The Marine Corps is not "stuck" with Force Design. The Commandant, using his Title X authority to "organize, train, and equip" the Service, could change course today by simply adopting a better capstone operating concept for the Corps. Fielding new capabilities woukd take time, probably years but the vector could be changed with the stroke of a pen. Vision 2035 offers the Marine Corps the intellectual foundation for a better way forward. The failure to change course and to instead continue down the FD rabbit hole can be hung on only one person - - the Commandant.
The CMC needs to see the "big picture." He needs to see/ understand that this narrow minded thinking jeopardizes the Nation, since we now do not have a credible and robust force in readiness.
Does he? CMC sees what he wants. Gen Smith was 8th RCT CO in Afghanistan a few years ago. Gen Berger was 8th RCT CO in Iraq a few years before that. They decided on their COA come hell or high water. They are not stupid men. It would be interesting to hear from the constellation of stars that met with Gen Smith not long ago about any feedback he (or the straphangers) had for them. Something doesn't quite add up. (We have the most difficult mission: to pursue relevant change for our Marine Corps without undermining that seat. Whether I admire the occupant or not...that seat is important.)
Reportedly 7 of the 8 former CMCs were opposed to Force Design 2030 at the meeting. CMC appeared to listen to the concerns of these 7, however, my understanding is he did not share with them the fact he had written his CPG and would issue it in just a few days after that meeting. That CPG is clearly more of the same Force Design minus the "2030" as the critiques posted on Compass Points illustrated. My guess is there is little likelihood of further meetings as CMC appears to be following in the footsteps of his predecessor. We can only hope members of Congress see the loss of operational capabilities and demand the Corps fulfill its Title 10 mandates.
Thank you sir. Unfortunate that it sounds very perfunctory. I wonder if General Smith was checking his watch (or aide) 8 and a half minutes into the session. More unfortunate that there seems to be nothing more in response to the concerns beyond 'we are going this way because this is the way we are going'. I would imagine the PR and Info Ops staff would see the value in, at the least, making an effort demonstrate some mutual ground with the block of former CMC's, if only to say 'we understand the concerns and are making efforts to keep the former CMCs abreast of key progress and capability demonstrations'. Hopefully, the Force Design Gift Bags for the attendees were nice.
As an aside, I wonder where our retired senior Sgt's Maj and Master Guns' are at? Can't imagine they are too happy at the loss of capability either.
This article (and many others) correctly describe the "close fight" of resisting the stubbornness associated with the current misguided redesign of the USMC force structure. The "deep fight" isn't talked about much. That is the need for another congressional "roles and missions" law. Roles and missions law was passed in 1949. I think it's about time we revisited the issue. The lack of contemporary clarity has developed into what I think has become a diffusion of USMC focus. I can't for the life of me figure out how the current leadership can think that defense of islands not associated with Naval Bases, and/or becoming a reconnaissance tripwire for the Joint Forces can be interpreted from USMC roles and missions.
The only thing worse than old, dated or not, roles and missions would be new, overcome by events, roles and missions.
I am always conflicted on this....updating the roles can easily backfire. Especially in the current political environment; we are more likely to end up with an ugly 3 headed dog of a mission set. And there is a possibility that the updated role that gets passed into law is just copy and pasted from the FD 2030 original document; now you have to live with it. I remember when we were updating METLS in the mid '00s. I watched the Artillery Community jam a provisional mission into their new METLs. It wasn't the win they thought it would be. My community had a brief discussion about it; talking it through to it's obvious conclusion, we felt there were much better ways to shoot ourselves in the foot. Or another way of putting it, building a box to trap someone else tends to be inconvenient the second you are forced to live in it. I'm a duty, honor guy who always appreciated when ambiguity over some matter gave me the room to achieve the mission in a better way.
I think the better fight is the long range one; continue to mentor the 'Corps to seek relevant capability and demonstrate that capability and relevance. Continue to mentor Congress to ask good questions. After all, 1949 was built on a decade of demonstration by the USMC.
