Permit me to add some comments about John Sayen. I found out that John Sayen passed away in 2018. I was interested in locating him to get his thoughts on FD-2030 and only stumbled on the fact he had died.
In October 1974 I reported to TBS Class 3-75 at Quantico. One of my classmates was John Sayen. John was probably 6”4, lanky, cerebral and introverted. His room was a few doors down. He didn’t look like he shaved yet. I later learned that he was younger than the class, as was I and Tom Peeler. We were 21 years old. We had one other guy who was a year younger too but his name has faded from my memory over the years. John was not the typical fire breathing Lieutenant. He was fit but it took endless hard work. He was not athletic. His father was a prominent Doctor in Philadelphia. John wanted to be an infantry officer. I had no idea there was anything but, unless you were an aviator. John and I had regular after hours conversations. Over the course of these it became clear that he was a student of history and had a deep insight on the Marines in the Pacific and war on the Eastern Front. Our conversations on weaponry, tactics, doctrine and training would last late into the night. He was clearly brilliant. I had met few people well versed in the German Soviet war 1941 to 1945. We both believed it might be the most dangerous conflict the US would ever fight if it came to that. John and I discussed everything from small arms to grand strategy in a peer confrontation. We did not neglect discussing insurgencies, partisans and guerrilla warfare, weapons, combat load, unit organization etc.
John did not join us in our liberty runs to Washington DC or partying. It held no interest for him. He had no interest in sports cars, sports, hunting or fishing. Nor did he display the intensity many of us had from an excess of testosterone and the limited judgment that put a cocky chip on our shoulders. While we were reading John Fairbain and practicing knife fighting he was doing a deep analysis of Bn operations in Korea. There were times when I came in from a night on the town and John would knock on the door: “ Doug, on day three in the Battle of Kursk why do you think that LAH did not break through to the south….” and drop a map on the floor. We would pour over the map asking questions about number of tanks available, ammunition stocks, fuel availability, air support etc. Around this time the secrets of the Enigma Codes were being revealed and John was intrigued. So was I. We even discussed one night if the USMC might let us go interview Generals in England, the US and Germany.
When the MOS selections were revealed John was designated Artillery. I was secretly relieved. That was the right MOS for John and I secretly applauded our SPC for his analysis of the skills and potential of his Lieutenants. John was not the charismatic leader type. Not a pugilist.
Saigon fell the day before my TBS class graduated and I lost track of John. He did not come to the 2nd Mar Div after Artillery School. I had hoped he would.
Careers, assignments, priorities and distance crippled communications before email. I last spoke with John in 1992 as we discussed his career options when I was at HQMC. I encouraged him to leverage his grasp of history, brilliant mind, focused analysis and devotion to work in the Marine Corps Schools and professional development. It was the last time we spoke in person. I vaguely remember that we emailed once or twice in the 1995-98 time frame. I remember a congratulatory email in 1998 when I took command of 25th Marines. That was 25 years ago.
John’s skills, devotion and intellect might have been better appreciated in the British or Prussian military where they tended to be more tolerant of the brilliant even eccentric who did not fit the mold. I believe conditions in that arena have been made worse by the Officer Fitness Report changes implemented in the early 1990’s. The focus shifted from character, potential,unique skills and strengths to metrics and laundry lists of achievements of questionable value.
John Sayen was a great Marine that our Corps, for many reasons, did not properly leverage during his active duty service. He is not alone. I often reflect on the talent we overlooked or discarded in favor of self promoters and grand standers.
I do not believe John ever married. If he did not marry I am certain he had no children. He is buried with his mother and father in Philadelphia.
I feel some guilt for not staying in touch. 2001-2018 was a busy time for me. It is no excuse. John was like many great Marines. He devoted his life to our Corps and nation for few rewards. I know he never asked for much and got even less other than the knowledge that he made innumerable individuals better and our Corps better. I hope he knew that in the end.
I was a young major when first I met the late General Al Gray. Beginning in that initial encounter and for many years afterwards I learned much from this giant of our Corps.
Today’s post questioning whether those responsible for the recent changes to the Marine infantry battalion ever consulted John Sayen’s seminal work on American Infantry before they set about making those changes reminds me of an important lesson I learned from General Gray. That is, the need to look to history before launching off on a project.
Though he did not use the term, what General Gray was telling me was I needed to conduct a literature search prior to putting forth any recommendation. As the post says, “The story before the story” I wanted to tell. That advice served me well while on active-duty and in many endeavors since I retired.
So, I wonder, did the Marines who recommended the recent changes to the Marine infantry battalion consult any of these important books on the role of the infantry?
S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War
B.A. Friedman, On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle
John A. English, On Infantry (New York: Praeger
John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmunsson, On Infantry: Revised Edition
Paddy Griffith, Forward Into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future
Michael D. Doubler, Closing With the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945
Charles B. MacDonald, Company Commander: The Classic Account of Infantry Combat in World War II
Erwin Rommel, Attacks
The Infantry Journal, Infantry in Battle
Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (
Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle
Peter S. Kindsvatter, American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam
Finally, did they happen to come across a Center for Naval Analyses study I assisted with titled, Development of the Squad: Historical Analysis? See: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1014512.pdf
1) The access to John Sayens' work is a treasure of its own.
