“China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations”* are a major strategic issue. Of course, “gray zone” refers to operations between war and peace. I have heard the words “great power competition” (GPC) thrown around more times than I can count but the US does not seem to have a GPC strategy. A GPC main purpose is deterrence as in deter a war. History tells us that a GPC failure can result in a war. Historians are now telling us that one of the causes of WW1 was the failed GPC between England and Germany.
We need to understand that when it comes to naval power and doctrine the US counts Navy combatant and support ships, which we are not able to build and maintain at a competitive rate with the CCP. The CCP Naval Doctrine is based on the “people’s war” concept and includes the PLAN, China’s Coast Guard (CCG), the CCP Maritime Militia and a CCP’s massive fishing fleet. The CCP will and is using all these organizations in a coherent strategy to exploit operational, legal, and alliance GPC gaps.
A great power competition must address a wide range of different competitive area’s including diplomatic, economic, informational, and national defense. Understanding that our Defense Department is civilian led, it is not their responsibility to develop a US great power competition strategy, however, our senior military leaders can point out that an effective military strategy cannot be developed without exploiting “America’s Great-Power Opportunity”**.
A good Great Power Competition Strategy should lead to a Good Military Defense Strategy and maybe we can then figure out how the US Marine Corps can help with both.
*China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, edited by Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson; China Maritime Studies Institute and Nava Institute Press, 2019
** America’s Great-Power Opportunity: Revitalizing US Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition by Ali Wyne; Policy Press, 2022
One way to counter China is to have a permanent presence of Philippine, Australian, Japanese, and US ships. I think LCS/frigates would be enough. Also and expeditionary fast transport with a reinforced Marine company should suffice.
A combined arms MEU has many capabilities that the SIF/Marine Littoral Regiment does not possess, and thus is more capable in the gray zone.
Totally off topic, but relevant. What good would SIF be in the Middle East? Would a Marine Littoral Regiment be of value? Probably not to both questions. But, a combined arms MEU would be very valuable in this crisis.
CMC claims the SIF is valuable world wide but I can't see how except to strip out the missile battery for long-range supporting fires for MAGTF Command Element and littoral combat team (a modified infantry battalion) as a maneuver unit for an infantry regiment. Air Defense Battalion could go to the Wing and Logistics Battalion to the MLC.. Claim is one of many unsupported assertions all too typical of today's senior Marine Corps leaders.
Just think, the MEU can do it all and doesn't have to be modified. (maybe to add in a naval strike missile battery). The traditional MEU is a general purpose force with a little of everything.
Interesting article. While the value of amphibs is obvious, it is clear that the Navy has no interest in significantly investing in them any time soon. And the amphibs we do possess have woefully outdated C4 capabilities (the Navy ignores the annual afloat C4 capabilites requirements CD&I sends them). The Navy's focus seems to be more on OPLANs and outright war. In these scenarios, amphibs floating around in the WEZ get sunk and the key elements of the joint fight are missles and subs. Those platforms therefore take priority. There isn't enough money to invest in those and amphibs to support gray zone ops. Given this reality, we need to enable our partners and work with them to develop low cost strategies and tactics they can use to counter the PRC's gray zone activities.
“China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations”* are a major strategic issue. Of course, “gray zone” refers to operations between war and peace. I have heard the words “great power competition” (GPC) thrown around more times than I can count but the US does not seem to have a GPC strategy. A GPC main purpose is deterrence as in deter a war. History tells us that a GPC failure can result in a war. Historians are now telling us that one of the causes of WW1 was the failed GPC between England and Germany.
We need to understand that when it comes to naval power and doctrine the US counts Navy combatant and support ships, which we are not able to build and maintain at a competitive rate with the CCP. The CCP Naval Doctrine is based on the “people’s war” concept and includes the PLAN, China’s Coast Guard (CCG), the CCP Maritime Militia and a CCP’s massive fishing fleet. The CCP will and is using all these organizations in a coherent strategy to exploit operational, legal, and alliance GPC gaps.
A great power competition must address a wide range of different competitive area’s including diplomatic, economic, informational, and national defense. Understanding that our Defense Department is civilian led, it is not their responsibility to develop a US great power competition strategy, however, our senior military leaders can point out that an effective military strategy cannot be developed without exploiting “America’s Great-Power Opportunity”**.
A good Great Power Competition Strategy should lead to a Good Military Defense Strategy and maybe we can then figure out how the US Marine Corps can help with both.
*China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, edited by Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson; China Maritime Studies Institute and Nava Institute Press, 2019
** America’s Great-Power Opportunity: Revitalizing US Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition by Ali Wyne; Policy Press, 2022
One way to counter China is to have a permanent presence of Philippine, Australian, Japanese, and US ships. I think LCS/frigates would be enough. Also and expeditionary fast transport with a reinforced Marine company should suffice.
Agree. Sharing the load across allies and partners is smarter and cheaper.
A combined arms MEU has many capabilities that the SIF/Marine Littoral Regiment does not possess, and thus is more capable in the gray zone.
Totally off topic, but relevant. What good would SIF be in the Middle East? Would a Marine Littoral Regiment be of value? Probably not to both questions. But, a combined arms MEU would be very valuable in this crisis.
CMC claims the SIF is valuable world wide but I can't see how except to strip out the missile battery for long-range supporting fires for MAGTF Command Element and littoral combat team (a modified infantry battalion) as a maneuver unit for an infantry regiment. Air Defense Battalion could go to the Wing and Logistics Battalion to the MLC.. Claim is one of many unsupported assertions all too typical of today's senior Marine Corps leaders.
Just think, the MEU can do it all and doesn't have to be modified. (maybe to add in a naval strike missile battery). The traditional MEU is a general purpose force with a little of everything.
Interesting article. While the value of amphibs is obvious, it is clear that the Navy has no interest in significantly investing in them any time soon. And the amphibs we do possess have woefully outdated C4 capabilities (the Navy ignores the annual afloat C4 capabilites requirements CD&I sends them). The Navy's focus seems to be more on OPLANs and outright war. In these scenarios, amphibs floating around in the WEZ get sunk and the key elements of the joint fight are missles and subs. Those platforms therefore take priority. There isn't enough money to invest in those and amphibs to support gray zone ops. Given this reality, we need to enable our partners and work with them to develop low cost strategies and tactics they can use to counter the PRC's gray zone activities.
If these people do not and cannot go on the offensive, why are they taking up boat spaces in the Marine Corps? Semper Fi