I completely understand your concern. I have two slightly different takes that are in no way trying to convince you not to be concerned. First is that it appears to me we are "stuck" with FD2030 as the leadership appears intransigent. 2nd is that it's the job of congress to sort out this stuff. Yes they may not get it right but we have way more influence in that arena than we appear to have with the current crop of 4 stars. At least there would be a debate in that arena where we appear to be getting "censored" in USMC circles. There are risks in any direction taken to correct a misguided force structure.
Thank you; I appreciate the thoughtful reply. I do agree with you in part. It's just that I see the best solution (and a credible solution) between somewhat generational when reality and the Officers/SNCOs start 'fixing' everything wrong with FD (2030). It won't be quick, it's not satisfying, and it's painful in wartime, but I've seen the 'ooze' method work wonderfully at healing damage. And even the current 4 stars will eventually pass through the beast. I anticipate we will see a correction / over correction at some point.
I'm also leery of Congress right now since half the Marines in the Capital are vocal advocates of Force Design since they've all read a review of 'Kill Chain' and think anything prior to 2020 is out of date;) You are right though; the only way to help Congress is to engage with Congress...as you say: " it's the job of congress to sort out this stuff". I guess we'll just have to keep working at it from all angles. Semper Fi.
And accepting responsibility and WELCOMING accountability is what adult leaders do. I and many of my peers feel let down by current senior leaders who have not found a way to call for an accounting. If there is a sound basis for decisions taken re FD 2030 then a defense and justification would have been presented years ago. CMC and his supporters may be true believers but they have not made their case and at this late date that fact alone undermines confidence in their leadership. But perhaps we old guys were shaped by leaders who could anticipate the reaction to changes and act promptly and sometimes bluntly to demonstrate the value of their decisions.
The comments and critique in both articles give food for thought. I see the common issue is one of clarity of purpose. Is the USMC organized to do a job it a) can choose to do given an existing mission or b) will likely be asked to do?
A recent article in the Gazette came at this from a different, but pertinent angle. Col G.J. David, USMC, in his article "Units of Action" (https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/units-of-action/) looked at the 'Corps' ability from a more favorable perspective with regards to the objectives of Force Design (2030). His commentary is reasoned and worth considering as we all advocate for a relevant and capable USMC. Col David writes: "The Marine Corps requires a clarifying review to connect its operating concepts based on current events to its force capabilities.". He follows in his conclusion with "If the Service seeks to alter course to achieve its SIF and RXR vision, then it will have to find a way to make culture-adjusting investments in ISR and intelligence immediately.". For his part, as least with respect to the implementing SIF and fighting the RXR fight integrated with the fleet and Joint Force, he also sees shortfalls and a need to get on the rails. For awareness, "Col David is the Deputy Director for Intelligence Division under the Deputy Commandant for Information/Director of Intelligence.".
ISR is a huge part of the Force's conceptual 'Graphic User Interface', and whether we get the modern, Global Enhanced Combined Arms Team or the Force Design Team, his comments with respect to ISR and RXR are relevant and add to the discussion opened in the article.
I prefer the bluntness of Mr. Anderson. I recall being a young Lieutenant at TBS. I had a clear notion of how I could best serve our Corps and country and where. I was corrected of that notion “bluntly”. I was not the one to decide, it was the Corps and country I served that would decide. Congress informed us of our mission years ago and did not change it. It was a small cadre of leadership that made that decision that brought us to today. Hopefully Congress will correct this soon.
"A new Congressional Research Service report brings harsh scrutiny to the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, with many in Congress and the Department of Defense reportedly having buyer’s remorse. What they thought was a modernization effort has rapidly become an embarrassment — with the Marine Corps’ preparedness hanging in the balance."
"Interestingly, independent war-games conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies have determined that Force Design would be of marginal use in a war with China over Taiwan. Despite these lackluster findings, Berger’s successor, Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Eric Smith has doubled down on Force Design. Smith’s steadfast devotion to Force Design ignores the advice from all eight of his and Berger’s living predecessors, as well as the former four-star Marine Corps theater commanders."
Slowly, the powers that be are coming around to the fact that FD2030, or whatever they are calling it these days, is a dismal failure and brings nothing to the table.