2) Generational amnesia and lack of self reflection is a thing. The level of confusion over how innovation and change work is astonishing. Often it is on the order of "I gave you an electronic calculator, why are you still asking for food? That is yesterday's thinking". Everyone loves the Kodak analogy...but they forget how many aspects of cameras, including the camera, remained despite the move to digital photography. Digitalization enhanced how camera's worked and could be applied...it didn't replace the camera. Likewise, the move from the Curtiss C-3 to the F-35 does not mean 'aircraft' are obsolete, anymore than the change from the Krag to the M27 meant 'rifle' is obsolete. Some legacy systems are enhanced by emerging concepts and technologies vice being replaced by them.
3) This interview from "The School of War" podcast is a good reference for a primer on RFDEW, though more USN focused (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hdxr3gVkfg8). The innovation, especially in digital and solid state management of wave forming, have drastically increased capabilities. It will be very interesting to see how this adds to the warfighter's stack.
This prompted me to recall some great initiatives and experiments in the early 90's that were the talk of the Corps. Directed energy, non-lethals, etc...driven by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of semi-permissive HA/DR (e. g. Somalia, Liberia).
These were great innovations and ideas, and driven by real operational requirements. Some have, but some did not survive the Combat Development Process. Some fit, but some did not, into the Warfighting Concept that was developed prior to their evaluation and integration. I wonder what the Corps would look like today if after Desert Storm and the Cold War's end, the Corps leaders had shortcut the process and eliminated wholesale conventional capabilities to re-engineer for non-lethal warfare.
An absolutely brilliant discussion on the depth of warfighting understanding that Marines need to have before doing potential harm to the organization. Due to the professional media's bandwidth consumed by "futurists," I'm afraid we're seeing a decline in the quality of PME in the history of warfare and military organization, and an institutional failure to appreciate that all warfare's history is marked by war's immutable nature of violence, uncertainty and friction. Further, gamers and futurists plagued with what C.S. Lewis called "generational snobbery," are willfully uninformed by what they dismiss as the old way of warfare.
I believe I know the answer to Lieutenant General Van Riper’s question. No, those who undertook to revise the Marine infantry battalion did not look to the past or they would not have come up with the flawed organization they did. Two factors likely drove their conclusions. First, they were looking for personnel savings to help fund the former commandant’s fundamentally flawed “divest to invest” Force Design 2030 plan, therefore, the battalion needed to be smaller. Second, displaying the “I know best” overconfidence of that commandant, they probably saw no need to go beyond their own ill-informed ideas.
The push back will be that the Marine Corps ran a series of experiments to determine the viability of these “geniuses” ideas. I’m betting a case of beer they did not evaluate their favored organization against any of the robust battalions of old, that is, those that numbered in the 1,100s.
So, having more than the average Marine’s time in infantry battalions including years of combat and having studied most of the books on General Van Riper’s list, I’ll be bold enough to offer the “school solution”—four rifle companies, a weapons company, and a headquarters and service company—with close to 1,200 Marines. However, The Marine Corps should never adopt this solution unless it has survived the formal combat development process.
1. Of course the USMC should be involved in a development of directed radio waves. There are two reasons. The USMC might employ it or need to defend against it. Sadly, USMC RD&A is the graveyard of many good ideas. This was particularly true for ideas that were in the realm of small to medium businesses or foreign sources and might bring about rapid combat improvement in the ground combat arena. Somehow these efforts were often smothered in the cradle and with them the companies with great ideas. What got the attention was high tech developments for the long term future, pushed by large defense contractors vice immediate combat concerns. The protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan brought about changes slowly. The Corps resisted the immediate need for MRAPs based on the imagined lack of need in the future. Things are simple as body armor received short shrift like decades before bullet trap rifle grenades fell by the wayside as did small radios, plastic cartridges and superior rifle magazines. For decades after decade RPVs languished when their utility was clear.
The history of Marine RD&A is one of repeated failure and apathy.
2. It is rare that Infantry Bn’s were reduced in size based on combat performance. Reductions occurred as the bill payer for new “good ideas” that needed to skirt end strength restrictions. A force that must fight in any place and clime needs larger Rifle Bns. The Fox hole strength on the FLOT ( old FEBA) is not hard to estimate for Norway, Alaska, Korea, Thailand, Iraq or Afghanistan. There can be no counter attack without a 4 rifle company Bn, nor can you exploit your attack. How does a Company fire the FPF without 60mm mortars? Without them in the attack the infantry company cannot reach out beyond 1200 meters. It is limited to the range of rifles and machine guns. Every rifle company needs individuals trained, equipped and certified to direct close air, NGF, artillery and 81mm mortars. Anything less is unacceptable. It needs enough men to carry ammo. Even if only over the last 400 meters. There are not enough men to carry ammo forward in even a minor fire fight. Nor enough men to carry the wounded to the rear and return to the fight. Rifle Bn’s need RPVs at the company level and the people to man them. Who escorts POWs to the rear? Who pulls the Akio Sleds in Arctic environments while the unit maintains tactical movement? Who breaks trail? Each Rifle Bn needs snipers. Who controls the crowds during a non permissive NEO? Just these few questions will reveal to the most ardent reduction advocate that the Rifle Bn must be larger to survive. My almost 27 years as an infantry officer and 23 years of study since convince me that the modern Rifle Bn must be about 1200 Marines to fight as part of a MAGTF in virtually any scenario other than a very low grade insurgency. Four rifle companies, one Weapons Company and one H&S Company. Any exercise in excess of two weeks will make this very clear. Intense combat will make it clear in the first 24 hrs.
What I learned from SLA Marshall and others plus some additional reading.
