Logistics runs a long trail from the resupply of ammunition on the FLOT all the way back to an industrial base that can
Produce and store the required assets for a long war with a peer competitor. To some extent DoD became enamored with just in time logistics so popular in civilian industry. COVID shot that full of holes.
The warehouse needs to make a comeback.
As weapons become increasingly sophisticated it takes longer to make them, longer to train people to maintain and operate them. We are talking about many months and often many years. If we compare production time and personnel training time ( not to even discuss collective training time) the time has increased ten fold. This tells even the village idiot that you need a deeper bench. The demand for expensive simulators grows greater.
Currently, in a “come as you are” war the US will be out of Schlitz very quickly. Not only are we too small, we could not replace losses or expenditures. While most human endeavors strive to be efficient, war requires effective. You can bet that the Chinese have done the math when we we run out of weapons platforms, ammunition and trained people.
Stalin made exactly these calculations vs Germany. If he needed five Soviet Divisions to destroy one German Division his math was simple. Attrition is math. After Hitler bogged down on the outskirts of Moscow his intelligence experts calculated that the Soviets would be able to put over 300 Divisions into the fight by spring. This exceeded the numbers destroyed July through December 1941. In fact the Soviets started to counterattack by Christmas and put 326 Divisions into play before spring.
If the Corps made the decision to modernize and reconstitute three MEF’s tomorrow I can not even estimate the time, cost and personnel training requirements before you could even consider collective unit training and exercises. It will be a multi year effort. Gen Berger’s damage to the Corps was significant and long term. Every day wasted to begin to rebuild and modernize is a direct threat to the very relevance of the Corps. I am not sure when we will reach rock bottom but both the Russians and Chinese are doing those calculations today. We are not.
Doug, you hit the nail right on the head with the statement: "Gen. Berger's damage to the Corps was significant and long term." The question now is: when will the rebuilding of our Corps begin?
I don’t know why the leadership has not seen the light and acted accordingly. I can only ascribe it to stubborn egos. It is not responsible leadership.
I honestly don't know if they want to see the light. Gen. Van Ripper had a good answer, and he can explain it better than I. But their logic makes no sense. I don't agree with this, but if they just maintained the one regiment in the Pac. as a missile force, maybe I could understand. But they eliminated the whole logic of the Marine Corps as a crisis reaction force. This is very frustrating to understand.
The need for more and better equipment is not limited to missiles and is not limited to the US Navy. Not only does the Navy need more missiles, it needs more ships, subs, aircraft, and much more.
The Navy is having trouble recruiting. And they send ships out with 75-80% manning. The Navy needs to take a HARD look at all the shore billets. I would be willing to bet that a good 25-30% of the Navy is in shore-based commands (excluding aviation units and SEALs).
The Navy no longer has the giant repair shops where sailors learned advanceds skills ashore (motor rewind, valve rebuild, machining) having given those jobs up to civilians and contractors. So what exactly are they doing ashore? Filling a billet in one of the 223 Admirals the Navy currently has?
The have damned near an Admiral for every ship in the Fleet.
We have become unserious as a Corps. We have allowed dreamers to inhabit the oldest standing structure in Washington DC. They have been allowed to ignore reality, and in doing so, diminished the essence of the Marine Corps ability to quickly and effectively move (note, one might add efficiently) to a combat conflict or even a humanitarian crisis. Bedrock of the Corps capability and value to the Nation and by the way mandated by stature in Title X of the US Code, is the requirement to locate, close with and destroy the enemy, et al, to be the 911 force that can immediately respond to a crisis when the Nation calls. Thus when Captains Hendrix and Brent (USN retired) call for a one on one review of all Navy three and four star admirals, the same must be done with the 3 and 4 star Generals in the Corps. In fact it should go further, any and all general officers in the Corps need the same one on one treatment. Not sure how it works in the military world today, but if "deep selection" is still around than it ought be used RUTHLESSLY to remove general officers currently serving, but not qualified, and bring up hard hitting no nonsense colonels that have had it with the BS and want to get the Corps back into fighting shape and all that entails. No doubt there are 05's and 06's out there that are very qualified, but their heads are down, and who can blame them to a degree. To a degree.