The "American Spectator" is a conservative publication. Gary Anderson's conservative politics are barely congealed and are unfortunately published in Compass Points. The FD 2030 fiasco was well underway in 2019 before President Biden was inaugurated on 2021. In fact, Gen. Berger was selected to be CMC in 2019 while Donald Trump was President. It is noteworthy that both Gen. Kelly and Gen. Mattis were highly influential members of the Trump Administration at the time of Gen, Berger's selection to be CMC. Surely they had opinions about his selection.
Once the outline of FD 2030 became public with its divest to invest policy there was immediate pushback that was subtle and not so subtle. Former ACMC, Gen. Dake, who flew the Ch-53 in Vietnam, stated the divest to invest would "cripple" USMC aviation as one opposing example. The annual Aviation Plan was not published for 2 years until Lt.Gen Wise released it in 2022. The delay being a form of pushback. The plan clearly stated aviation assets were being reduced without a reduction in commitments. Then Wise retired for obvious reasons.
Toward the end of his 4 years as CMC, Gen. Berger was being actively considered to become the next Chairman of the JCS. It can be inferred he was not selected by President Biden to be the JCS Chairman because of the public controversy over FD 2030. Regardless, it is a huge stretch of political misinformation to call President Biden incompetent because of a program initiated 2 years before Biden became President. Biden did not select him to be CMC, nor did he select Berger to be JCS Chairman.
Possibly Col. Anderson is not aware of the fact that retired regular officers are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice FOR LIFE. Regular officers better be aware of that fact should Trump win the election. My impression of him is he would not like a senior officer calling him incompetent.
Sir, You are correct to point out that the 38th CMC served about 19 months under a Republican administration and the remainder of his 4 years under a Democratic administration. Personally, I doubt either commander in chief was ever made personally aware of what the 38th CMC did to the Corps. Those of us who identify as members of Chowder Society II have varying and opposing political views; we do not consider them relevant to the loss of the Corps' operational capabilities, which we are seeking to have restored in a modernized form. I can assure you that neither of the two 4-star Marine Corps generals you mention in any way support what Force Design 2030 did to our Corps. I am fairly certain the general in position to do so made a different recommendation for CMC than the one selected and confirmed. S/F PKVR
Good Sir, let me be clear, I place the blame for the FD 2030 fiasco squarely on the shoulders of Gen. Berger and his senior Marine officers who do not speak out. Where I take exception is Compass Points publishing the inappropriate political views of Gary Anderson published in a politically conservative media that lays the blame squarely for FD 2030 on the Commander-in-Chief. I agree fully with you that it is highly unlikely that neither Trump nor Biden had any idea, or concerns, about the implications and disaster that FD 2030 would cause the Marine Corps. The question becomes, why was FD 2030, now simply Force Design, allowed to proceed in the manner it has? In my humble opinion, FD 2030 and Force Design have been allowed to continue without question because it was being done by United States Marines. I believe the historical reputation of excellence of military service by the Marines of the past is why FD 2030 was allowed to proceed without question. If the Marines are doing it, it must be good. It was the history of Marine Corps excellence, and their personal histories, that led to Gen. Kelley and Gen. Mattis selection for service in the previous administration. Especially significant is the fact Gen. Mattis's appointment required special congressional approval. Finally, please know, anytime something is published in Compass Points that I believe is inappropriate such as the Anderson article, I will continue to speak out. In doing so I am supporting your goal "for a stronger Marine Corps." SF
Sir, Why Berger did what he did is simply inexplicable. How he was able to do so is perhaps explainable by the fact he served under 7 Secretaries of the Navy and 5 Secretaries of defense for those billets became musical chairs in the latter stages of the second administration under which he served; no one was "watching the store." As to Congressional oversight, much of what he did was at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic and Congress was consumed by that and impeachment hearings. And, as you note, a big part of his success came because he was trading on the reputations of those who went before--if a Marine said something it was seldom questioned because of the reputation of stalwarts such as Generals Chapman, Wilson, Barrow, and Gray. Though I didn't interpret Gary's remarks as negatively as you did, I commend you for speaking out and holding Compass Points' staff to a non-political standard. Finally, though our goals are virtually the same and much of what we do is reported on by Compass Points, the Editor and Publisher are not behold to Chowder Society II members and on occasion posts things we wish they had not.