BTW, listen to the heeds of General Van Riper and General Gray’s recommendation and important lesson for “the need to look to history before launching off on a project”.
What I learned from SLA Marshall was that at the beginning of the Korean War SLA Marshall was concerned with the question; Why are US Army Units losing fire fights and retreating, when the US Marine Units were wining and holding? What he found was Army Battalion commanders were deploying rifle companies on hill tops that were not mutual supporting. The Communist Chinese would infiltrate the existing gaps attacking the flanks or the rear of the company position. If the company held, the next issue was ammo, casualty EVAC, and retreat (Civil War General McDowell Union troops called their retreat phase the “great skedaddle”). Marshall found that the Marines would not only deploy their companies in mutual supporting positions but also their battalions.
In SLA Marshall’s “Men Against Fire”, I learned to keep your troop’s equipment load as light as possible and your crew served weapons teams are usually the first to fire and employ their weapons.
I learned from Dr. A.J. Piscitelli’s book: “No Quarter Given, No Quarter Sought: The Colonel of Marines, Michael Wyly” that when a company commander comes up with a neat maneuver of a helo-lift to enable his company to attack a bunker complex from the rear, listen to your Marines when they suggest that you let them add “muscle” to their attack with the use of grenades.
From T.X. Hammes book, Forgotten Warriors, I learned that Marine Battalions of two rifle companies were two light for ground combat. I also learned that the 1st Marine Brigade, when attached to a US Army Division on the Pusan Perimeter, would not counter attack until all available supporting arms were ready, including artillery, mortars, recoilless-rifles and close air support.
What I learned from Rommel’s Attacks, when Rommel as a rifle company commander fighting in the Italian mountains,, and his company was designated as the “focus of effort”, he received the support from his entire battalion to make major break troughs and penetrations.
When I again read “How to Fight and Win the Single Naval Battle” I got interested in one of the references: FPT167 and the opening paragraph:
“101. General objectives. -
a. Landing operations may be conducted by naval forces for the following general purposes:
For securing bases for our fleet or components thereof.
For denying bases or facilities to the enemy.
For bringing on a fleet engagement at a remote distance from an enemy main base by causing the enemy fleet to operate in protection of the threatened area.
To cause a dispersion of the enemy fleet by threatening areas vital to his plan of campaign.
For protection of life and property in connection with small wars.
For sabotage.
For the conduct of such other land operations as may be required in the prosecution of the naval campaign.
b. The purpose for which a landing operation is conducted in any given area will influence the nature of the operation, its specific objectives, and the forces to be employed.”
Seems to me that FTP167 would have been a good starting point for the staffers of 2030 Design.
In addition, “How to Fight and Win the Single Naval Battle” also sent me into a review of the Strategic Situation presented in this case study. One item missed was the Japanese attack on Port Darwin Australia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Darwin “The Bombing of Darwin, also known as the Battle of Darwin, on 19 February 1942, was the largest single attack ever mounted by a foreign power on Australia.”
This attack by four Japanese Carriers launching 188 aircraft on 19 Feb 1942 and 54 bomber attack on the second day forced the Australians to abandon Port Darwin as a support base. It also supported the Japanese invasion of Salamaua and Lae on New Guinea on March 7, 1942 and the Dutch surrender of Java on March 8, 1942.
Other interesting time line events:
March 23, 1942 - Japanese invade the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal.
April 3, 1942 - Japanese attack U.S. and Filipino troops at Bataan.
April 9, 1942 - U.S. forces on Bataan surrender unconditionally to the Japanese.
April 10, 1942 - Bataan Death March begins as 76,000 Allied POWs including 12,000 Americans are forced to walk 60 miles under a blazing sun without food or water toward a new POW camp, resulting in over 5,000 American deaths.
April 29, 1942 - Japanese take central Burma.
May 1, 1942 - Japanese occupy Mandalay in Burma.
May 3, 1942 - Japanese take Tulagi in the Solomon Islands.
May 5, 1942 - Japanese prepare to invade Midway and the Aleutian Islands.
May 6, 1942 - Japanese take Corregidor as Gen. Wainwright unconditionally surrenders all U.S. And Filipino forces in the Philippines.
May 7-8, 1942 - Japan suffers its first defeat of the war during the Battle of the Coral Sea off New Guinea - the first time in history that two opposing carrier forces fought only using aircraft without the opposing ships ever sighting each other.
May 12, 1942 - The last U.S. Troops holding out in the Philippines surrender on Mindanao.
May 20, 1942 - Japanese complete the capture of Burma and reach India.
June 4-5, 1942 - Turning point in the war occurs with a decisive victory for the U.S. against Japan in the Battle of Midway as squadrons of U.S. torpedo planes and dive bombers from ENTERPRISE, HORNET, and YORKTOWN attack and destroy four Japanese carriers, a cruiser, and damage another cruiser and two destroyers. U.S. loses YORKTOWN.
June 7, 1942 - Japanese invade the Aleutian Islands.
June 9, 1942 - Japanese postpone further plans to take Midway.
July 21, 1942 - Japanese land troops near Gona on New Guinea.
August 7, 1942 - The first U.S. amphibious landing of the Pacific War occurs as 1st Marine Division invades Tulagi and Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands.
Like Caesar, FD2030 should take heed of the “Ides of March” or the heeds of General Van Riper and Chowder II.