Secretary of the Navy James Webb, could have gone along to get along, but decided to take a different path in selecting and pushing the appointment to CMC of Alfred M. Grey, it was somewhat controversial as a pick and it ruffled feathers. It also put the Corps on a course that would by all accounts reshape, or rather remind and codify what the war fighting capability of the Corps needed to be. The rest is history. Fast forward to the last 5 years. We have had a CMC ignore reality, divest the Corps of vital assets, depleted war fighting inventory, and pass the baton to the current CMC to finish the job of reducing the Corps to a marching band and pretty parade units outside his office window. (They literally couldn't even come up with a new and acceptable PT uniform, a rather mundane and basic task one would think)That would be bad enough but another USMC four star general in charge of a command, was so deficient in his regard to the situation in Afghanistan that he allowed and then conducted one of the biggest military defeats in detail to occur under his watch, which by the way led to 11 Marines, 1 US Army soldier, and Navy sailor to be killed as well as many Marine WIA. Negligence and dereliction of duty come to mind. But, that General officer to this day refuses to take legitimate responsibility for the failures that led to the NEO, and its conduct in terms of preparation. Once on the ground at HKIA, the Marines conducted an operation of Herculean scale, and mission success.
If one wants to be considered serious, they need to be so. If the Corps wants to be serious, it needs to be so. Equipment can be gathered up, ships built, armor found, tubes and aircraft reconstituted, but war fighting ethos is another matter, it is not natural and needs to be taught and nurtured and needs to reinforced daily, like PT, early and often. That comes from pure unadulterated leadership. Isn't is sad commentary we have had to rely on those men who have led from the front in the matter of debunking FD2030, who have already made their bones to come back and pick up the Chowder Society II GuideOn, and fight another "war' to save the Corps. Well as General Wilson said on the day he became CMC, "Marines get in step behind me and do so smartly." Aye aye. Get in line behind them and do so smartly.
Remarks regarding pre-WW2 War Plans and War Gaming: “The famous remark by Admiral Chester Nimitz (who in 1923 had studied under War College President Clarence Williams, one of the finest strategist of the century) that the war unfolded just as predicted in naval war games applied to plans as well.” (War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to defeat Japan 1897-1945 by Edward S. Miller, p. 2)
Because “geography is the bones of strategy” War Plan Orange (war in the Pacific) defaulted to the US Navy. The Naval strategist at the Naval War College were given the independence needed to test new tactics and find solutions to new problems. This allowed the War College and the “Fleet” to pass operational problems and tested solutions between the operational Navy’s leaders and its school house. The US Navy War College also enabled the developed of a set of strategically savvy leaders like Admiral Nimitz.
As an example, one set of new problems was presented by the “Aircraft Carrier”. Naval leaders learned that they needed procedures to quickly launch and recover aircraft. They also needed to maximize the number of aircraft carried. US carriers did carry more aircraft than the Japanese carriers and provided a numerical advance in the early carrier battles. In addition, the carrier flight deck vulnerability to bomb damage meant it would need to be repaired while still at sea. They also learned that the US aircraft industry could provide the planes needed to replace losses. The long tent pole, however, would be replacing trained pilots. The Japanese missed this lesson and developed shortages of trained and experienced pilots early in the war.
The Plan Orange assumptions that the US Naval leadership made were remarkably accurate. They realized that the plan had to be strategically offensive in nature. Advance bases for operations and logistical support would need to be seized and SLOCs secured. Despite this assumption, they realized that Phase I of the war: ‘Japan would seize the lightly defended American outposts and assure itself of access to oil and raw materials of territories to the south and west.”
“Phase II, Blue expeditions spearheaded by superior naval and air power would steam westward. Intense but small-scale battles would procure Japanese islands of the central Pacific. Advanced naval and air bases would be established and supply lines secured…A progressively tightening blockade would sever Japanese ocean trade.”
Phase III “Japan’s insularity would prove fatal. American forces would advance northward through islands paralleling the coast of Asia to establish new bases for economic warfare. They would choke off all of Japan’s imports and ravage its industries and cities by air bombardment until it sued for peace, even though its proud army stood intact in the home islands and in China.”(p.4)
The point here is the superior planning of pre-WW2 Plan Orange. In addition, the War Plan was driving experimentation. Compared to FD2030, where experimentation seems to be driving the war plan as in “the tail is wagging the dog”. S/F
Good discussion. I am left pondering..."How do we identify who to dump and who to elevate? What marks a Fredendall versus a Gavin? There's an aspect of 'why didn't Lincoln pick Grant sooner?' inherent in this topic. To be more succinct in summary, what seperates the wheat from the chaff and when can one identify it?".