WHOA! …there Col Whitner. Recommend you take that threating finger pointing at a fellow Marine Officer, click it on safe, and put back in your holster. Seems you have a personal vs a professional issue with the author. Col Anderson’s article addresses the findings of the “Congressional Research Service report brings harsh scrutiny to the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, with many in Congress and the Department of Defense”. His article may have appeared in a “conservative” (but respected) publication but it certainly does not rate a “subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice FOR LIFE” response. What are you thinking here Col, NJP or Court Martial?
The justification for FD first went public in the Marine Gazette in the Feb 2019 article “Forward To a New Naval Future” https://archive.mca-marines.org/publications/forward-to-a-new-naval-future/ . Great article and well written. This article also states the clear threat of A2/AD, “The A2/AD threat has led to questions about whether or not amphibious assault operations are even feasible and, by inference, the necessity of the Marine Corps.” Yes, that problem requires looking into the future and experimenting with solutions. In my opinion Commandant Berger “jumped the gun” by reorganizing and reducing lethality to experiment. In addition, there was some implied defense of FD2030 criticism with “sit down and shut up, this is how it is going to be”. Three years later we are witnessing the counter to A2/AD missiles with Israel’s Iron Dome, the US Army’s MDTF, and the US Navy’s Alleigh-Burk Destroyers anti-missile capability. Yep, that darn warfare has changed again requiring new tactics and technology. In my mind the problem with amphibious assaults is the same as WW2. They are best conducted after you establish air superiority and secure the SLOC. CCP just added another domain of A2/AD in order to secure the SLOC. In light of the fact we have a reduced air capability and an MLR (x3) with no long range anti-ship missiles and no way to sustain our MLR Marines, General Berger's "experiment" ain't looking good. S/F
Polar Bear, I agreed with the Anderson article unril the end when he declared the President incompetent. That is a red line with me no matter who the President is. I then researched the American Spectator. It is termed a ^conservative^ publication. That connotation or a ^liberal^ tag infers a political bias. In the current 2024 campaign one of the candidates plans to arrest and jail opponents. The spectre of the UCMJ for life could be a problem for any regular officer that candidate doesnt like. Finally, my name is spelled ^Whitener.^
Apologies for the misspelling there is no disrespect intended. I really don’t care if a pub is liberal or conservative. I feel everyone is free to express their opinion and we certainly want to hear those opinions and ideas here on CP.
Yes, General Berger started his initiative two years before the current administration took over. However, it really didn’t start to go public until Feb 2019 with the MC Gazette article: “Forward To a New Naval Future”. The next announcement was “tanks” are gone with a lot of other “combat power” before the experiment.
I certainly recognize the need for a Commandant to experiment. I remember the story I heard about Smedley Butler bringing a “swamp vehicle” to the San Diego Marine Barracks to test. His experiment later turned into wartime battalions of amphibious assault vehicles. Regardless of the when or how, General Berger is responsible for FD2030 and General Smith has adopted that responsibility. I have stated before on CP that I wonder if General Smith is now standing in a dry corner with a wet paint brush. My concern is that General Berger made the decision to reduce combat power before experimentation.
I also understand that politics is in the “generals” lane as it relates to military affairs. General Berger, the SECDEF, and the CNO had to testify before the Armed Forces Committee regarding why the amphibious shipbuilding plan contained only 28 amphibs vs 31, as the Senator stated, the “Law” requires. Recently, I have heard a number of active duty and retired generals weighing in on the current Presidential election. In my opinion, I don’t think that is appropriate and damages their professional reputations. I have no problem with statements being challenged for correctness or if they are appropriate. I agree with everything you stated up to “subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice FOR LIFE”. I see that as a threat and in my opinion that has no place on CP. Respectfully and SF.
I stand by what I said and why I said it. I find what was said about President Biden so outrageous and unwarranted, I will not repeat it here in this response. That is what has no place in Compass Points.
The Marine Corps is not "stuck" with Force Design. The Commandant, using his Title X authority to "organize, train, and equip" the Service, could change course today by simply adopting a better capstone operating concept for the Corps. Fielding new capabilities woukd take time, probably years but the vector could be changed with the stroke of a pen. Vision 2035 offers the Marine Corps the intellectual foundation for a better way forward. The failure to change course and to instead continue down the FD rabbit hole can be hung on only one person - - the Commandant.