Exceptional response. I pray the Brigadier, currently in the Billet of President MCU is briefing CMC Smith daily on MCCP or even better CMC and the ACMC should read them before their nightly prayers.
Well no one is supposed to know, but the puzzle palace has it all figured out. They met this very odd looking dude in the hills above Camp Pendleton, squat, huge head and big eyes, doesn’t do ANY PT, and he can’t fit in a “traditional” Marine Officers uniform, slouches a bit, but you should see what Major ET can do with his index finger! He has extraordinary communication skills so much so no one knows what he is saying most of the time, but we are told he is brilliant like his index finger, he ah just glows. HQMC is now gathering up a new information battalion, waaay smaller still than the current infantry battalions , waaay cheaper and so secret that even if the CMC and ACMC give you their decoder rings you might not get through to Major ET to learn just what it is that he does! But never you mind you old thinkers! Imagine thinking the wounded have to carried from the battle field, or company commanders might their own hip pocket artillery aka 60mm mortar. Or ammo needs to move forward and we sure don’t want to forget the salt tabs so we can operate on two canteens of water…chow? Major ET doesn’t eat the normal food served so make do with what you have on hand.
In fairness of there is a new component that is complimentary to the organic weapons of the infantry battalion and that augments the MAGTF ability to push force forward than why not. But one gets a slippery stomach when the newest gizmo’s start popping up. (Here we go again) plus not to throw shade at the Brits, but every own a Land Rover??? Which would you rather have a Willy’s Jeep or a Series II Landy? Now if I could find my super secret sunglasses maybe Major ET and I can share sewing secrets.
General Van Riper's comment prompted me to take a look at the Marine Corps' professional reading list. None of the books he referenced were on it.
Further, I dove into the archival reading lists going back to General Gray's first ever, in 1989. Interesting to track the trends in the Corps by the periodic additions to the list.
It was also interesting to look at the current reading list, which was changed dramatically in 2020. Some self-help business and leadership books, some memoirs and naval strategy, a few token history books. Lots of futurist influence.
All the classics are gone. None of General Van Riper's appear there. Maybe that's good. As many leaders have reinforced over the past few years, the old ways of war are not in its future character.
Whatever the case, it cannot be honestly said that our Warfighting ethos is not impacted by the shift in focus. Our combined-arms, first to fight mission is receding into history as we focus on futurist theories.
I was tasked by General Al Gray to produce the original Marine Corps reading list and until about 2010 was asked by several commandants to review and comment on the revised lists. Most of these updated lists missed the mark that General Gray established largely because they were the product of Marines unfamiliar with the wide body of military and military related literature. Some, like the current list were the victim of futurists who had scant knowledge of the the past and gave little evidence of being serious students of the profession of arms. Sad!
Historian Victor Davis Hanson argues that war is unchanging and tragically persistent through the ages. While technology improves and strategies adapt, human nature remains the same.
His collection of essays on war and history is titled, The Father Of Us All.
NEAL CONAN, host:
The current HBO series "The Pacific" is based in part on E.B. Sledge's memoir of two almost forgotten battles fought by the U.S. Marines during the Second World War. Anyone who's read "With the Old Breed" or seen the TV show emerges with a fresh appreciation for the brutality and waste of war. But there are other lessons from Peleliu and Okinawa about loyalty and love, about suicide attacks and fanatic enemies, and about human nature.
Military historian, classicist and syndicated columnist Victor David Hanson wrote an introduction to Sledge's book and then adapted that as part of one chapter in the new book of essays on war and history, ancient and modern, called "Father of Us All: War and History, Ancient and Modern." And the author joins us now from a studio at Stanford University, where he's a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. Victor, nice to have you back on TALK OF THE NATION.
Mr. VICTOR DAVIS HANSON (Author) Thank you for having me again, Neal.
CONAN: And I wonder if you've been watching the miniseries.
Mr. HANSON: I have. I just watched the ninth episode last night.
CONAN: And do you think they're getting it right?
Mr. HANSON: I think they are. I think "The Pacific" was a lot more difficult to comprehend and a lot more - it was a lot more brutal and it was a lot harder on the American soldier than even Europe was. It was not as well understood. And remember, when Okinawa was going on, which was last night's episode...
CONAN: Mm-hmm.
Mr. HANSON: ...the country was occupied with the death of Franklin Roosevelt, the upcoming defeat of Germany, and people had no idea that we were going to lose 50,000 casualties in an amphibious operation after we had just supposedly learned from Iwo Jima and Tarawa and Peleliu. And yet, Okinawa turned out to be the most horrific American experience, in some ways, in the entire war.
CONAN: And the - what do you take as - you had a relative who was lost in that conflict.
Mr. HANSON: Yes. My namesake, Victor Hanson, was killed May 19th on Sugar Loaf Hill. And he was...
Permit me to add some comments about John Sayen. I found out that John Sayen passed away in 2018. I was interested in locating him to get his thoughts on FD-2030 and only stumbled on the fact he had died.
