I have always thought one of the better quotes for Operation Overload was Eisenhower's directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It read, "You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces." Talk about a clear, concrete, and concise mission order. Compare that with the gobbledygook we see today trying to explain the virtues of EABO, FD, and SIF.
Further to General McAbee’s comments, it strikes this writer, that as amazing an effort as Operation Overlord was and remains today, the Marines in the Pacific had been conducting amphibious assaults against entrenched static defensive positions of the Japanese Imperial Navy and Army, prior to the landings in North Africa, Sicily and Italy and to include the first upon Guadalcanal, which very quickly in a sense turned on its ear, as the US Navy, was forced to vacate the battle space, leaving the Marines exposed to the Japanese’s Navy and Air Force as well as conducting offensive missions to take the island. The Marines prevailed, but lack of logistics could have become a factor if they had not overwhelmed and defeated the opponent. Thus we are supposed to believe the hokum (Gobbledygook was used already!) that the FD2030 proponents use to define a murky “first island chain” defensive posture, (EABO) with limited assets, (MLR/SIF) because the PLA/PLAN will ever know, see or grapple with forward “sensing” units and will not defend themselves against the firecrackers we intend to fire at their warships. Does FD2030 even contemplate one of the Principals of War? The Normandy Invasion included them all and it was still a dicey affair. Why use proven capabilities when you can invent new ones without merit? The roll up of the Japanese’s Imperial forces was a long slow defeat in detail. Why would anyone expect less of the FD2030 concept? Oh we know! Because it’s us!
This all said, Semper Fidelis to the fighting forces of 6 June 1944, that starting with the airborne pathfinders jumping in behind the Normandy beaches, took “light the way” took the fight further into Europe and sallied forward to defeat the combined force of the Nazi regime.
My good Corporal of Marines (or is it Major), I have a list of 120 retired Marine Corps general officers who stand firmly opposed to Force Design 2030 and many have been very pointed about their concerns, often employing very strong language. That list continues to grow, not diminish! What say you to that?
My good corporal, you have a very limited view of what members of Chowder Society II are accomplishing. Apparently, you are unaware of meetings our members have recently had in the White House, Pentagon, and on the Hill. These were meetings with principals, not staff. In focusing on comments in Compass Points posts you miss the articles countering FD 2030 signed by numerous retired generals including Sheehan, Krulak, Zinni, Wilhelm, Hagee, Conway, Dake, Howell, Libutti, Knutson, Newbold, Jenkins, Owens, Holcomb, and McAbee. You also miss the fact only one of the former eight commandants supports FD 2030 and that is its originator, the 38th Commandant. You are seemingly unaware that among us are very recently retired Marine generals who witnessed the disaster unfolding from inside, some of whom were sent home early because of the concerns they voiced. As to lack of progress, you actually need to turn to FD 2030 itself; after five years no SIF deployed, in fact no SIFs in existence, no LAWs or LSMs, and no continual deployment of two ARG/MEUs.
You want an open debate but that can’t happen when the most senior leaders in the Corps say, “the retired generals are dead to us.” It can’t happen when these leaders won’t allow me and others to participate as guests in MCU seminars despite repeated requests from faculty. (Requests for me to visit to discuss the Vietnam War, John Boyd, and Future War were all denied, not just a request to discuss concerns about FD 2030.) It can’t happen when senior leaders won’t let MCU student seminars have dinner with some of our noted leaders. It can’t happen when Marine Corps Gazette and Proceedings won’t publish our articles. The 38th and 39th commandments have effectively killed the Corps’ intellectual renaissance began by General Al Gray who by the way was appalled by what has happened to our Corps under FD 2030.
Those retired Marines opposed to FD 2030 have decades of combat experience, have led previous major changes in the Corps, are serious students of the profession of arms, and are well aware of new technologies and an evolving battlefield. In comparison to this group, current senior leaders are amateurs and proved it by attempting to implement an operational concept before determining how to logistically support it.
I’ve followed this site since your first post. What I see now is a lot of noise, few results, and promises without progress. Beyond you and one other general officer, there’s silence. Is this truly the movement you envisioned?
Where is the unity? Where is the momentum? Five years on, there’s more division than direction.