The CMC needs to see the "big picture." He needs to see/ understand that this narrow minded thinking jeopardizes the Nation, since we now do not have a credible and robust force in readiness.
Does he? CMC sees what he wants. Gen Smith was 8th RCT CO in Afghanistan a few years ago. Gen Berger was 8th RCT CO in Iraq a few years before that. They decided on their COA come hell or high water. They are not stupid men. It would be interesting to hear from the constellation of stars that met with Gen Smith not long ago about any feedback he (or the straphangers) had for them. Something doesn't quite add up. (We have the most difficult mission: to pursue relevant change for our Marine Corps without undermining that seat. Whether I admire the occupant or not...that seat is important.)
Reportedly 7 of the 8 former CMCs were opposed to Force Design 2030 at the meeting. CMC appeared to listen to the concerns of these 7, however, my understanding is he did not share with them the fact he had written his CPG and would issue it in just a few days after that meeting. That CPG is clearly more of the same Force Design minus the "2030" as the critiques posted on Compass Points illustrated. My guess is there is little likelihood of further meetings as CMC appears to be following in the footsteps of his predecessor. We can only hope members of Congress see the loss of operational capabilities and demand the Corps fulfill its Title 10 mandates.
Thank you sir. Unfortunate that it sounds very perfunctory. I wonder if General Smith was checking his watch (or aide) 8 and a half minutes into the session. More unfortunate that there seems to be nothing more in response to the concerns beyond 'we are going this way because this is the way we are going'. I would imagine the PR and Info Ops staff would see the value in, at the least, making an effort demonstrate some mutual ground with the block of former CMC's, if only to say 'we understand the concerns and are making efforts to keep the former CMCs abreast of key progress and capability demonstrations'. Hopefully, the Force Design Gift Bags for the attendees were nice.
As an aside, I wonder where our retired senior Sgt's Maj and Master Guns' are at? Can't imagine they are too happy at the loss of capability either.
This article (and many others) correctly describe the "close fight" of resisting the stubbornness associated with the current misguided redesign of the USMC force structure. The "deep fight" isn't talked about much. That is the need for another congressional "roles and missions" law. Roles and missions law was passed in 1949. I think it's about time we revisited the issue. The lack of contemporary clarity has developed into what I think has become a diffusion of USMC focus. I can't for the life of me figure out how the current leadership can think that defense of islands not associated with Naval Bases, and/or becoming a reconnaissance tripwire for the Joint Forces can be interpreted from USMC roles and missions.
The only thing worse than old, dated or not, roles and missions would be new, overcome by events, roles and missions.
I am always conflicted on this....updating the roles can easily backfire. Especially in the current political environment; we are more likely to end up with an ugly 3 headed dog of a mission set. And there is a possibility that the updated role that gets passed into law is just copy and pasted from the FD 2030 original document; now you have to live with it. I remember when we were updating METLS in the mid '00s. I watched the Artillery Community jam a provisional mission into their new METLs. It wasn't the win they thought it would be. My community had a brief discussion about it; talking it through to it's obvious conclusion, we felt there were much better ways to shoot ourselves in the foot. Or another way of putting it, building a box to trap someone else tends to be inconvenient the second you are forced to live in it. I'm a duty, honor guy who always appreciated when ambiguity over some matter gave me the room to achieve the mission in a better way.
I think the better fight is the long range one; continue to mentor the 'Corps to seek relevant capability and demonstrate that capability and relevance. Continue to mentor Congress to ask good questions. After all, 1949 was built on a decade of demonstration by the USMC.
I completely understand your concern. I have two slightly different takes that are in no way trying to convince you not to be concerned. First is that it appears to me we are "stuck" with FD2030 as the leadership appears intransigent. 2nd is that it's the job of congress to sort out this stuff. Yes they may not get it right but we have way more influence in that arena than we appear to have with the current crop of 4 stars. At least there would be a debate in that arena where we appear to be getting "censored" in USMC circles. There are risks in any direction taken to correct a misguided force structure.