In October 1974 I reported to TBS Class 3-75 at Quantico. One of my classmates was John Sayen. John was probably 6”4, lanky, cerebral and introverted. His room was a few doors down. He didn’t look like he shaved yet. I later learned that he was younger than the class, as was I and Tom Peeler. We were 21 years old. We had one other guy who was a year younger too but his name has faded from my memory over the years. John was not the typical fire breathing Lieutenant. He was fit but it took endless hard work. He was not athletic. His father was a prominent Doctor in Philadelphia. John wanted to be an infantry officer. I had no idea there was anything but, unless you were an aviator. John and I had regular after hours conversations. Over the course of these it became clear that he was a student of history and had a deep insight on the Marines in the Pacific and war on the Eastern Front. Our conversations on weaponry, tactics, doctrine and training would last late into the night. He was clearly brilliant. I had met few people well versed in the German Soviet war 1941 to 1945. We both believed it might be the most dangerous conflict the US would ever fight if it came to that. John and I discussed everything from small arms to grand strategy in a peer confrontation. We did not neglect discussing insurgencies, partisans and guerrilla warfare, weapons, combat load, unit organization etc.
John did not join us in our liberty runs to Washington DC or partying. It held no interest for him. He had no interest in sports cars, sports, hunting or fishing. Nor did he display the intensity many of us had from an excess of testosterone and the limited judgment that put a cocky chip on our shoulders. While we were reading John Fairbain and practicing knife fighting he was doing a deep analysis of Bn operations in Korea. There were times when I came in from a night on the town and John would knock on the door: “ Doug, on day three in the Battle of Kursk why do you think that LAH did not break through to the south….” and drop a map on the floor. We would pour over the map asking questions about number of tanks available, ammunition stocks, fuel availability, air support etc. Around this time the secrets of the Enigma Codes were being revealed and John was intrigued. So was I. We even discussed one night if the USMC might let us go interview Generals in England, the US and Germany.
When the MOS selections were revealed John was designated Artillery. I was secretly relieved. That was the right MOS for John and I secretly applauded our SPC for his analysis of the skills and potential of his Lieutenants. John was not the charismatic leader type. Not a pugilist.
Saigon fell the day before my TBS class graduated and I lost track of John. He did not come to the 2nd Mar Div after Artillery School. I had hoped he would.
Careers, assignments, priorities and distance crippled communications before email. I last spoke with John in 1992 as we discussed his career options when I was at HQMC. I encouraged him to leverage his grasp of history, brilliant mind, focused analysis and devotion to work in the Marine Corps Schools and professional development. It was the last time we spoke in person. I vaguely remember that we emailed once or twice in the 1995-98 time frame. I remember a congratulatory email in 1998 when I took command of 25th Marines. That was 25 years ago.
John’s skills, devotion and intellect might have been better appreciated in the British or Prussian military where they tended to be more tolerant of the brilliant even eccentric who did not fit the mold. I believe conditions in that arena have been made worse by the Officer Fitness Report changes implemented in the early 1990’s. The focus shifted from character, potential,unique skills and strengths to metrics and laundry lists of achievements of questionable value.
John Sayen was a great Marine that our Corps, for many reasons, did not properly leverage during his active duty service. He is not alone. I often reflect on the talent we overlooked or discarded in favor of self promoters and grand standers.
I do not believe John ever married. If he did not marry I am certain he had no children. He is buried with his mother and father in Philadelphia.
I feel some guilt for not staying in touch. 2001-2018 was a busy time for me. It is no excuse. John was like many great Marines. He devoted his life to our Corps and nation for few rewards. I know he never asked for much and got even less other than the knowledge that he made innumerable individuals better and our Corps better. I hope he knew that in the end.
I was a young major when first I met the late General Al Gray. Beginning in that initial encounter and for many years afterwards I learned much from this giant of our Corps.
Today’s post questioning whether those responsible for the recent changes to the Marine infantry battalion ever consulted John Sayen’s seminal work on American Infantry before they set about making those changes reminds me of an important lesson I learned from General Gray. That is, the need to look to history before launching off on a project.
Though he did not use the term, what General Gray was telling me was I needed to conduct a literature search prior to putting forth any recommendation. As the post says, “The story before the story” I wanted to tell. That advice served me well while on active-duty and in many endeavors since I retired.
So, I wonder, did the Marines who recommended the recent changes to the Marine infantry battalion consult any of these important books on the role of the infantry?
S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War
B.A. Friedman, On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle
John A. English, On Infantry (New York: Praeger
John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmunsson, On Infantry: Revised Edition
Paddy Griffith, Forward Into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future
Michael D. Doubler, Closing With the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945
Charles B. MacDonald, Company Commander: The Classic Account of Infantry Combat in World War II
Erwin Rommel, Attacks
The Infantry Journal, Infantry in Battle
Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (
Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle
Peter S. Kindsvatter, American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam
Furthermore, did they look to the important work done by Secretary of Defense, General Jim Mattis’ lethality task force? See: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1639138/task-force-looks-at-making-infantry-squads-more-lethal/.
Finally, did they happen to come across a Center for Naval Analyses study I assisted with titled, Development of the Squad: Historical Analysis? See: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1014512.pdf
You continue to set the example. Semper Fidelis.
Great post.
1) The access to John Sayens' work is a treasure of its own.
2) Generational amnesia and lack of self reflection is a thing. The level of confusion over how innovation and change work is astonishing. Often it is on the order of "I gave you an electronic calculator, why are you still asking for food? That is yesterday's thinking". Everyone loves the Kodak analogy...but they forget how many aspects of cameras, including the camera, remained despite the move to digital photography. Digitalization enhanced how camera's worked and could be applied...it didn't replace the camera. Likewise, the move from the Curtiss C-3 to the F-35 does not mean 'aircraft' are obsolete, anymore than the change from the Krag to the M27 meant 'rifle' is obsolete. Some legacy systems are enhanced by emerging concepts and technologies vice being replaced by them.