I don’t say this to inflame—but because I care. I want to see more general good will for the Marine Corps. More unity. Less divisiveness. Less echo chamber, more honest debate with purpose. Because if we’re truly fighting for the future of the Corps, we can’t afford to fight each other more than the enemy.
And I will wait for 118 more of these so called retired Generals to publicly back you. Their silence is deafening and questions the validity of your claim.
Im unsure if you are questioning whether I have a list of 112 retired generals opposed to FD 2030 or are looking for 118 others to sign on. I will share it when it best meets Chowder Society II plans. By the way, I thought you opposed anonymous names "corporal."
You’re whistling past the graveyard yard. You continue to use empty words to describe FD. Professionals use concrete items that they can touch and feel.
For instance you continually use nebulous terms such as multi-domain, connectors, MLR, SIF, NEMESIS, sensor node, etc. Not one is a concrete example. Yes, the MLRs and SIFs exist but they’re hollow units with no COMBAT deployable equipment. Empty launchers, no missiles, no emplaced SIF units, no logistical support, etc.
I know you’ll say we just signed an agreement with the Philippines for emplacing a unit on a northern Philippine island, but after 6 years THAT’s all you have, hollow units, no missiles, one island, no clear mission statement, and in six years absolutely no true full unit proof of concept field test.
Every Marine a rifleman is a credo in the Corps, and every Marine officer is trained in the basic concepts of company operations. Ok, put your MLR/SIF units to the test. Let’s have them conduct a CAX-like exercise in WESTPAC, let’s say NTA on Okinawa, or Wild Horse Creek in the Philippines and let’s exercise the entire concept INCLUDING logistics. The logistics pipeline will fail because it doesn’t exist. Then when those units are out of missiles they turn into you guessed it MARINE RIFLEMEN! But you’ll say the logistics part is coming just give us another 10 years, because that’s what the Navy estimates it will take for ship bottoms to sail.
Cpl. I say stick to squad level tactics, and really listen to the 120 Marine general officers who tell you the Corps is in shoal waters.
Just because you don’t understand terms like “multi-domain,” “connector,” “sensor node,” or “MLR” doesn’t make them empty—they’re doctrinal, technical, and operationally defined in Joint pubs, wargames, and acquisition programs. These aren’t buzzwords—they’re part of how modern warfare works.
Also, it’s NMESIS, not “NEMESIS.” If you’re going to critique the concept, at least spell a capability correctly.
Hollow units? False. MLRs are forward-deployed, real units integrating with joint C2, and participating in bilateral exercises across the Indo-Pacific. You’re pointing at evolving capability and declaring it failure because it isn’t 1985 again. That’s not analysis—it’s nostalgia dressed up as critique.
As for your “every Marine a rifleman” jab and CAX challenge: We’ve already seen elements of the concept executed in Balikatan, Resolute Dragon, Noble Fusion, and more. Could we do a fully scaled proof of concept tomorrow? No. That’s why Force Design is phased. No one said this is plug-and-play. FD is pacing against a threat that isn’t waiting for your permission.
Lastly, let’s be honest about the “120 generals” line—it’s inflated, recycled, and mostly includes long-retired voices whose vision was shaped by a different fight. The current CMC, Joint Staff, INDOPACOM, and Congress back FD. That’s not a fringe opinion—it’s the operational direction of the U.S. military.
If you’re still stuck on Cold War metrics, you’re not arguing from strength—you’re arguing from memory.
My response to "Corporal Grable" is buried under an exchange we are engaged in, but I believe it merits sharing with all, so here it is copied below.
My good corporal, you have a very limited view of what members of Chowder Society II are accomplishing. Apparently, you are unaware of meetings our members have recently had in the White House, Pentagon, and on the Hill. These were meetings with principals, not staff. In focusing on comments in Compass Points posts you miss the articles countering FD 2030 signed by numerous retired generals including Sheehan, Krulak, Zinni, Wilhelm, Hagee, Conway, Dake, Howell, Libutti, Knutson, Newbold, Jenkins, Owens, Holcomb, and McAbee. You also miss the fact only one of the former eight commandants supports FD 2030 and that is its originator, the 38th Commandant. You are seemingly unaware that among us are very recently retired Marine generals who witnessed the disaster unfolding from inside, some of whom were sent home early because of the concerns they voiced. As to lack of progress, you actually need to turn to FD 2030 itself; after five years no SIF deployed, in fact no SIFs in existence, no LAWs or LSMs, and no continual deployment of two ARG/MEUs.