Thank you; I appreciate the thoughtful reply. I do agree with you in part. It's just that I see the best solution (and a credible solution) between somewhat generational when reality and the Officers/SNCOs start 'fixing' everything wrong with FD (2030). It won't be quick, it's not satisfying, and it's painful in wartime, but I've seen the 'ooze' method work wonderfully at healing damage. And even the current 4 stars will eventually pass through the beast. I anticipate we will see a correction / over correction at some point.
I'm also leery of Congress right now since half the Marines in the Capital are vocal advocates of Force Design since they've all read a review of 'Kill Chain' and think anything prior to 2020 is out of date;) You are right though; the only way to help Congress is to engage with Congress...as you say: " it's the job of congress to sort out this stuff". I guess we'll just have to keep working at it from all angles. Semper Fi.
There will be no attaboys for the dolts behind this fiasco…Too bad that they will not be held accountable. Semper Fi
And accepting responsibility and WELCOMING accountability is what adult leaders do. I and many of my peers feel let down by current senior leaders who have not found a way to call for an accounting. If there is a sound basis for decisions taken re FD 2030 then a defense and justification would have been presented years ago. CMC and his supporters may be true believers but they have not made their case and at this late date that fact alone undermines confidence in their leadership. But perhaps we old guys were shaped by leaders who could anticipate the reaction to changes and act promptly and sometimes bluntly to demonstrate the value of their decisions.
The comments and critique in both articles give food for thought. I see the common issue is one of clarity of purpose. Is the USMC organized to do a job it a) can choose to do given an existing mission or b) will likely be asked to do?
A recent article in the Gazette came at this from a different, but pertinent angle. Col G.J. David, USMC, in his article "Units of Action" (https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/units-of-action/) looked at the 'Corps' ability from a more favorable perspective with regards to the objectives of Force Design (2030). His commentary is reasoned and worth considering as we all advocate for a relevant and capable USMC. Col David writes: "The Marine Corps requires a clarifying review to connect its operating concepts based on current events to its force capabilities.". He follows in his conclusion with "If the Service seeks to alter course to achieve its SIF and RXR vision, then it will have to find a way to make culture-adjusting investments in ISR and intelligence immediately.". For his part, as least with respect to the implementing SIF and fighting the RXR fight integrated with the fleet and Joint Force, he also sees shortfalls and a need to get on the rails. For awareness, "Col David is the Deputy Director for Intelligence Division under the Deputy Commandant for Information/Director of Intelligence.".
ISR is a huge part of the Force's conceptual 'Graphic User Interface', and whether we get the modern, Global Enhanced Combined Arms Team or the Force Design Team, his comments with respect to ISR and RXR are relevant and add to the discussion opened in the article.
I prefer the bluntness of Mr. Anderson. I recall being a young Lieutenant at TBS. I had a clear notion of how I could best serve our Corps and country and where. I was corrected of that notion “bluntly”. I was not the one to decide, it was the Corps and country I served that would decide. Congress informed us of our mission years ago and did not change it. It was a small cadre of leadership that made that decision that brought us to today. Hopefully Congress will correct this soon.
Excellent piece. There. Is food for thought, and ideas to act on.
https://spectator.org/the-marine-corps-has-gone-off-the-rails/
Article in the American Spectator.
"A new Congressional Research Service report brings harsh scrutiny to the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, with many in Congress and the Department of Defense reportedly having buyer’s remorse. What they thought was a modernization effort has rapidly become an embarrassment — with the Marine Corps’ preparedness hanging in the balance."
"Interestingly, independent war-games conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies have determined that Force Design would be of marginal use in a war with China over Taiwan. Despite these lackluster findings, Berger’s successor, Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Eric Smith has doubled down on Force Design. Smith’s steadfast devotion to Force Design ignores the advice from all eight of his and Berger’s living predecessors, as well as the former four-star Marine Corps theater commanders."
Slowly, the powers that be are coming around to the fact that FD2030, or whatever they are calling it these days, is a dismal failure and brings nothing to the table.
I just realized......this is the article that was referenced in the posting!!