3) This interview from "The School of War" podcast is a good reference for a primer on RFDEW, though more USN focused (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hdxr3gVkfg8). The innovation, especially in digital and solid state management of wave forming, have drastically increased capabilities. It will be very interesting to see how this adds to the warfighter's stack.
This prompted me to recall some great initiatives and experiments in the early 90's that were the talk of the Corps. Directed energy, non-lethals, etc...driven by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of semi-permissive HA/DR (e. g. Somalia, Liberia).
These were great innovations and ideas, and driven by real operational requirements. Some have, but some did not survive the Combat Development Process. Some fit, but some did not, into the Warfighting Concept that was developed prior to their evaluation and integration. I wonder what the Corps would look like today if after Desert Storm and the Cold War's end, the Corps leaders had shortcut the process and eliminated wholesale conventional capabilities to re-engineer for non-lethal warfare.
An absolutely brilliant discussion on the depth of warfighting understanding that Marines need to have before doing potential harm to the organization. Due to the professional media's bandwidth consumed by "futurists," I'm afraid we're seeing a decline in the quality of PME in the history of warfare and military organization, and an institutional failure to appreciate that all warfare's history is marked by war's immutable nature of violence, uncertainty and friction. Further, gamers and futurists plagued with what C.S. Lewis called "generational snobbery," are willfully uninformed by what they dismiss as the old way of warfare.
I believe I know the answer to Lieutenant General Van Riper’s question. No, those who undertook to revise the Marine infantry battalion did not look to the past or they would not have come up with the flawed organization they did. Two factors likely drove their conclusions. First, they were looking for personnel savings to help fund the former commandant’s fundamentally flawed “divest to invest” Force Design 2030 plan, therefore, the battalion needed to be smaller. Second, displaying the “I know best” overconfidence of that commandant, they probably saw no need to go beyond their own ill-informed ideas.
The push back will be that the Marine Corps ran a series of experiments to determine the viability of these “geniuses” ideas. I’m betting a case of beer they did not evaluate their favored organization against any of the robust battalions of old, that is, those that numbered in the 1,100s.
So, having more than the average Marine’s time in infantry battalions including years of combat and having studied most of the books on General Van Riper’s list, I’ll be bold enough to offer the “school solution”—four rifle companies, a weapons company, and a headquarters and service company—with close to 1,200 Marines. However, The Marine Corps should never adopt this solution unless it has survived the formal combat development process.
Two subjects:
1. Of course the USMC should be involved in a development of directed radio waves. There are two reasons. The USMC might employ it or need to defend against it. Sadly, USMC RD&A is the graveyard of many good ideas. This was particularly true for ideas that were in the realm of small to medium businesses or foreign sources and might bring about rapid combat improvement in the ground combat arena. Somehow these efforts were often smothered in the cradle and with them the companies with great ideas. What got the attention was high tech developments for the long term future, pushed by large defense contractors vice immediate combat concerns. The protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan brought about changes slowly. The Corps resisted the immediate need for MRAPs based on the imagined lack of need in the future. Things are simple as body armor received short shrift like decades before bullet trap rifle grenades fell by the wayside as did small radios, plastic cartridges and superior rifle magazines. For decades after decade RPVs languished when their utility was clear.
The history of Marine RD&A is one of repeated failure and apathy.
2. It is rare that Infantry Bn’s were reduced in size based on combat performance. Reductions occurred as the bill payer for new “good ideas” that needed to skirt end strength restrictions. A force that must fight in any place and clime needs larger Rifle Bns. The Fox hole strength on the FLOT ( old FEBA) is not hard to estimate for Norway, Alaska, Korea, Thailand, Iraq or Afghanistan. There can be no counter attack without a 4 rifle company Bn, nor can you exploit your attack. How does a Company fire the FPF without 60mm mortars? Without them in the attack the infantry company cannot reach out beyond 1200 meters. It is limited to the range of rifles and machine guns. Every rifle company needs individuals trained, equipped and certified to direct close air, NGF, artillery and 81mm mortars. Anything less is unacceptable. It needs enough men to carry ammo. Even if only over the last 400 meters. There are not enough men to carry ammo forward in even a minor fire fight. Nor enough men to carry the wounded to the rear and return to the fight. Rifle Bn’s need RPVs at the company level and the people to man them. Who escorts POWs to the rear? Who pulls the Akio Sleds in Arctic environments while the unit maintains tactical movement? Who breaks trail? Each Rifle Bn needs snipers. Who controls the crowds during a non permissive NEO? Just these few questions will reveal to the most ardent reduction advocate that the Rifle Bn must be larger to survive. My almost 27 years as an infantry officer and 23 years of study since convince me that the modern Rifle Bn must be about 1200 Marines to fight as part of a MAGTF in virtually any scenario other than a very low grade insurgency. Four rifle companies, one Weapons Company and one H&S Company. Any exercise in excess of two weeks will make this very clear. Intense combat will make it clear in the first 24 hrs.
What I learned from SLA Marshall and others plus some additional reading.
BTW, listen to the heeds of General Van Riper and General Gray’s recommendation and important lesson for “the need to look to history before launching off on a project”.