Logistics runs a long trail from the resupply of ammunition on the FLOT all the way back to an industrial base that can
Produce and store the required assets for a long war with a peer competitor. To some extent DoD became enamored with just in time logistics so popular in civilian industry. COVID shot that full of holes.
The warehouse needs to make a comeback.
As weapons become increasingly sophisticated it takes longer to make them, longer to train people to maintain and operate them. We are talking about many months and often many years. If we compare production time and personnel training time ( not to even discuss collective training time) the time has increased ten fold. This tells even the village idiot that you need a deeper bench. The demand for expensive simulators grows greater.
Currently, in a “come as you are” war the US will be out of Schlitz very quickly. Not only are we too small, we could not replace losses or expenditures. While most human endeavors strive to be efficient, war requires effective. You can bet that the Chinese have done the math when we we run out of weapons platforms, ammunition and trained people.
Stalin made exactly these calculations vs Germany. If he needed five Soviet Divisions to destroy one German Division his math was simple. Attrition is math. After Hitler bogged down on the outskirts of Moscow his intelligence experts calculated that the Soviets would be able to put over 300 Divisions into the fight by spring. This exceeded the numbers destroyed July through December 1941. In fact the Soviets started to counterattack by Christmas and put 326 Divisions into play before spring.
If the Corps made the decision to modernize and reconstitute three MEF’s tomorrow I can not even estimate the time, cost and personnel training requirements before you could even consider collective unit training and exercises. It will be a multi year effort. Gen Berger’s damage to the Corps was significant and long term. Every day wasted to begin to rebuild and modernize is a direct threat to the very relevance of the Corps. I am not sure when we will reach rock bottom but both the Russians and Chinese are doing those calculations today. We are not.
Doug, you hit the nail right on the head with the statement: "Gen. Berger's damage to the Corps was significant and long term." The question now is: when will the rebuilding of our Corps begin?
I don’t know why the leadership has not seen the light and acted accordingly. I can only ascribe it to stubborn egos. It is not responsible leadership.
I honestly don't know if they want to see the light. Gen. Van Ripper had a good answer, and he can explain it better than I. But their logic makes no sense. I don't agree with this, but if they just maintained the one regiment in the Pac. as a missile force, maybe I could understand. But they eliminated the whole logic of the Marine Corps as a crisis reaction force. This is very frustrating to understand.
The need for more and better equipment is not limited to missiles and is not limited to the US Navy. Not only does the Navy need more missiles, it needs more ships, subs, aircraft, and much more.
The Navy is having trouble recruiting. And they send ships out with 75-80% manning. The Navy needs to take a HARD look at all the shore billets. I would be willing to bet that a good 25-30% of the Navy is in shore-based commands (excluding aviation units and SEALs).
The Navy no longer has the giant repair shops where sailors learned advanceds skills ashore (motor rewind, valve rebuild, machining) having given those jobs up to civilians and contractors. So what exactly are they doing ashore? Filling a billet in one of the 223 Admirals the Navy currently has?
The have damned near an Admiral for every ship in the Fleet.
We have become unserious as a Corps. We have allowed dreamers to inhabit the oldest standing structure in Washington DC. They have been allowed to ignore reality, and in doing so, diminished the essence of the Marine Corps ability to quickly and effectively move (note, one might add efficiently) to a combat conflict or even a humanitarian crisis. Bedrock of the Corps capability and value to the Nation and by the way mandated by stature in Title X of the US Code, is the requirement to locate, close with and destroy the enemy, et al, to be the 911 force that can immediately respond to a crisis when the Nation calls. Thus when Captains Hendrix and Brent (USN retired) call for a one on one review of all Navy three and four star admirals, the same must be done with the 3 and 4 star Generals in the Corps. In fact it should go further, any and all general officers in the Corps need the same one on one treatment. Not sure how it works in the military world today, but if "deep selection" is still around than it ought be used RUTHLESSLY to remove general officers currently serving, but not qualified, and bring up hard hitting no nonsense colonels that have had it with the BS and want to get the Corps back into fighting shape and all that entails. No doubt there are 05's and 06's out there that are very qualified, but their heads are down, and who can blame them to a degree. To a degree.