You want an open debate but that can’t happen when the most senior leaders in the Corps say, “the retired generals are dead to us.” It can’t happen when these leaders won’t allow me and others to participate as guests in MCU seminars despite repeated requests from faculty. (Requests for me to visit to discuss the Vietnam War, John Boyd, and Future War were all denied, not just a request to discuss concerns about FD 2030.) It can’t happen when senior leaders won’t let MCU student seminars have dinner with some of our noted leaders. It can’t happen when Marine Corps Gazette and Proceedings won’t publish our articles. The 38th and 39th commandments have effectively killed the Corps’ intellectual renaissance began by General Al Gray who by the way was appalled by what has happened to our Corps under FD 2030.
Those retired Marines opposed to FD 2030 have decades of combat experience, have led previous major changes in the Corps, are serious students of the profession of arms, and are well aware of new technologies and an evolving battlefield. In comparison to this group, current senior leaders are amateurs and proved it by attempting to implement an operational concept before determining how to logistically support it.
I’m well aware of your meetings on the Hill and with senior members of the administration—you crow about them constantly. That’s the “smoke and noise.” What’s missing are results—hits. Despite all the articles, letters, and “principals-level” engagements, Force Design continues to move forward with Joint, Congressional, and Combatant Commander support. That’s not theory. That’s progress.
I’ve read the articles signed by the retired generals. Most are dated. Many are published in third-rate outlets with no editorial rigor. You claim Proceedings and Marine Corps Gazette won’t publish your work—frankly, I doubt that. Editorial standards exist for a reason. Even if true, the idea that Real Clear Defense is the only remaining outlet suggests a failure of the argument, not of the platform.
“No one will let us have dinner”? Come on. Let’s not pretend this is about access. The Corps isn’t required to hand a megaphone to those running an openly hostile campaign against its leadership. You speak of an “intellectual renaissance,” yet refuse to acknowledge that your own movement has turned into an echo chamber that increasingly alienates Marines still in the fight.
And maybe—just maybe—the silence you interpret as fear or arrogance is something else entirely: a conscious decision not to engage with those who have abandoned constructive discourse in favor of public character assassination. Your group has not only disagreed—you’ve smeared. You’ve questioned the integrity, competence, and patriotism of serving Marines. You’ve made it personal. You’ve made it bitter. And then you wonder why doors aren’t open?
The real damage Chowder II has done isn’t in its opinions—it’s in the how. The tone, the tactics, the targeting. Because of this maybe you just made yourselves irrelevant to the Marines still out there doing the job.
The fight is not against you—it’s without you. And that’s a decision you earned.
And just to be clear—I’m not Ian. But I’d like to meet him someday, because it’s obvious he’s living rent-free in your head.
"Corporal," you don't know what you don't know, that is obvious. First and foremost, you are unaware that many active duty officers have reached out to us with their own concerns and are asking us to keep up the fight. Second, it is. the senior leaders of the Corps who refused to discuss our concerns and ignored our efforts to engage. It was not like this under previous commandants; the debates over maneuver warfare were heated and widespread and all were engaged. Bottom line, our large and experienced group of retired officers is very much satisfied with its current position, so I'll let your rave on without responding
The CPL continues to shoot the same old blank rounds. In addition, I do not believe the FD2030 assumption that amphibious operations are no longer possible in an environment of short and long range missiles. After Gallipoli, the word was amphibious operations are done; they don’t work; abandon the concept…etc. etc, etc. The US Marine Corps said, wait a minute, let us take a look at this failed operation.
What the Marine Corps concluded was; superiority of Naval Gun Fire is essential for amphibious operations and assault troops were not properly trained for amphibious operations when they stop on the beach to make their morning tea.
Every major amphibious landing in WW2 was accomplished once control of the SLOC was established. The US Army’s initial WW2 amphibious operations in N. Africa demonstrated these lessons learned: “During Operation Torch, air superiority operations were crucial for supporting the Allied landings in North Africa. Allied air forces, including the Royal Air Force (RAF) and United States Army Air Forces (USAAF), focused on gaining control of the airspace to minimize French and German air opposition. This involved attacking airfields, destroying enemy aircraft, and providing air cover for the amphibious forces.”