What I learned from SLA Marshall was that at the beginning of the Korean War SLA Marshall was concerned with the question; Why are US Army Units losing fire fights and retreating, when the US Marine Units were wining and holding? What he found was Army Battalion commanders were deploying rifle companies on hill tops that were not mutual supporting. The Communist Chinese would infiltrate the existing gaps attacking the flanks or the rear of the company position. If the company held, the next issue was ammo, casualty EVAC, and retreat (Civil War General McDowell Union troops called their retreat phase the “great skedaddle”). Marshall found that the Marines would not only deploy their companies in mutual supporting positions but also their battalions.
In SLA Marshall’s “Men Against Fire”, I learned to keep your troop’s equipment load as light as possible and your crew served weapons teams are usually the first to fire and employ their weapons.
I learned from Dr. A.J. Piscitelli’s book: “No Quarter Given, No Quarter Sought: The Colonel of Marines, Michael Wyly” that when a company commander comes up with a neat maneuver of a helo-lift to enable his company to attack a bunker complex from the rear, listen to your Marines when they suggest that you let them add “muscle” to their attack with the use of grenades.
From T.X. Hammes book, Forgotten Warriors, I learned that Marine Battalions of two rifle companies were two light for ground combat. I also learned that the 1st Marine Brigade, when attached to a US Army Division on the Pusan Perimeter, would not counter attack until all available supporting arms were ready, including artillery, mortars, recoilless-rifles and close air support.
https://www.amazon.com/Forgotten-Warriors-Provisional-Brigade-Studies/dp/0700618929/ref=sr_1_1?crid=34B2II3RQR1QG&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.z6lcrEsVia9hQGiFdjwOeYrVWaYhrw6Sik5dUGRaOGysuIijFYg3_InOu_rukYJyjOQSFR-gNoisrtCtnPXsvF-wltIiMi5zRZdPIwQnxYLgJS3MOhzCBZK2PmgroahHngTTyH5m7EbZFXnjKWuZiVEZQ26rGhDFVosFhT_ogq9rTr3to6ss73sIOSiV9OOJdptdK-xNgtBX4bB7pnnUwHzVt7zOHRdvDzCud5yzYWw.UPjKmjs_FkZhyJgFb7ppxwquGzDqilqRB4ePJ4TIxiU&dib_tag=se&keywords=first+Marine+Brigade&qid=1716297665&s=books&sprefix=first+marine+brigade%2Cstripbooks%2C85&sr=1-1
What I learned from Rommel’s Attacks, when Rommel as a rifle company commander fighting in the Italian mountains,, and his company was designated as the “focus of effort”, he received the support from his entire battalion to make major break troughs and penetrations.
When I again read “How to Fight and Win the Single Naval Battle” I got interested in one of the references: FPT167 and the opening paragraph:
“101. General objectives. -
a. Landing operations may be conducted by naval forces for the following general purposes:
For securing bases for our fleet or components thereof.
For denying bases or facilities to the enemy.
For bringing on a fleet engagement at a remote distance from an enemy main base by causing the enemy fleet to operate in protection of the threatened area.
To cause a dispersion of the enemy fleet by threatening areas vital to his plan of campaign.
For protection of life and property in connection with small wars.
For sabotage.
For the conduct of such other land operations as may be required in the prosecution of the naval campaign.
b. The purpose for which a landing operation is conducted in any given area will influence the nature of the operation, its specific objectives, and the forces to be employed.”
Seems to me that FTP167 would have been a good starting point for the staffers of 2030 Design.
In addition, “How to Fight and Win the Single Naval Battle” also sent me into a review of the Strategic Situation presented in this case study. One item missed was the Japanese attack on Port Darwin Australia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Darwin “The Bombing of Darwin, also known as the Battle of Darwin, on 19 February 1942, was the largest single attack ever mounted by a foreign power on Australia.”
This attack by four Japanese Carriers launching 188 aircraft on 19 Feb 1942 and 54 bomber attack on the second day forced the Australians to abandon Port Darwin as a support base. It also supported the Japanese invasion of Salamaua and Lae on New Guinea on March 7, 1942 and the Dutch surrender of Java on March 8, 1942.
Other interesting time line events:
March 23, 1942 - Japanese invade the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal.
April 3, 1942 - Japanese attack U.S. and Filipino troops at Bataan.
April 9, 1942 - U.S. forces on Bataan surrender unconditionally to the Japanese.
April 10, 1942 - Bataan Death March begins as 76,000 Allied POWs including 12,000 Americans are forced to walk 60 miles under a blazing sun without food or water toward a new POW camp, resulting in over 5,000 American deaths.
April 29, 1942 - Japanese take central Burma.
May 1, 1942 - Japanese occupy Mandalay in Burma.
May 3, 1942 - Japanese take Tulagi in the Solomon Islands.
May 5, 1942 - Japanese prepare to invade Midway and the Aleutian Islands.
May 6, 1942 - Japanese take Corregidor as Gen. Wainwright unconditionally surrenders all U.S. And Filipino forces in the Philippines.
May 7-8, 1942 - Japan suffers its first defeat of the war during the Battle of the Coral Sea off New Guinea - the first time in history that two opposing carrier forces fought only using aircraft without the opposing ships ever sighting each other.
May 12, 1942 - The last U.S. Troops holding out in the Philippines surrender on Mindanao.
May 20, 1942 - Japanese complete the capture of Burma and reach India.
June 4-5, 1942 - Turning point in the war occurs with a decisive victory for the U.S. against Japan in the Battle of Midway as squadrons of U.S. torpedo planes and dive bombers from ENTERPRISE, HORNET, and YORKTOWN attack and destroy four Japanese carriers, a cruiser, and damage another cruiser and two destroyers. U.S. loses YORKTOWN.
