Facts are stubborn things. The 38th Commandant radically reorganized and restructured the Marine Corps from an expeditionary global force in readiness to a toothless regional force in waiting. His ACMC was the biggest cheerleader for the changes. The 39th Commandant doubled-down on the madness. The record is indisputable. Read the 38th and 39th Commandants Planning Guidance, Force Design 2030 and the Force Design 2030 Annual Update of 2022, and the Concept for Stand-in Forces. Today's Corps has no operationally capable MLRs; no armor; no bridging; no instride breaching; no resiliency in infantry, aviation, or amphibious assault vehicles; insufficient cannon artillery and expeditionary logistics; and is inadequately supported by amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships. These are the facts.
The Marine Corps is in a difficult situation--done to itself, of course.
Fearing being just a second Army, it decided to become a second Navy with ground-based anti-ship assets. Yet even as it gutted its ability to fight on land or even fight its way ashore, it has yet to provide survivable anti-ship capabilities that even match what the Navy and Air Force have.
I am concerned with the chatter of firing the CMC. Accountability has the support of us all, I’m sure. But, before we seriously speak of firing our CMC, we probably should have a “come to Jesus meeting” with ourselves, and ask uncomfortable questions regarding the “multitude of sins” that have landed us where we are today. The lack of Amphibs -just in numbers alone, much less needed upgrades - did not come about with the ascent of the General Berger tenure. We might recall the last time the Naval Service embarked a Marine Division was “Operation Steel Pike” in 1965. We have argued for adequate numbers of Amphibs for decades: deaf ears in terms of results. Of course, we deal in new and deadly technologies … but, so did our dad’s and grandpa’s in the 1940’s … anyone recall “Advance Force Operations”? Does the reduced state of Amphibious capability really rest on the shoulders of any one CMC when those who can make a decisive difference wears another uniform, or, a civilian coat & tie? I refer here to any number of SecDef’s, SecNav’s, any number of Senators & Rep’s who could have made a difference, perhaps DOS Statesmen who should know of our numerous NEO’s over the years, and leading
Academic & Intellectuals. So, it seems to me our current status has many fathers rather than a single CMC. If, after due consideration by wiser heads than mine, it is deemed appropriate to move on our CMC, so be it. But, we need to remember our plight has been brought on a multitude of players, and over a very long period of time. The foregoing is offered as food for thought. Semper Fidelis!
The good news is the review discusses the “Good” and the “Disappointing” topics. There is several interesting paragraphs on “indiscriminate weapons” that are “incapable of being directed at specific military objectives” or “of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction“. EMP weapons, for example, targeted at satellites (both military and civilian), and their potential long term lingering radiation.
The review also makes the point that: “While Woomera and the other domain-specific legal manuals all provide helpful advice to practitioners and policy makers, readers always need to be mindful that definitive sounding rules they contain may not reflect their State’s understanding of international law rules. This observation gets to the heart of the nature of international law”... however, “different national communities of international lawyers have different constructs for understanding international law that are believe universality. States, not experts or advocacy organizations, are the relevant agents in international law. Thus, from a government practitioner’s standpoint, a manual’s stated rule is really only a rule when the practitioner’s State acknowledges as much.”
The last sentence of the above quote brings up an interesting issue about the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC). The Laws of War are written to be broad and general in nature and that makes them subjective. They must be subjective because of the needed flexibility to be applied to the infinite number of combat situations that occur at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. This subjective evaluation is the responsibility of the military commander based on their established Rules of Engagement (ROE). I have yet to read a combat ROE that did not establish the LOAC principles of military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and self-defense.
The Laws of War are developed at the negotiation table between states by international law experts. Our “warfighting” generals are not at that the negotiation table and neither are their military lawyers. Our generals will not only defer the responsibility of establishing ROEs to his lawyers but also the subjective evaluation of combat actions. In both the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, we see general officers and their ROEs subjected to critical political and media pressure that result in restrictive interpretations.