The "American Spectator" is a conservative publication. Gary Anderson's conservative politics are barely congealed and are unfortunately published in Compass Points. The FD 2030 fiasco was well underway in 2019 before President Biden was inaugurated on 2021. In fact, Gen. Berger was selected to be CMC in 2019 while Donald Trump was President. It is noteworthy that both Gen. Kelly and Gen. Mattis were highly influential members of the Trump Administration at the time of Gen, Berger's selection to be CMC. Surely they had opinions about his selection.
Once the outline of FD 2030 became public with its divest to invest policy there was immediate pushback that was subtle and not so subtle. Former ACMC, Gen. Dake, who flew the Ch-53 in Vietnam, stated the divest to invest would "cripple" USMC aviation as one opposing example. The annual Aviation Plan was not published for 2 years until Lt.Gen Wise released it in 2022. The delay being a form of pushback. The plan clearly stated aviation assets were being reduced without a reduction in commitments. Then Wise retired for obvious reasons.
Toward the end of his 4 years as CMC, Gen. Berger was being actively considered to become the next Chairman of the JCS. It can be inferred he was not selected by President Biden to be the JCS Chairman because of the public controversy over FD 2030. Regardless, it is a huge stretch of political misinformation to call President Biden incompetent because of a program initiated 2 years before Biden became President. Biden did not select him to be CMC, nor did he select Berger to be JCS Chairman.
Possibly Col. Anderson is not aware of the fact that retired regular officers are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice FOR LIFE. Regular officers better be aware of that fact should Trump win the election. My impression of him is he would not like a senior officer calling him incompetent.
Sir, You are correct to point out that the 38th CMC served about 19 months under a Republican administration and the remainder of his 4 years under a Democratic administration. Personally, I doubt either commander in chief was ever made personally aware of what the 38th CMC did to the Corps. Those of us who identify as members of Chowder Society II have varying and opposing political views; we do not consider them relevant to the loss of the Corps' operational capabilities, which we are seeking to have restored in a modernized form. I can assure you that neither of the two 4-star Marine Corps generals you mention in any way support what Force Design 2030 did to our Corps. I am fairly certain the general in position to do so made a different recommendation for CMC than the one selected and confirmed. S/F PKVR
Good Sir, let me be clear, I place the blame for the FD 2030 fiasco squarely on the shoulders of Gen. Berger and his senior Marine officers who do not speak out. Where I take exception is Compass Points publishing the inappropriate political views of Gary Anderson published in a politically conservative media that lays the blame squarely for FD 2030 on the Commander-in-Chief. I agree fully with you that it is highly unlikely that neither Trump nor Biden had any idea, or concerns, about the implications and disaster that FD 2030 would cause the Marine Corps. The question becomes, why was FD 2030, now simply Force Design, allowed to proceed in the manner it has? In my humble opinion, FD 2030 and Force Design have been allowed to continue without question because it was being done by United States Marines. I believe the historical reputation of excellence of military service by the Marines of the past is why FD 2030 was allowed to proceed without question. If the Marines are doing it, it must be good. It was the history of Marine Corps excellence, and their personal histories, that led to Gen. Kelley and Gen. Mattis selection for service in the previous administration. Especially significant is the fact Gen. Mattis's appointment required special congressional approval. Finally, please know, anytime something is published in Compass Points that I believe is inappropriate such as the Anderson article, I will continue to speak out. In doing so I am supporting your goal "for a stronger Marine Corps." SF
Sir, Why Berger did what he did is simply inexplicable. How he was able to do so is perhaps explainable by the fact he served under 7 Secretaries of the Navy and 5 Secretaries of defense for those billets became musical chairs in the latter stages of the second administration under which he served; no one was "watching the store." As to Congressional oversight, much of what he did was at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic and Congress was consumed by that and impeachment hearings. And, as you note, a big part of his success came because he was trading on the reputations of those who went before--if a Marine said something it was seldom questioned because of the reputation of stalwarts such as Generals Chapman, Wilson, Barrow, and Gray. Though I didn't interpret Gary's remarks as negatively as you did, I commend you for speaking out and holding Compass Points' staff to a non-political standard. Finally, though our goals are virtually the same and much of what we do is reported on by Compass Points, the Editor and Publisher are not behold to Chowder Society II members and on occasion posts things we wish they had not.
Thank you sir. Marine officers like naval officers are admonished to avoid discussing politics in the wardroom. It’s a good rule to live by.
WHOA! …there Col Whitner. Recommend you take that threating finger pointing at a fellow Marine Officer, click it on safe, and put back in your holster. Seems you have a personal vs a professional issue with the author. Col Anderson’s article addresses the findings of the “Congressional Research Service report brings harsh scrutiny to the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, with many in Congress and the Department of Defense”. His article may have appeared in a “conservative” (but respected) publication but it certainly does not rate a “subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice FOR LIFE” response. What are you thinking here Col, NJP or Court Martial?
The justification for FD first went public in the Marine Gazette in the Feb 2019 article “Forward To a New Naval Future” https://archive.mca-marines.org/publications/forward-to-a-new-naval-future/ . Great article and well written. This article also states the clear threat of A2/AD, “The A2/AD threat has led to questions about whether or not amphibious assault operations are even feasible and, by inference, the necessity of the Marine Corps.” Yes, that problem requires looking into the future and experimenting with solutions. In my opinion Commandant Berger “jumped the gun” by reorganizing and reducing lethality to experiment. In addition, there was some implied defense of FD2030 criticism with “sit down and shut up, this is how it is going to be”. Three years later we are witnessing the counter to A2/AD missiles with Israel’s Iron Dome, the US Army’s MDTF, and the US Navy’s Alleigh-Burk Destroyers anti-missile capability. Yep, that darn warfare has changed again requiring new tactics and technology. In my mind the problem with amphibious assaults is the same as WW2. They are best conducted after you establish air superiority and secure the SLOC. CCP just added another domain of A2/AD in order to secure the SLOC. In light of the fact we have a reduced air capability and an MLR (x3) with no long range anti-ship missiles and no way to sustain our MLR Marines, General Berger's "experiment" ain't looking good. S/F
Polar Bear, I agreed with the Anderson article unril the end when he declared the President incompetent. That is a red line with me no matter who the President is. I then researched the American Spectator. It is termed a ^conservative^ publication. That connotation or a ^liberal^ tag infers a political bias. In the current 2024 campaign one of the candidates plans to arrest and jail opponents. The spectre of the UCMJ for life could be a problem for any regular officer that candidate doesnt like. Finally, my name is spelled ^Whitener.^
SF Bob
Apologies for the misspelling there is no disrespect intended. I really don’t care if a pub is liberal or conservative. I feel everyone is free to express their opinion and we certainly want to hear those opinions and ideas here on CP.
Yes, General Berger started his initiative two years before the current administration took over. However, it really didn’t start to go public until Feb 2019 with the MC Gazette article: “Forward To a New Naval Future”. The next announcement was “tanks” are gone with a lot of other “combat power” before the experiment.
I certainly recognize the need for a Commandant to experiment. I remember the story I heard about Smedley Butler bringing a “swamp vehicle” to the San Diego Marine Barracks to test. His experiment later turned into wartime battalions of amphibious assault vehicles. Regardless of the when or how, General Berger is responsible for FD2030 and General Smith has adopted that responsibility. I have stated before on CP that I wonder if General Smith is now standing in a dry corner with a wet paint brush. My concern is that General Berger made the decision to reduce combat power before experimentation.
I also understand that politics is in the “generals” lane as it relates to military affairs. General Berger, the SECDEF, and the CNO had to testify before the Armed Forces Committee regarding why the amphibious shipbuilding plan contained only 28 amphibs vs 31, as the Senator stated, the “Law” requires. Recently, I have heard a number of active duty and retired generals weighing in on the current Presidential election. In my opinion, I don’t think that is appropriate and damages their professional reputations. I have no problem with statements being challenged for correctness or if they are appropriate. I agree with everything you stated up to “subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice FOR LIFE”. I see that as a threat and in my opinion that has no place on CP. Respectfully and SF.
I stand by what I said and why I said it. I find what was said about President Biden so outrageous and unwarranted, I will not repeat it here in this response. That is what has no place in Compass Points.