The critique of the Marine Forces in readiness often focuses on amphibious assault being obsolete. The first combat action by Marines in Korea was after a tactical offload at Pusan. The Amphibious Assault at Inchon followed. The common denominator in Amphibious Assault, tactical off load, administrative off load or fly in is that they deliver the MAGTF to the fight. Getting ashore, via multiple options, is only one part of the plan. The most important part after those options is being able to fight once there.
FD-20XX has no way to actually come ashore, nothing of note to fight with once there and no viable way to sustain whatever you have put ashore.
If one were do a map reconnaissance of where MAGTFs could possibly be required, from the Aleutians to Northern Japan to N Australia in a conventional conflict with China, the options are endless and none have much to do with sinking the Chinese war ships. If one only focuses on the Maritime chokepoints in the Pacific, the key would be holding them icw allied nations and not needing to re- capture them.
Permit me an analogy. As NATO, in 1985, looked at the vast tank Armies of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR they opted for tanks, artillery, close air, anti tank mines and the anti tank weaponry of various ranges from 4000 meters to 100 meters as well as a variety of fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Imagine if the USMC came along and said they could become the eyes and ears, place themselves beyond the FEBA clandestinely, live off of the land, resupply by conventional delivery vans and disrupt the tank assault with satchel charges. How is EABO different?
The Inchon Landing and Han River crossing could not have been accomplished by the wheeled ACV. This tragic selection of wheels instead of tracks is typical of people who have no combat operational experience with combined arms mobility. They are always looking for an easy way and dreaming of things to come. Semper Fi
If one wishes to comprehend America's present position in the world order That now exists, I suggest that he look back in time to when The united states abandoned its mission in vietnam and then engaged with china.
We made china rich and powerful by engaging economically and diplomatically with that nation.
Had we not done so, I believe that china would still be Largely an agrarian society
Working working communal fields with hand tools, And producing poor quality steel in small quantities In their backyards.
Americans were talked out of continuing to fight in vietnam By elites who Argued that doing so cost too Much money, And was morally repugnant.
Well where did that lead us to? Where are we now located along the geostrategic/economic continuum?
I'll tell you where we are. We are confronted by The spectre of soon having to fight China, Russia, North korea, And iran. And that's just for starters. They're probably our others who would be willing to join them.
I believe we have an advantage in both aircraft carrier Battle groups and nuclear submarines.
Our ground forces, Putting it lightly, don't seem to be
the quite awesome fighting machine they once were.
Our air forces I believe are still quite formidable. But we've never been able to bomb our way to absolute victory.
I believe that half of Our aircraft Carrier battle groups presently are incapable of launching sustained operations due to deferred maintenance.
I don't think that our submarines alone, Well capable of inflicting great damage, We'll be able to.
Decisively end a conflict.
That brings me back to our ground forces.
Recruitment goals have not been met for a number of years. Most most eighteen and nineteen year Olds Are not cut from the same cloth as GIs and Marines formerly we're.
And from what I can infer, Based upon what I read, They are not forged
With as much rigor by by strong tough drill instructors they formally were.
Cutting to the chase, I have no idea how these kids of today would be able to survive against hardened tough Russians, Chinese, North koreans, and so on and so forth.
And now I mention the cost of fighting in terms of dollars and cents.
The machinery costs for war fighting equipment is not only through the roof, But it has risen far beyond the earth's atmosphere.
With the all volunteer military, The cost to Is hire, train, equipment, and sustain personnel Is seemingly out of control as well.
As a buck private basic trainee in nineteen sixty eight I cost uncle sam a whole eighty six dollars per month.
The cost rose to two hundred twenty dollars per month when I reached ETS in 1970.
A quick check on google shows that an e one now costs more than twenty one thousand dollars per yearin salary alone.
And, I estimate that we're unable to hire enough of them to be able to successfully execute a large scale war plan.
I think it would have been far cheaper to have continued funding the south vietnamese, and to have refrained from reaching out so fatefully, to 🇨🇳 China, with that 1970s ping pong diplomacy.
So much for all those then and now, who, we were and still now are told, are the best and the brightest!