Military lawyer’s roots are based on constitutional law and that is very different from the Laws of War. Lawyers are not combat analysis experts and combat does not have the clarity of a civilian traffic accident or “Law and Order” murder cases. The subjective evaluation of the combat actions must be conducted by the commanders that are responsible for the combat operation.
As we sort out strategies for “great power competitions” and military war planning for Air, Land, Sea, Cyber and Space, we can’t miss the “Legal” domain of war. Conflicts are governed by International Laws of War vs US Constructional Law and the US needs to maintain the moral and ethical high ground in any conflict. Unless our military leadership understands the correct application of the Laws of War, our enemies will take advantage at every opportunity.
This isnt about who the current or future CMC is. This is about how the US Navy and MC team definitely need to do a complete relook and strategy related to their Amphibious platform capabilities and numbers. The ARG/MEU is only viable and strategic (to tactically) sound if it can "Land the landing force" in today's threat A2AD environment. In my view we have not looked at the current more dangerous capabilities of our numerous enemies, whether China, VEOs, (Sunni and Shia), Russia, Iran as a nation state and state sponsors of terrorism, nKorea, Transnational Organized Crime/ Transnational Naro Terrorists, or national/ regional threats to our embassies and US nationals abroad. Our enemies are sharing technologies, i.e. drones, IEDs, ASBM, RPV, FAS etc. China, Russia and Iran are sharing the capabilities to kill our fleet before it gets into the AOR. " China's DF-21D is believed to have a range in excess of 1,500 km. The CH-AS-X-13 may have a similar range, or possibly further due to the aerial launch and a hypersonic glide vehicle. Either way, being carried by a bomber will massively increase its overall reach. The H-6N version which carries it has aerial refueling to further increase their range. The CH-AS-X-13 is therefore a threat beyond the first island chain and South China Sea. It could potentially hit targets in the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, or Indian Ocean." Russia's 3M-14 Kalibr/Klub (SS-N-27 “Sizzler”) is the Russian long range short-range ship-, and submarine-launched anti-ship missile.2000 km (1,079.91nm), Iran's latest addition to naval warfare technology, the CM-300 anti-ship cruise missile is designed to strike medium and large warships, the CM-300 has a range capable of reaching up to 300 kilometers, (161.98nm). So our antiquated ideas of being safe at 20+/- nm OTH is no longer viable, or safe for the fleet. What is our Ship to shore capabilities... currently the ACV, which only has an amphibious reach of 12 nmi (14 mi) in water, at a maximum speed of 6 kn (11 km/h). It is too slow and puts our troops in harms way at its most vulnerable point. The ARG/MEU to be our "Pointy end of the spear" needs better stealth, distance and speed capabilities to be a viable option in the current threat world. Our enemies are sharing technologies, and its only a matter of time when the Houthis, Hezbollah, or any other rogue nation or nonstate actor orchestrates a critical direct hit on the ARG/MEU. The enemy watched and learned as we executed DS/DS, AFg and IZ. They will not allow a MPSRON unload in a "safe zone" as we did in Al Jubail KSA. The Marine Corps BLT/MEU is a phenomenal force in readiness... when it can get there. We need the Navy to think well beyond its current ARG capabilities... or our Marines will be "dead in the water" before they enter the AOR! M2
Facts are stubborn things. The 38th Commandant radically reorganized and restructured the Marine Corps from an expeditionary global force in readiness to a toothless regional force in waiting. His ACMC was the biggest cheerleader for the changes. The 39th Commandant doubled-down on the madness. The record is indisputable. Read the 38th and 39th Commandants Planning Guidance, Force Design 2030 and the Force Design 2030 Annual Update of 2022, and the Concept for Stand-in Forces. Today's Corps has no operationally capable MLRs; no armor; no bridging; no instride breaching; no resiliency in infantry, aviation, or amphibious assault vehicles; insufficient cannon artillery and expeditionary logistics; and is inadequately supported by amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships. These are the facts.