The Boyd “Theory” and the maneuver warfare concept experienced similar levels of criticism as Gallipoli. The Boyd “apostles” were criticized and in some cases “run out” of DOD and their Service. It took a Marine Division Commander to sit down with a small group of officers (at the O’Club in 1982) to recognize there is something valuable in the concept. He then encouraged this group to continue their research, analysis and discussions. Later that Division Commander became the Commandant and FMFM 1 “Warfighting” became doctrine. Of note, FMFM 1 did not change Marine Corps doctrine but it did enhanced our Amphibious Doctrine.
Warfighting (FMFM 1) was issued in 1989 but there was still questions regarding its implementation. The Marine Corps Command and Staff Class that year, was tasked to work out the concepts. I was a member of that class and I swear, if I had a dollar for every time PKV sent us into the our conference room “Dens” to discuss concepts like “mission orders”, “commander’s intent”, task organization, and other related ideas, I could have retired a rich man.
We are currently watching the next evolution of warfare with the counter missile and drone operations in the Red Sea, Yemen and Israel. Arleigh-Burke destroyers, Naval and Air Force aircraft and Israel’s Iron Dome successful neutralized multiple missile and drone attacks.
FD2030 is not amphibious Doctrine nor does fit with FMFM 1 - Warfighting. Maritime operations to secure SLOC will required the seizure of airbases and the neutralization of enemy bases. Air superiority (including the domain of Space) is the key to the SLOC control. A global war with the CCP will be fought over control of the SLOC. I also believe that aircraft will still remain as the key component to controlling the SLOC.
The blank rounds metaphor is a good one—but I’d argue they’re being fired by those still resisting Force Design. This isn’t a concept stuck in planning slides. It’s happening now. Funding is in place. Capabilities are being fielded. It has support from Congress, combatant commanders, and the Joint Staff. Force Design has moved out. Those who oppose it have yet to cross the line of departure in any meaningful or measurable way.
That said, your historical vignettes were well stated and insightful. They reflect deep institutional memory—something worth respecting. But they also highlight a key point of misunderstanding: a fundamental misreading of what Force Design actually is.
This is not an either-or argument between traditional amphibious operations and Force Design. Both have vital roles in the Marine Corps. Amphibious assault remains a core competency. Force Design does not replace it—it complements it by shaping the battlespace before escalation, enabling access, and preserving options for escalation if needed. It’s not about discarding doctrine—it’s about evolving it to meet the threat.
The Marine Littoral Regiment and related initiatives are not about reacting late—they’re about being in position early, inside contested spaces, actively deterring aggression. This is deterrence through posture, presence, mobility, and resilience. It’s how you avoid a war—or win one faster if deterrence fails.
What would be truly helpful is if Chowder II and its supporters redirected their energy. Instead of trying to fight a battle that has already been lost, help the Commandant restore 3.0 presence. Help the Corps return to forward-postured naval integration and global responsiveness. That’s the fight we all signed up for—and it still matters.
“Keep fighting. Keep fighting as the 160,000 Allied troops fought on D-Day, June 6, 1944. Whatever the struggle, whatever the challenge, victory may take time. But keep fighting. Have patience. If you are fighting for what is right, never flag or fail. Victory is on the way.”
My friend, the USNI's publications are mouthpieces for the Navy and Marine Corps. Chowder Society II has accidentally released internal documents from the Institute that reveals its prejudices.
As to the LSM (actually an LSV), it is a response to ACMC's reported concern that "we have to get something into the water" after the Navy canceled the LAW and then the real LSM. As you likely know, the LSV is an Army logistics vessel and it is not built to "survivability standards" as all Navy warships are required to be. Yet, the Corps intends for it to operate inside the PLAs WEZ where it argues Navy warships can not safely sail. The whole failed concept is nonsensical to anyone who understand what has happened and continues to happen to a Corps gone astray.
I have always thought one of the better quotes for Operation Overload was Eisenhower's directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It read, "You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces." Talk about a clear, concrete, and concise mission order. Compare that with the gobbledygook we see today trying to explain the virtues of EABO, FD, and SIF.