The critique of the Marine Forces in readiness often focuses on amphibious assault being obsolete. The first combat action by Marines in Korea was after a tactical offload at Pusan. The Amphibious Assault at Inchon followed. The common denominator in Amphibious Assault, tactical off load, administrative off load or fly in is that they deliver the MAGTF to the fight. Getting ashore, via multiple options, is only one part of the plan. The most important part after those options is being able to fight once there.
FD-20XX has no way to actually come ashore, nothing of note to fight with once there and no viable way to sustain whatever you have put ashore.
If one were do a map reconnaissance of where MAGTFs could possibly be required, from the Aleutians to Northern Japan to N Australia in a conventional conflict with China, the options are endless and none have much to do with sinking the Chinese war ships. If one only focuses on the Maritime chokepoints in the Pacific, the key would be holding them icw allied nations and not needing to re- capture them.
Permit me an analogy. As NATO, in 1985, looked at the vast tank Armies of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR they opted for tanks, artillery, close air, anti tank mines and the anti tank weaponry of various ranges from 4000 meters to 100 meters as well as a variety of fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Imagine if the USMC came along and said they could become the eyes and ears, place themselves beyond the FEBA clandestinely, live off of the land, resupply by conventional delivery vans and disrupt the tank assault with satchel charges. How is EABO different?
I really tried very hard to figure out what he was thinking. That thought had crossed my mind too.
It's almost like CMC Berger wanted the entire Marine Corps to be a giant ANGLICO force.
The Inchon Landing and Han River crossing could not have been accomplished by the wheeled ACV. This tragic selection of wheels instead of tracks is typical of people who have no combat operational experience with combined arms mobility. They are always looking for an easy way and dreaming of things to come. Semper Fi
If one wishes to comprehend America's present position in the world order That now exists, I suggest that he look back in time to when The united states abandoned its mission in vietnam and then engaged with china.
We made china rich and powerful by engaging economically and diplomatically with that nation.
Had we not done so, I believe that china would still be Largely an agrarian society
Working working communal fields with hand tools, And producing poor quality steel in small quantities In their backyards.
Americans were talked out of continuing to fight in vietnam By elites who Argued that doing so cost too Much money, And was morally repugnant.
Well where did that lead us to? Where are we now located along the geostrategic/economic continuum?
I'll tell you where we are. We are confronted by The spectre of soon having to fight China, Russia, North korea, And iran. And that's just for starters. They're probably our others who would be willing to join them.
I believe we have an advantage in both aircraft carrier Battle groups and nuclear submarines.
Our ground forces, Putting it lightly, don't seem to be
the quite awesome fighting machine they once were.
Our air forces I believe are still quite formidable. But we've never been able to bomb our way to absolute victory.
I believe that half of Our aircraft Carrier battle groups presently are incapable of launching sustained operations due to deferred maintenance.
I don't think that our submarines alone, Well capable of inflicting great damage, We'll be able to.
Decisively end a conflict.
That brings me back to our ground forces.
Recruitment goals have not been met for a number of years. Most most eighteen and nineteen year Olds Are not cut from the same cloth as GIs and Marines formerly we're.
And from what I can infer, Based upon what I read, They are not forged
With as much rigor by by strong tough drill instructors they formally were.
Cutting to the chase, I have no idea how these kids of today would be able to survive against hardened tough Russians, Chinese, North koreans, and so on and so forth.
And now I mention the cost of fighting in terms of dollars and cents.
The machinery costs for war fighting equipment is not only through the roof, But it has risen far beyond the earth's atmosphere.
With the all volunteer military, The cost to Is hire, train, equipment, and sustain personnel Is seemingly out of control as well.
As a buck private basic trainee in nineteen sixty eight I cost uncle sam a whole eighty six dollars per month.
The cost rose to two hundred twenty dollars per month when I reached ETS in 1970.
A quick check on google shows that an e one now costs more than twenty one thousand dollars per yearin salary alone.
And, I estimate that we're unable to hire enough of them to be able to successfully execute a large scale war plan.
I think it would have been far cheaper to have continued funding the south vietnamese, and to have refrained from reaching out so fatefully, to 🇨🇳 China, with that 1970s ping pong diplomacy.
So much for all those then and now, who, we were and still now are told, are the best and the brightest!