The Marine Corps is in a difficult situation--done to itself, of course.
Fearing being just a second Army, it decided to become a second Navy with ground-based anti-ship assets. Yet even as it gutted its ability to fight on land or even fight its way ashore, it has yet to provide survivable anti-ship capabilities that even match what the Navy and Air Force have.
Just what is the USMC mission these days?
I am concerned with the chatter of firing the CMC. Accountability has the support of us all, I’m sure. But, before we seriously speak of firing our CMC, we probably should have a “come to Jesus meeting” with ourselves, and ask uncomfortable questions regarding the “multitude of sins” that have landed us where we are today. The lack of Amphibs -just in numbers alone, much less needed upgrades - did not come about with the ascent of the General Berger tenure. We might recall the last time the Naval Service embarked a Marine Division was “Operation Steel Pike” in 1965. We have argued for adequate numbers of Amphibs for decades: deaf ears in terms of results. Of course, we deal in new and deadly technologies … but, so did our dad’s and grandpa’s in the 1940’s … anyone recall “Advance Force Operations”? Does the reduced state of Amphibious capability really rest on the shoulders of any one CMC when those who can make a decisive difference wears another uniform, or, a civilian coat & tie? I refer here to any number of SecDef’s, SecNav’s, any number of Senators & Rep’s who could have made a difference, perhaps DOS Statesmen who should know of our numerous NEO’s over the years, and leading
Academic & Intellectuals. So, it seems to me our current status has many fathers rather than a single CMC. If, after due consideration by wiser heads than mine, it is deemed appropriate to move on our CMC, so be it. But, we need to remember our plight has been brought on a multitude of players, and over a very long period of time. The foregoing is offered as food for thought. Semper Fidelis!
Very well said, Sir, Semper Fi
I came across this interesting article recently: Ted Richard reviews “The Woomera Manual on the International Law of Military Space Activities and Operations”. https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2025/02/26/ted-richard-reviews-the-woomera-manual-on-the-international-law-of-military-space-activities-and-operations/ This article reminds me that war fighters and planners have two additional domains to consider, Cyber and Space, in addition to Air, Land, and Sea, and maybe another domain.
The good news is the review discusses the “Good” and the “Disappointing” topics. There is several interesting paragraphs on “indiscriminate weapons” that are “incapable of being directed at specific military objectives” or “of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction“. EMP weapons, for example, targeted at satellites (both military and civilian), and their potential long term lingering radiation.
The review also makes the point that: “While Woomera and the other domain-specific legal manuals all provide helpful advice to practitioners and policy makers, readers always need to be mindful that definitive sounding rules they contain may not reflect their State’s understanding of international law rules. This observation gets to the heart of the nature of international law”... however, “different national communities of international lawyers have different constructs for understanding international law that are believe universality. States, not experts or advocacy organizations, are the relevant agents in international law. Thus, from a government practitioner’s standpoint, a manual’s stated rule is really only a rule when the practitioner’s State acknowledges as much.”
The last sentence of the above quote brings up an interesting issue about the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC). The Laws of War are written to be broad and general in nature and that makes them subjective. They must be subjective because of the needed flexibility to be applied to the infinite number of combat situations that occur at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. This subjective evaluation is the responsibility of the military commander based on their established Rules of Engagement (ROE). I have yet to read a combat ROE that did not establish the LOAC principles of military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and self-defense.
The Laws of War are developed at the negotiation table between states by international law experts. Our “warfighting” generals are not at that the negotiation table and neither are their military lawyers. Our generals will not only defer the responsibility of establishing ROEs to his lawyers but also the subjective evaluation of combat actions. In both the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, we see general officers and their ROEs subjected to critical political and media pressure that result in restrictive interpretations.
Military lawyer’s roots are based on constitutional law and that is very different from the Laws of War. Lawyers are not combat analysis experts and combat does not have the clarity of a civilian traffic accident or “Law and Order” murder cases. The subjective evaluation of the combat actions must be conducted by the commanders that are responsible for the combat operation.
As we sort out strategies for “great power competitions” and military war planning for Air, Land, Sea, Cyber and Space, we can’t miss the “Legal” domain of war. Conflicts are governed by International Laws of War vs US Constructional Law and the US needs to maintain the moral and ethical high ground in any conflict. Unless our military leadership understands the correct application of the Laws of War, our enemies will take advantage at every opportunity.
In addition to Phelan the Undersecretary of the Department of the “Marine Corps/Navy” will be Captain USN Hung Cao Ret. .
This isnt about who the current or future CMC is. This is about how the US Navy and MC team definitely need to do a complete relook and strategy related to their Amphibious platform capabilities and numbers. The ARG/MEU is only viable and strategic (to tactically) sound if it can "Land the landing force" in today's threat A2AD environment. In my view we have not looked at the current more dangerous capabilities of our numerous enemies, whether China, VEOs, (Sunni and Shia), Russia, Iran as a nation state and state sponsors of terrorism, nKorea, Transnational Organized Crime/ Transnational Naro Terrorists, or national/ regional threats to our embassies and US nationals abroad. Our enemies are sharing technologies, i.e. drones, IEDs, ASBM, RPV, FAS etc. China, Russia and Iran are sharing the capabilities to kill our fleet before it gets into the AOR. " China's DF-21D is believed to have a range in excess of 1,500 km. The CH-AS-X-13 may have a similar range, or possibly further due to the aerial launch and a hypersonic glide vehicle. Either way, being carried by a bomber will massively increase its overall reach. The H-6N version which carries it has aerial refueling to further increase their range. The CH-AS-X-13 is therefore a threat beyond the first island chain and South China Sea. It could potentially hit targets in the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, or Indian Ocean." Russia's 3M-14 Kalibr/Klub (SS-N-27 “Sizzler”) is the Russian long range short-range ship-, and submarine-launched anti-ship missile.2000 km (1,079.91nm), Iran's latest addition to naval warfare technology, the CM-300 anti-ship cruise missile is designed to strike medium and large warships, the CM-300 has a range capable of reaching up to 300 kilometers, (161.98nm). So our antiquated ideas of being safe at 20+/- nm OTH is no longer viable, or safe for the fleet. What is our Ship to shore capabilities... currently the ACV, which only has an amphibious reach of 12 nmi (14 mi) in water, at a maximum speed of 6 kn (11 km/h). It is too slow and puts our troops in harms way at its most vulnerable point. The ARG/MEU to be our "Pointy end of the spear" needs better stealth, distance and speed capabilities to be a viable option in the current threat world. Our enemies are sharing technologies, and its only a matter of time when the Houthis, Hezbollah, or any other rogue nation or nonstate actor orchestrates a critical direct hit on the ARG/MEU. The enemy watched and learned as we executed DS/DS, AFg and IZ. They will not allow a MPSRON unload in a "safe zone" as we did in Al Jubail KSA. The Marine Corps BLT/MEU is a phenomenal force in readiness... when it can get there. We need the Navy to think well beyond its current ARG capabilities... or our Marines will be "dead in the water" before they enter the AOR! M2
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/11/chinas-new-aircraft-carrier-killer-is-worlds-largest-air-launched-missile/
https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/russia/
https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2024/focus-iranian-military-new-cm-300-anti-ship-missile-a-regional-power-shift#:~:text=Iran%20has%20introduced%20its%20latest%20addition%20to%20naval,borders%20and%20enhancing%20its%20strategic%20capabilities%20at%20sea.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amphibious_Combat_Vehicle
Please review
https://substack.com/home/post/p-158088904
For an in depth view of the current Marine Corps configuration