Further to General McAbee’s comments, it strikes this writer, that as amazing an effort as Operation Overlord was and remains today, the Marines in the Pacific had been conducting amphibious assaults against entrenched static defensive positions of the Japanese Imperial Navy and Army, prior to the landings in North Africa, Sicily and Italy and to include the first upon Guadalcanal, which very quickly in a sense turned on its ear, as the US Navy, was forced to vacate the battle space, leaving the Marines exposed to the Japanese’s Navy and Air Force as well as conducting offensive missions to take the island. The Marines prevailed, but lack of logistics could have become a factor if they had not overwhelmed and defeated the opponent. Thus we are supposed to believe the hokum (Gobbledygook was used already!) that the FD2030 proponents use to define a murky “first island chain” defensive posture, (EABO) with limited assets, (MLR/SIF) because the PLA/PLAN will ever know, see or grapple with forward “sensing” units and will not defend themselves against the firecrackers we intend to fire at their warships. Does FD2030 even contemplate one of the Principals of War? The Normandy Invasion included them all and it was still a dicey affair. Why use proven capabilities when you can invent new ones without merit? The roll up of the Japanese’s Imperial forces was a long slow defeat in detail. Why would anyone expect less of the FD2030 concept? Oh we know! Because it’s us!
This all said, Semper Fidelis to the fighting forces of 6 June 1944, that starting with the airborne pathfinders jumping in behind the Normandy beaches, took “light the way” took the fight further into Europe and sallied forward to defeat the combined force of the Nazi regime.
The LSM is a flawed concept. Some may be built but none will survive inside a contested area during combat. Two distinguished Navy officers tell us why in the Proceedings article at the link: https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/january/do-not-lower-navys-ship-survivability-standards
It amazes me you want the Corps to fail.
Telling, in so many ways.
Semper Fidelis
And thanks to Chowder II and five years of failed attempts, the influence of you and the retired officers you cite continues to diminish.
#notonehit
My good Corporal of Marines (or is it Major), I have a list of 120 retired Marine Corps general officers who stand firmly opposed to Force Design 2030 and many have been very pointed about their concerns, often employing very strong language. That list continues to grow, not diminish! What say you to that?
My good corporal, you have a very limited view of what members of Chowder Society II are accomplishing. Apparently, you are unaware of meetings our members have recently had in the White House, Pentagon, and on the Hill. These were meetings with principals, not staff. In focusing on comments in Compass Points posts you miss the articles countering FD 2030 signed by numerous retired generals including Sheehan, Krulak, Zinni, Wilhelm, Hagee, Conway, Dake, Howell, Libutti, Knutson, Newbold, Jenkins, Owens, Holcomb, and McAbee. You also miss the fact only one of the former eight commandants supports FD 2030 and that is its originator, the 38th Commandant. You are seemingly unaware that among us are very recently retired Marine generals who witnessed the disaster unfolding from inside, some of whom were sent home early because of the concerns they voiced. As to lack of progress, you actually need to turn to FD 2030 itself; after five years no SIF deployed, in fact no SIFs in existence, no LAWs or LSMs, and no continual deployment of two ARG/MEUs.
You want an open debate but that can’t happen when the most senior leaders in the Corps say, “the retired generals are dead to us.” It can’t happen when these leaders won’t allow me and others to participate as guests in MCU seminars despite repeated requests from faculty. (Requests for me to visit to discuss the Vietnam War, John Boyd, and Future War were all denied, not just a request to discuss concerns about FD 2030.) It can’t happen when senior leaders won’t let MCU student seminars have dinner with some of our noted leaders. It can’t happen when Marine Corps Gazette and Proceedings won’t publish our articles. The 38th and 39th commandments have effectively killed the Corps’ intellectual renaissance began by General Al Gray who by the way was appalled by what has happened to our Corps under FD 2030.
Those retired Marines opposed to FD 2030 have decades of combat experience, have led previous major changes in the Corps, are serious students of the profession of arms, and are well aware of new technologies and an evolving battlefield. In comparison to this group, current senior leaders are amateurs and proved it by attempting to implement an operational concept before determining how to logistically support it.
I say this, General.
I’ve followed this site since your first post. What I see now is a lot of noise, few results, and promises without progress. Beyond you and one other general officer, there’s silence. Is this truly the movement you envisioned?
Where is the unity? Where is the momentum? Five years on, there’s more division than direction.
I don’t say this to inflame—but because I care. I want to see more general good will for the Marine Corps. More unity. Less divisiveness. Less echo chamber, more honest debate with purpose. Because if we’re truly fighting for the future of the Corps, we can’t afford to fight each other more than the enemy.
And I will wait for 118 more of these so called retired Generals to publicly back you. Their silence is deafening and questions the validity of your claim.
Im unsure if you are questioning whether I have a list of 112 retired generals opposed to FD 2030 or are looking for 118 others to sign on. I will share it when it best meets Chowder Society II plans. By the way, I thought you opposed anonymous names "corporal."
You’re whistling past the graveyard yard. You continue to use empty words to describe FD. Professionals use concrete items that they can touch and feel.
For instance you continually use nebulous terms such as multi-domain, connectors, MLR, SIF, NEMESIS, sensor node, etc. Not one is a concrete example. Yes, the MLRs and SIFs exist but they’re hollow units with no COMBAT deployable equipment. Empty launchers, no missiles, no emplaced SIF units, no logistical support, etc.
I know you’ll say we just signed an agreement with the Philippines for emplacing a unit on a northern Philippine island, but after 6 years THAT’s all you have, hollow units, no missiles, one island, no clear mission statement, and in six years absolutely no true full unit proof of concept field test.
Every Marine a rifleman is a credo in the Corps, and every Marine officer is trained in the basic concepts of company operations. Ok, put your MLR/SIF units to the test. Let’s have them conduct a CAX-like exercise in WESTPAC, let’s say NTA on Okinawa, or Wild Horse Creek in the Philippines and let’s exercise the entire concept INCLUDING logistics. The logistics pipeline will fail because it doesn’t exist. Then when those units are out of missiles they turn into you guessed it MARINE RIFLEMEN! But you’ll say the logistics part is coming just give us another 10 years, because that’s what the Navy estimates it will take for ship bottoms to sail.
Cpl. I say stick to squad level tactics, and really listen to the 120 Marine general officers who tell you the Corps is in shoal waters.
Just because you don’t understand terms like “multi-domain,” “connector,” “sensor node,” or “MLR” doesn’t make them empty—they’re doctrinal, technical, and operationally defined in Joint pubs, wargames, and acquisition programs. These aren’t buzzwords—they’re part of how modern warfare works.
Also, it’s NMESIS, not “NEMESIS.” If you’re going to critique the concept, at least spell a capability correctly.
Hollow units? False. MLRs are forward-deployed, real units integrating with joint C2, and participating in bilateral exercises across the Indo-Pacific. You’re pointing at evolving capability and declaring it failure because it isn’t 1985 again. That’s not analysis—it’s nostalgia dressed up as critique.
As for your “every Marine a rifleman” jab and CAX challenge: We’ve already seen elements of the concept executed in Balikatan, Resolute Dragon, Noble Fusion, and more. Could we do a fully scaled proof of concept tomorrow? No. That’s why Force Design is phased. No one said this is plug-and-play. FD is pacing against a threat that isn’t waiting for your permission.
Lastly, let’s be honest about the “120 generals” line—it’s inflated, recycled, and mostly includes long-retired voices whose vision was shaped by a different fight. The current CMC, Joint Staff, INDOPACOM, and Congress back FD. That’s not a fringe opinion—it’s the operational direction of the U.S. military.
If you’re still stuck on Cold War metrics, you’re not arguing from strength—you’re arguing from memory.
My response to "Corporal Grable" is buried under an exchange we are engaged in, but I believe it merits sharing with all, so here it is copied below.
My good corporal, you have a very limited view of what members of Chowder Society II are accomplishing. Apparently, you are unaware of meetings our members have recently had in the White House, Pentagon, and on the Hill. These were meetings with principals, not staff. In focusing on comments in Compass Points posts you miss the articles countering FD 2030 signed by numerous retired generals including Sheehan, Krulak, Zinni, Wilhelm, Hagee, Conway, Dake, Howell, Libutti, Knutson, Newbold, Jenkins, Owens, Holcomb, and McAbee. You also miss the fact only one of the former eight commandants supports FD 2030 and that is its originator, the 38th Commandant. You are seemingly unaware that among us are very recently retired Marine generals who witnessed the disaster unfolding from inside, some of whom were sent home early because of the concerns they voiced. As to lack of progress, you actually need to turn to FD 2030 itself; after five years no SIF deployed, in fact no SIFs in existence, no LAWs or LSMs, and no continual deployment of two ARG/MEUs.
You want an open debate but that can’t happen when the most senior leaders in the Corps say, “the retired generals are dead to us.” It can’t happen when these leaders won’t allow me and others to participate as guests in MCU seminars despite repeated requests from faculty. (Requests for me to visit to discuss the Vietnam War, John Boyd, and Future War were all denied, not just a request to discuss concerns about FD 2030.) It can’t happen when senior leaders won’t let MCU student seminars have dinner with some of our noted leaders. It can’t happen when Marine Corps Gazette and Proceedings won’t publish our articles. The 38th and 39th commandments have effectively killed the Corps’ intellectual renaissance began by General Al Gray who by the way was appalled by what has happened to our Corps under FD 2030.
Those retired Marines opposed to FD 2030 have decades of combat experience, have led previous major changes in the Corps, are serious students of the profession of arms, and are well aware of new technologies and an evolving battlefield. In comparison to this group, current senior leaders are amateurs and proved it by attempting to implement an operational concept before determining how to logistically support it.
I’m well aware of your meetings on the Hill and with senior members of the administration—you crow about them constantly. That’s the “smoke and noise.” What’s missing are results—hits. Despite all the articles, letters, and “principals-level” engagements, Force Design continues to move forward with Joint, Congressional, and Combatant Commander support. That’s not theory. That’s progress.
I’ve read the articles signed by the retired generals. Most are dated. Many are published in third-rate outlets with no editorial rigor. You claim Proceedings and Marine Corps Gazette won’t publish your work—frankly, I doubt that. Editorial standards exist for a reason. Even if true, the idea that Real Clear Defense is the only remaining outlet suggests a failure of the argument, not of the platform.
“No one will let us have dinner”? Come on. Let’s not pretend this is about access. The Corps isn’t required to hand a megaphone to those running an openly hostile campaign against its leadership. You speak of an “intellectual renaissance,” yet refuse to acknowledge that your own movement has turned into an echo chamber that increasingly alienates Marines still in the fight.
And maybe—just maybe—the silence you interpret as fear or arrogance is something else entirely: a conscious decision not to engage with those who have abandoned constructive discourse in favor of public character assassination. Your group has not only disagreed—you’ve smeared. You’ve questioned the integrity, competence, and patriotism of serving Marines. You’ve made it personal. You’ve made it bitter. And then you wonder why doors aren’t open?
The real damage Chowder II has done isn’t in its opinions—it’s in the how. The tone, the tactics, the targeting. Because of this maybe you just made yourselves irrelevant to the Marines still out there doing the job.
The fight is not against you—it’s without you. And that’s a decision you earned.
And just to be clear—I’m not Ian. But I’d like to meet him someday, because it’s obvious he’s living rent-free in your head.
"Corporal," you don't know what you don't know, that is obvious. First and foremost, you are unaware that many active duty officers have reached out to us with their own concerns and are asking us to keep up the fight. Second, it is. the senior leaders of the Corps who refused to discuss our concerns and ignored our efforts to engage. It was not like this under previous commandants; the debates over maneuver warfare were heated and widespread and all were engaged. Bottom line, our large and experienced group of retired officers is very much satisfied with its current position, so I'll let your rave on without responding
The CPL continues to shoot the same old blank rounds. In addition, I do not believe the FD2030 assumption that amphibious operations are no longer possible in an environment of short and long range missiles. After Gallipoli, the word was amphibious operations are done; they don’t work; abandon the concept…etc. etc, etc. The US Marine Corps said, wait a minute, let us take a look at this failed operation.
What the Marine Corps concluded was; superiority of Naval Gun Fire is essential for amphibious operations and assault troops were not properly trained for amphibious operations when they stop on the beach to make their morning tea.
Every major amphibious landing in WW2 was accomplished once control of the SLOC was established. The US Army’s initial WW2 amphibious operations in N. Africa demonstrated these lessons learned: “During Operation Torch, air superiority operations were crucial for supporting the Allied landings in North Africa. Allied air forces, including the Royal Air Force (RAF) and United States Army Air Forces (USAAF), focused on gaining control of the airspace to minimize French and German air opposition. This involved attacking airfields, destroying enemy aircraft, and providing air cover for the amphibious forces.”
The Boyd “Theory” and the maneuver warfare concept experienced similar levels of criticism as Gallipoli. The Boyd “apostles” were criticized and in some cases “run out” of DOD and their Service. It took a Marine Division Commander to sit down with a small group of officers (at the O’Club in 1982) to recognize there is something valuable in the concept. He then encouraged this group to continue their research, analysis and discussions. Later that Division Commander became the Commandant and FMFM 1 “Warfighting” became doctrine. Of note, FMFM 1 did not change Marine Corps doctrine but it did enhanced our Amphibious Doctrine.
Warfighting (FMFM 1) was issued in 1989 but there was still questions regarding its implementation. The Marine Corps Command and Staff Class that year, was tasked to work out the concepts. I was a member of that class and I swear, if I had a dollar for every time PKV sent us into the our conference room “Dens” to discuss concepts like “mission orders”, “commander’s intent”, task organization, and other related ideas, I could have retired a rich man.
We are currently watching the next evolution of warfare with the counter missile and drone operations in the Red Sea, Yemen and Israel. Arleigh-Burke destroyers, Naval and Air Force aircraft and Israel’s Iron Dome successful neutralized multiple missile and drone attacks.
FD2030 is not amphibious Doctrine nor does fit with FMFM 1 - Warfighting. Maritime operations to secure SLOC will required the seizure of airbases and the neutralization of enemy bases. Air superiority (including the domain of Space) is the key to the SLOC control. A global war with the CCP will be fought over control of the SLOC. I also believe that aircraft will still remain as the key component to controlling the SLOC.
The blank rounds metaphor is a good one—but I’d argue they’re being fired by those still resisting Force Design. This isn’t a concept stuck in planning slides. It’s happening now. Funding is in place. Capabilities are being fielded. It has support from Congress, combatant commanders, and the Joint Staff. Force Design has moved out. Those who oppose it have yet to cross the line of departure in any meaningful or measurable way.
That said, your historical vignettes were well stated and insightful. They reflect deep institutional memory—something worth respecting. But they also highlight a key point of misunderstanding: a fundamental misreading of what Force Design actually is.
This is not an either-or argument between traditional amphibious operations and Force Design. Both have vital roles in the Marine Corps. Amphibious assault remains a core competency. Force Design does not replace it—it complements it by shaping the battlespace before escalation, enabling access, and preserving options for escalation if needed. It’s not about discarding doctrine—it’s about evolving it to meet the threat.
The Marine Littoral Regiment and related initiatives are not about reacting late—they’re about being in position early, inside contested spaces, actively deterring aggression. This is deterrence through posture, presence, mobility, and resilience. It’s how you avoid a war—or win one faster if deterrence fails.
What would be truly helpful is if Chowder II and its supporters redirected their energy. Instead of trying to fight a battle that has already been lost, help the Commandant restore 3.0 presence. Help the Corps return to forward-postured naval integration and global responsiveness. That’s the fight we all signed up for—and it still matters.
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o7
“Keep fighting. Keep fighting as the 160,000 Allied troops fought on D-Day, June 6, 1944. Whatever the struggle, whatever the challenge, victory may take time. But keep fighting. Have patience. If you are fighting for what is right, never flag or fail. Victory is on the way.”
Speaking of which—see this attached link.
https://news.usni.org/2025/06/05/landing-ship-medium-almost-shovel-ready-congress-quizzes-navy-panel-on-low-fy26-shipbuilding-ask
My friend, the USNI's publications are mouthpieces for the Navy and Marine Corps. Chowder Society II has accidentally released internal documents from the Institute that reveals its prejudices.
As to the LSM (actually an LSV), it is a response to ACMC's reported concern that "we have to get something into the water" after the Navy canceled the LAW and then the real LSM. As you likely know, the LSV is an Army logistics vessel and it is not built to "survivability standards" as all Navy warships are required to be. Yet, the Corps intends for it to operate inside the PLAs WEZ where it argues Navy warships can not safely sail. The whole failed concept is nonsensical to anyone who understand what has happened and continues to happen to a Corps gone astray.