merchant in theories, and who employ logisticians in war and ignore them in peace, are generals.
Generals are a happy blessed race who radiate confidence and power. They feed only on ambrosia and drink only nectar. In peace, they stride confidently and can invade a world simply by sweeping their hands grandly over a map, point their fingers decisively up terrain corridors, and blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their hands. In war, they must stride more slowly because each general has a logistician riding on his back and he knows that, at any moment, the logistician may lean forward and whisper: "No, you can't do that." Generals fear logisticians in war and, in peace, generals try to forget logisticians.
Romping along beside generals are strategists and tacticians. Logisticians despise strategists and tacticians. Strategists and tacticians do not know about logisticians until they grow up to be generals—which they usually do.
Sometimes a logistician becomes a general. If he does, he must associate with generals whom he hates; he has a retinue of strategists and tacticians whom he despises; and, on his back, is a logistician whom he fears. This is why logisticians who become generals always have ulcers and cannot eat their ambrosia.