June 7, 1942 - Japanese invade the Aleutian Islands.
June 9, 1942 - Japanese postpone further plans to take Midway.
July 21, 1942 - Japanese land troops near Gona on New Guinea.
August 7, 1942 - The first U.S. amphibious landing of the Pacific War occurs as 1st Marine Division invades Tulagi and Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands.
Like Caesar, FD2030 should take heed of the “Ides of March” or the heeds of General Van Riper and Chowder II.
Exceptional response. I pray the Brigadier, currently in the Billet of President MCU is briefing CMC Smith daily on MCCP or even better CMC and the ACMC should read them before their nightly prayers.
Well no one is supposed to know, but the puzzle palace has it all figured out. They met this very odd looking dude in the hills above Camp Pendleton, squat, huge head and big eyes, doesn’t do ANY PT, and he can’t fit in a “traditional” Marine Officers uniform, slouches a bit, but you should see what Major ET can do with his index finger! He has extraordinary communication skills so much so no one knows what he is saying most of the time, but we are told he is brilliant like his index finger, he ah just glows. HQMC is now gathering up a new information battalion, waaay smaller still than the current infantry battalions , waaay cheaper and so secret that even if the CMC and ACMC give you their decoder rings you might not get through to Major ET to learn just what it is that he does! But never you mind you old thinkers! Imagine thinking the wounded have to carried from the battle field, or company commanders might their own hip pocket artillery aka 60mm mortar. Or ammo needs to move forward and we sure don’t want to forget the salt tabs so we can operate on two canteens of water…chow? Major ET doesn’t eat the normal food served so make do with what you have on hand.
In fairness of there is a new component that is complimentary to the organic weapons of the infantry battalion and that augments the MAGTF ability to push force forward than why not. But one gets a slippery stomach when the newest gizmo’s start popping up. (Here we go again) plus not to throw shade at the Brits, but every own a Land Rover??? Which would you rather have a Willy’s Jeep or a Series II Landy? Now if I could find my super secret sunglasses maybe Major ET and I can share sewing secrets.
General Van Riper's comment prompted me to take a look at the Marine Corps' professional reading list. None of the books he referenced were on it.
Further, I dove into the archival reading lists going back to General Gray's first ever, in 1989. Interesting to track the trends in the Corps by the periodic additions to the list.
It was also interesting to look at the current reading list, which was changed dramatically in 2020. Some self-help business and leadership books, some memoirs and naval strategy, a few token history books. Lots of futurist influence.
All the classics are gone. None of General Van Riper's appear there. Maybe that's good. As many leaders have reinforced over the past few years, the old ways of war are not in its future character.
Whatever the case, it cannot be honestly said that our Warfighting ethos is not impacted by the shift in focus. Our combined-arms, first to fight mission is receding into history as we focus on futurist theories.
I was tasked by General Al Gray to produce the original Marine Corps reading list and until about 2010 was asked by several commandants to review and comment on the revised lists. Most of these updated lists missed the mark that General Gray established largely because they were the product of Marines unfamiliar with the wide body of military and military related literature. Some, like the current list were the victim of futurists who had scant knowledge of the the past and gave little evidence of being serious students of the profession of arms. Sad!
Hanson On War: 'The Father Of Us All"
MAY 10, 20101:00 PM ET
HEARD ON TALK OF THE NATION
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Transcript
Historian Victor Davis Hanson argues that war is unchanging and tragically persistent through the ages. While technology improves and strategies adapt, human nature remains the same.
His collection of essays on war and history is titled, The Father Of Us All.
NEAL CONAN, host:
The current HBO series "The Pacific" is based in part on E.B. Sledge's memoir of two almost forgotten battles fought by the U.S. Marines during the Second World War. Anyone who's read "With the Old Breed" or seen the TV show emerges with a fresh appreciation for the brutality and waste of war. But there are other lessons from Peleliu and Okinawa about loyalty and love, about suicide attacks and fanatic enemies, and about human nature.
Military historian, classicist and syndicated columnist Victor David Hanson wrote an introduction to Sledge's book and then adapted that as part of one chapter in the new book of essays on war and history, ancient and modern, called "Father of Us All: War and History, Ancient and Modern." And the author joins us now from a studio at Stanford University, where he's a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. Victor, nice to have you back on TALK OF THE NATION.
Mr. VICTOR DAVIS HANSON (Author) Thank you for having me again, Neal.
CONAN: And I wonder if you've been watching the miniseries.
Mr. HANSON: I have. I just watched the ninth episode last night.
CONAN: And do you think they're getting it right?
Mr. HANSON: I think they are. I think "The Pacific" was a lot more difficult to comprehend and a lot more - it was a lot more brutal and it was a lot harder on the American soldier than even Europe was. It was not as well understood. And remember, when Okinawa was going on, which was last night's episode...
CONAN: Mm-hmm.
Mr. HANSON: ...the country was occupied with the death of Franklin Roosevelt, the upcoming defeat of Germany, and people had no idea that we were going to lose 50,000 casualties in an amphibious operation after we had just supposedly learned from Iwo Jima and Tarawa and Peleliu. And yet, Okinawa turned out to be the most horrific American experience, in some ways, in the entire war.
CONAN: And the - what do you take as - you had a relative who was lost in that conflict.
Mr. HANSON: Yes. My namesake, Victor Hanson, was killed May 19th on Sugar Loaf Hill. And he was...
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