Secretary of the Navy James Webb, could have gone along to get along, but decided to take a different path in selecting and pushing the appointment to CMC of Alfred M. Grey, it was somewhat controversial as a pick and it ruffled feathers. It also put the Corps on a course that would by all accounts reshape, or rather remind and codify what the war fighting capability of the Corps needed to be. The rest is history. Fast forward to the last 5 years. We have had a CMC ignore reality, divest the Corps of vital assets, depleted war fighting inventory, and pass the baton to the current CMC to finish the job of reducing the Corps to a marching band and pretty parade units outside his office window. (They literally couldn't even come up with a new and acceptable PT uniform, a rather mundane and basic task one would think)That would be bad enough but another USMC four star general in charge of a command, was so deficient in his regard to the situation in Afghanistan that he allowed and then conducted one of the biggest military defeats in detail to occur under his watch, which by the way led to 11 Marines, 1 US Army soldier, and Navy sailor to be killed as well as many Marine WIA. Negligence and dereliction of duty come to mind. But, that General officer to this day refuses to take legitimate responsibility for the failures that led to the NEO, and its conduct in terms of preparation. Once on the ground at HKIA, the Marines conducted an operation of Herculean scale, and mission success.
If one wants to be considered serious, they need to be so. If the Corps wants to be serious, it needs to be so. Equipment can be gathered up, ships built, armor found, tubes and aircraft reconstituted, but war fighting ethos is another matter, it is not natural and needs to be taught and nurtured and needs to reinforced daily, like PT, early and often. That comes from pure unadulterated leadership. Isn't is sad commentary we have had to rely on those men who have led from the front in the matter of debunking FD2030, who have already made their bones to come back and pick up the Chowder Society II GuideOn, and fight another "war' to save the Corps. Well as General Wilson said on the day he became CMC, "Marines get in step behind me and do so smartly." Aye aye. Get in line behind them and do so smartly.
Outstanding post! Semper Fi!
Remarks regarding pre-WW2 War Plans and War Gaming: “The famous remark by Admiral Chester Nimitz (who in 1923 had studied under War College President Clarence Williams, one of the finest strategist of the century) that the war unfolded just as predicted in naval war games applied to plans as well.” (War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to defeat Japan 1897-1945 by Edward S. Miller, p. 2)
Because “geography is the bones of strategy” War Plan Orange (war in the Pacific) defaulted to the US Navy. The Naval strategist at the Naval War College were given the independence needed to test new tactics and find solutions to new problems. This allowed the War College and the “Fleet” to pass operational problems and tested solutions between the operational Navy’s leaders and its school house. The US Navy War College also enabled the developed of a set of strategically savvy leaders like Admiral Nimitz.
As an example, one set of new problems was presented by the “Aircraft Carrier”. Naval leaders learned that they needed procedures to quickly launch and recover aircraft. They also needed to maximize the number of aircraft carried. US carriers did carry more aircraft than the Japanese carriers and provided a numerical advance in the early carrier battles. In addition, the carrier flight deck vulnerability to bomb damage meant it would need to be repaired while still at sea. They also learned that the US aircraft industry could provide the planes needed to replace losses. The long tent pole, however, would be replacing trained pilots. The Japanese missed this lesson and developed shortages of trained and experienced pilots early in the war.
The Plan Orange assumptions that the US Naval leadership made were remarkably accurate. They realized that the plan had to be strategically offensive in nature. Advance bases for operations and logistical support would need to be seized and SLOCs secured. Despite this assumption, they realized that Phase I of the war: ‘Japan would seize the lightly defended American outposts and assure itself of access to oil and raw materials of territories to the south and west.”
“Phase II, Blue expeditions spearheaded by superior naval and air power would steam westward. Intense but small-scale battles would procure Japanese islands of the central Pacific. Advanced naval and air bases would be established and supply lines secured…A progressively tightening blockade would sever Japanese ocean trade.”
Phase III “Japan’s insularity would prove fatal. American forces would advance northward through islands paralleling the coast of Asia to establish new bases for economic warfare. They would choke off all of Japan’s imports and ravage its industries and cities by air bombardment until it sued for peace, even though its proud army stood intact in the home islands and in China.”(p.4)
The point here is the superior planning of pre-WW2 Plan Orange. In addition, the War Plan was driving experimentation. Compared to FD2030, where experimentation seems to be driving the war plan as in “the tail is wagging the dog”. S/F
Good discussion. I am left pondering..."How do we identify who to dump and who to elevate? What marks a Fredendall versus a Gavin? There's an aspect of 'why didn't Lincoln pick Grant sooner?' inherent in this topic. To be more succinct in summary, what seperates the wheat from the chaff and when can one identify it?".
VISION 2035 must be implemented to undo the damage by FD2030 and to restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities!