When studying the current state of affairs, one can't help but document the past mistakes that led to it.
In 2007, my brother (a SSgt) and I (a young Capt) were sitting in a Fallujah chow hall. We were discussing the interesting initiatives we had seen coming out of Quantico. Weird uniform regs, rent-a-cops at the base gates, and other changes in policy that seemed detached from our ethos and common sense. For example, HQMC had just announced that units were to refrain from conducting weekly field days and barracks inspections, on the premise that our Marines were combat veterans and should be allowed to live as adults without intrusive leadership. We were perplexed as we discussed these changes in the rear.
Then it struck me. "This is the plot of Risky Business, the Tom Cruise movie!" "The adults have left town and are all in Iraq, and the kids are back CONUS selling all the furniture and getting ripped off by hookers!
We laughed then, and we still do about that memory, although the crisis is no laughing matter now. There are plenty of bad decisions along the way...like using the war money from 2003-2014 to build barracks of shoddy construction, contracting out the maintenance, then losing that maintenance contract when the war money ran out. So Marines wait for days for an FMD guy to fix a leaking pipe.
Like building barracks that are supposed to look like apartments so Marines will feel like adults, but the layout in fact isolates Marines from one another and is the enemy of cohesion and camaraderie.
To bookend that beginning: I was a Bn commander in 2016. The base announced it was moving to a centrally managed barracks, with consolidated check-in and a customer service help desk for maintenance issues. After some digging, I discovered it was the good idea of some Quantico civilians.
Shortly after this, the DC for I&L came to our base. At a commander's town hall, we told him that someone had come up with the idea to centralize and consolidate barracks management. We told him it was a horrible idea and would make unit ownership of problems, cohesion, and leadership a further challenge.
He explained that he had been briefed by his civilian planners on this initiative, and it had sounded like a good solution. He further apologized having not paid close enough attention...for getting sold a bill of goods and promised the commanders he would kill it immediately.
Thanks to him, that initiative was put down then...but it arises again.
What does this chain of bad decisions have in common?
There are two components. First is the outsourcing of our Corps to the "continuity" of the federal civilian workforce. Good ideas, dreamed up by federal government civilians, with motives of Retention, Cost Savings, and Messaging. No motives involving combat effectiveness or readiness are involved. The second component necessary for these ideas to gain traction is when our senior leaders abdicate their leadership role and permit their implementation. Our leaders, who should be vigilant guardians of readiness, are at the front door signing us up for Kirby vacuums and magazine subscriptions. And letting the hookers ransack the house.
I saw photos of the facilities at Camp Pendleton that caused all the media attention. It is inexcusable for Marines to live in such squalor. I have become cautious about what I read in the media, but if any of the stories are true, the commanding officer and sergeant major should be relieved for a 'loss of confidence in their ability to lead.' Also, don’t hire civilians to manage living quarters for Marines; find some Marines with old-fashioned leadership skills. They still exist, don’t they?
I have been a Marine for 70 years and am worried that the Marines have lost their way. With stories like this and the Force 2030/Talent Management 2030 mess, I feel justified in my concerns.
Well we all know what is next, you enlisted Marines step back out of the chow line, the senior officers need to eat first and have that chow hot and fast by Jesus, make it snappy there cookie, we generals and wanna be general 06’s who sold our souls for the entrapments and refinements of general officership need to eat and eat well. Look no further than the current CMC, it is bonus enough to be a Marine, and if you want to know when I will be back at my post call the SecDef, oh not available??? call his/her/they/them deputy for skivvie management. Just look at ME he says. Well WE are looking, and We don’t like what WE/US/OUR CORPS see, and if you think for a minute that your cyclorama of nonsense and the “management style” that you got from Esquire Magazine thrills us “old thinkers” for one hot round minute then head over to Capital Hill and start knocking on doors selling crazy, because the Old Thinkers maybe old, but they have not lost their internal compasses. WE enjoy crazy, it is part of OUR ethos, I see a very cranky, very fit young Gunny with a steel shit can and battered billy club dressed in his red shorts and gold T shirt PT gear headed for an open squad bay at 0500, in my capacity as Officer of the Day I think I will follow him, have a feeling the day is going to start early with a loud wake up call. “Reveille Reveille” “be on the company street in 10 minutes ready to run...”
Managers, since when did it become okay to manage Marines? OUR Marines deserve OUR best always, they need to be lead by example and generally from the front unless the situation demands otherwise, for better unit control. Right old thinking again.
What many seem not to realize is just how insulting this whole mess is to the American People who send their sons and daughters to US lead and expect OUR best. It won’t end well, just about everyone here knows it. Easy enough to correct. Now where did that young Gunny and his infantry company get off to, I need to catch up, sounds like they are having some fun!
For those of us old enough to remember the chaos we had in the ‘70’s, I take solace in knowing that what the CMC says about this sort of travesty has meaningful impact I offer as Exhibits A & B: Generals Lew Wilson & Bob Barrow. So, CMC, let’s get this matter squared away. Semper Fi!
A lighthearted addendum to my reference to “Risky Business.” After discussing with my wife, it appears I took some liberties with tying that plot line to the idea of the kids running amok while the adults are out of town.
In the movie, Tom Cruise’s house is ransacked after being victimized by prostitutes and ne’er-do-wells, and he solves the problem by turning the house into a brothel to raise money, in order to buy all his furniture back.
I insist my pop culture reference still relates. Is there a similar strategy to buy back tanks and artillery? Was Tom realizing the dangers of divest to invest? Is this a COA for cfrog’s question of what we can do in the short term?
Sorry for the comedy addendum, but it gave me a laugh again, like in Fallujah in 2007.
We build a team with Fat Leonard (he's available), the Fire Island guy (google it), the guys from Silicon Valley bank (they are looking for new opportunities), and LCpl Jones (he's on restriction again for going to off limits establishments, so he's solid to be on the team). That's management. We get seed money from SoftBank (they'll fund anything). We are financing the rebuild of the USMC, to include the first Lunar Infantry Bn (stuff in space sells! Don't worry, a few computer renderings or pictures of MasterChief is all we ever actually need to accomplish for the lunar thing). As part of the rebuild, we are hosting a retreat with great music, luxury tents, strippers, beer, and emotional support dogs (with beer). Target is Congressional staff, DoD staff, DHS staff, and industry staff (any industry). We say Taylor and Travis are hosting (they won't return our calls...not our problem). All on a full deposit. No really sir, I am serious. We are capturing efficiencies here through a model that compounds other successful money raising models. Just be patient...look, we only support it enough that at least they get old GP tents and some 30 year old in flight MRE's(we found at a base that we forgot to BRAC) when they show. We'll throw a screen up and show some music videos if nothing else. They'll be happy enough to get out alive, they'll forget about the money. So, that should get us enough for a tank platoon, a maintenance/recovery section, and Jone's bar tab.........
I agree with the comments on the Compass page. My first four years of active duty were as a platoon commander at Camp Pendleton where my platoon sergeant and I were in the barracks every day. We had "field day" cleaning parties regularly. The next two years aboard ship as a Combat Cargo Officer were more challenging because the 50+year old ship--an LPA (troop transport) showed its age in the troop compartments. But when the Marines were aboard, they had to clean them daily. It was the NCO's and SNCO's who were the first line of responsibility. Then the officers had to inspect what was expected as the saying goes.
It is disheartening to read what is going on with our Marine Corps--and all services. The slope is very slippery and we are losing traction.
WHAT THE F***! As, a LCpl I was in charge of my Squad, I would check there gear, and make sure they were taken care of. When I became a NCO, I did the same thing. Then as a SNCO and Senior SNCO I would drop in on my Marines at their Barracks. I went to my Granddaughter's Barracks onboard Camp Hansen and I couldn't believe my eyes. The Barracks Duty was sitting at a desk and there were cases of empty beer bottles and pizza boxes stacked near his desk. When I went into my Granddaughter's room I yelled at her to square her room away. Her roommate had a male Marine staying in the same room. My Granddaughter complained that when she got off duty early in the morning it was bad. I did make my observations made to her SNCO, who just told me it was a "New" Marine Corps. My Granddaughter was an MP so I thought that was the way MP's lived. While I was in Okinawa she called me and said that we would have to postpone our sightseeing tour because her MSgt coming up to Camp Hansen to inspect the Barracks. Evidently her MSgt didn't open the wall lockers, because my Granddaughter said she just shoved her stuff in the wall locker. I would open lockers and confiscate beer. WHAT THE HELL happened to our Marine Corps!
Marines take care of their own! Leadership does not take breaks, nor does end at the end of a “normal work day”. Stay engaged or find a place that allows one to turn off at the end of work. (No CEO does that in the world of commerce, they are always thinking about business)
I was heart broken to read that the response of Marine leadership to this barracks issue was to bring in civilian resident advisors. I was a mediocre at best company grade officer but I always inspected the enlisted living quarters in Okinawa, Lejeune, aboard ship and in Beirut. It’s basic leadership that squad leaders understood back in the day. Today, our senior Field grade officers seem to have forgotten it.
The Battle of Rabaul New Guinea …a “Neutralization” Campaign (1943 – 1945)
(BTW get your camp stools and break out your maps)
Any Pacific Ocean military strategy should have started with a study of the WW2 Pacific Campaigns. One campaign set the strategy for most of the Pacific War. The Japanese established Rabaul as the major supply, communications and air dome hub. “The Rabaul port facilities were excellent, and the harbor big enough to hold the entire Imperial Japanese Navy, its fleet train, and enough transports and supply ships to carry and maintain an army corps.” Rabaul could support not only the Japanese efforts in New Guinea and the Southern Solomon Islands but also the Central Pacific Gilbert and Marshall Island Chains. In January 1942 the Japanese captured Rabaul and immediately started turning it into a fortress.
Isolating Rabaul required looking at the tactical situation as a triangle. The first leg started at Port Moresby on the southern tip of New Guinea held by the allies and ended at the Japanese held base at Wewak on the North side of New Guinea (550 miles). This leg also included the strategically important Vitiaz Strait between New Guinea and New Britain. The second leg was Port Moresby to Rabaul (550 miles). The last leg was the north side of the triangle from Wewak to Rabaul (600 miles).
The Joint Staff Directive established three tasks. “Task One directed the seizure of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and the Santa Cruz Islands. Task Two called for the recapturing the remaining Soloman Islands and northeastern coast of New Guinea. This included Japanese held New Guinea ports of Lae, Salamaua, and points north. Task Three called for the occupation of New Britain, including Rabaul.” These tasks were issued to the two regional commanders, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz.
In March 1943, the Japanese attempt to reinforce Lae, New Guinea from Rabaul with a convoy of eight destroyers and eight troop transport carrying 6900 troops. The Japanese convoy sailed into the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. The combined US Army 15th Air Force and allied Royal Australian Air Force jumped the convoy east of Lae and sunk all eight transports and four of the destroyers with only 1200 of the Jap soldiers making it to Lae. The Allied Air Groups were also engaged by enemy aircraft losing 102 of the 150 Japanese planes. A great 2 days for the allies and a complete disaster for the Japanese.
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea raised the question: Can Rabaul be neutralized and by-passed using air power? The Commander of the US 5th Air Force, General George Kenny, credited with the Bismarck Sea victory and reported to General MacArthur, said yes, but I am going to need some more airfields either captured or built.
MacArthur was the Southwest Pacific Area commander responsible for Australia, New Guinea, Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, New Britain (Rabaul), New Ireland and the water around them. Admiral Halsey, assigned by Admiral Nimitz, was the Southern Pacific Area Commander. The boundary between the two areas split the Solomon Island Chain, however, both MacArthur and Halsey, could penetrate into the others area with permission. This command arrangement set up Rabaul for a classic double envelopment.
MacArthur would start with his wing of the double envelopment taking the Islands of Kiriwina and Woodlark south of New Britain securing the SLOCs to the Solomon’s and Australia. Next Lae, on the north side of New Guinea, would be taken by Australian troops attacking from Salamaua. The first air born assault in the pacific war was execute by a US Army parachute drop cutting off the Japanese retreat from Lae. The drop was uniquely covered by a smoke screen provided by US Bombers. Trapped between two forces, the Japanese commander retreated his forces through the Saruwaged Mountain range.
Next MacArthur secured the Huon Peninsula and the Vitiaz Strait in order to make his amphibious assaults on New Britain. The Australian 9th Infantry Division conducted an amphibious assault to capture and secure the port town of Finschhafen to complete his Huon Peninsula Campaign. Finschhafen would be turned into a major base and port with three airfields.
New Britain was next. In Dec 1943 the 1st Marine Division conducted amphibious assaults at Cape Gloucester and Arawe to seize, improve and build airfields. The airfields at Gatsama and Talasea were captured in January. MacArthur would later close one of the back doors to Rabaul with the seizure of the Admiralty Islands (and the stationing of bombers) located 620 miles north of Cape Gloucester, New Britain.
The same tactics would be applied to the Solomon Island side of the double envelopment. From Guadalcanal the amphibious assaults would continue north to the Russel Islands, Vella Lavella Island, New George and the Battle of Munda Point, the deception amphibious raid on Choiseul by the 2nd Marine Parachute Battalion, in preparation for the Bougainville amphibious assaults and the construction of three airfields. At the end of the Solomon drive was the Green Islands. Again airfields were seized, improved and/or built at each one of these objectives. The final nail to close the back door was delivered by the 4th Marine Regiment with the capture of Emirau Island just north of the northern tip of New Ireland.
While this march of amphibious assaults, airfield seizures and construction was occurring, the USA 5th Air Force, Admiral Halsey’s carrier raids and ComAirSols made continuous (daily) air raids and sweeps on Rabaul. ComAirSols was all ground based aircraft on the Solomon Area of Operations and a Joint Organization make up of US Navy (19 Squadrons: 274 planes), US Marine (14 Squadrons; 181 planes), Royal New Zealand Air Force (2 Squadrons; 57 planes), and the US Army 13th Air Force (16 Squadrons; 216 planes).
The Japanese Rabaul “Fortress” consisted of five air fields with over 300 aircrafts, and these were later reinforced after heavy losses with another 100 planes. When the Japanese withdrew their planes there was less than a dozen planes that could fly out. In addition to 500+ small boats and barges, 20 destroyers, 10 submarines, 30 naval vessels, 154 large cargo vessels, and 70 small cargo ships were sunk. All dock facilities were destroyed. Of the over 110,000 military personal, approximately 60,000 surrender to Australian Forces two weeks have Japan’s surrender. The Australians found over 100 Japanese operational medium and light tanks and over 350 miles of tunnels. The neutralization of Rabaul was accomplished by 29,354 Allied sorties and 20,584 tons of bombs.
After looking at this campaign I am concern about the needed re-constitution of the Marine Air Wings. Acquisition and MOS training time lines are much longer for Marine aviation than for an infantry battalion or even a tank battalion or two. Something to think about. Semper Fi.
References: History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II by Robert Sherrod and Rabaul 1943-1945: Reducing Japan’s great island fortress by Mark Lardas
When studying the current state of affairs, one can't help but document the past mistakes that led to it.
In 2007, my brother (a SSgt) and I (a young Capt) were sitting in a Fallujah chow hall. We were discussing the interesting initiatives we had seen coming out of Quantico. Weird uniform regs, rent-a-cops at the base gates, and other changes in policy that seemed detached from our ethos and common sense. For example, HQMC had just announced that units were to refrain from conducting weekly field days and barracks inspections, on the premise that our Marines were combat veterans and should be allowed to live as adults without intrusive leadership. We were perplexed as we discussed these changes in the rear.
Then it struck me. "This is the plot of Risky Business, the Tom Cruise movie!" "The adults have left town and are all in Iraq, and the kids are back CONUS selling all the furniture and getting ripped off by hookers!
We laughed then, and we still do about that memory, although the crisis is no laughing matter now. There are plenty of bad decisions along the way...like using the war money from 2003-2014 to build barracks of shoddy construction, contracting out the maintenance, then losing that maintenance contract when the war money ran out. So Marines wait for days for an FMD guy to fix a leaking pipe.
Like building barracks that are supposed to look like apartments so Marines will feel like adults, but the layout in fact isolates Marines from one another and is the enemy of cohesion and camaraderie.
To bookend that beginning: I was a Bn commander in 2016. The base announced it was moving to a centrally managed barracks, with consolidated check-in and a customer service help desk for maintenance issues. After some digging, I discovered it was the good idea of some Quantico civilians.
Shortly after this, the DC for I&L came to our base. At a commander's town hall, we told him that someone had come up with the idea to centralize and consolidate barracks management. We told him it was a horrible idea and would make unit ownership of problems, cohesion, and leadership a further challenge.
He explained that he had been briefed by his civilian planners on this initiative, and it had sounded like a good solution. He further apologized having not paid close enough attention...for getting sold a bill of goods and promised the commanders he would kill it immediately.
Thanks to him, that initiative was put down then...but it arises again.
What does this chain of bad decisions have in common?
There are two components. First is the outsourcing of our Corps to the "continuity" of the federal civilian workforce. Good ideas, dreamed up by federal government civilians, with motives of Retention, Cost Savings, and Messaging. No motives involving combat effectiveness or readiness are involved. The second component necessary for these ideas to gain traction is when our senior leaders abdicate their leadership role and permit their implementation. Our leaders, who should be vigilant guardians of readiness, are at the front door signing us up for Kirby vacuums and magazine subscriptions. And letting the hookers ransack the house.
I saw photos of the facilities at Camp Pendleton that caused all the media attention. It is inexcusable for Marines to live in such squalor. I have become cautious about what I read in the media, but if any of the stories are true, the commanding officer and sergeant major should be relieved for a 'loss of confidence in their ability to lead.' Also, don’t hire civilians to manage living quarters for Marines; find some Marines with old-fashioned leadership skills. They still exist, don’t they?
I have been a Marine for 70 years and am worried that the Marines have lost their way. With stories like this and the Force 2030/Talent Management 2030 mess, I feel justified in my concerns.
Please help, General Smith."
Well we all know what is next, you enlisted Marines step back out of the chow line, the senior officers need to eat first and have that chow hot and fast by Jesus, make it snappy there cookie, we generals and wanna be general 06’s who sold our souls for the entrapments and refinements of general officership need to eat and eat well. Look no further than the current CMC, it is bonus enough to be a Marine, and if you want to know when I will be back at my post call the SecDef, oh not available??? call his/her/they/them deputy for skivvie management. Just look at ME he says. Well WE are looking, and We don’t like what WE/US/OUR CORPS see, and if you think for a minute that your cyclorama of nonsense and the “management style” that you got from Esquire Magazine thrills us “old thinkers” for one hot round minute then head over to Capital Hill and start knocking on doors selling crazy, because the Old Thinkers maybe old, but they have not lost their internal compasses. WE enjoy crazy, it is part of OUR ethos, I see a very cranky, very fit young Gunny with a steel shit can and battered billy club dressed in his red shorts and gold T shirt PT gear headed for an open squad bay at 0500, in my capacity as Officer of the Day I think I will follow him, have a feeling the day is going to start early with a loud wake up call. “Reveille Reveille” “be on the company street in 10 minutes ready to run...”
Managers, since when did it become okay to manage Marines? OUR Marines deserve OUR best always, they need to be lead by example and generally from the front unless the situation demands otherwise, for better unit control. Right old thinking again.
What many seem not to realize is just how insulting this whole mess is to the American People who send their sons and daughters to US lead and expect OUR best. It won’t end well, just about everyone here knows it. Easy enough to correct. Now where did that young Gunny and his infantry company get off to, I need to catch up, sounds like they are having some fun!
For those of us old enough to remember the chaos we had in the ‘70’s, I take solace in knowing that what the CMC says about this sort of travesty has meaningful impact I offer as Exhibits A & B: Generals Lew Wilson & Bob Barrow. So, CMC, let’s get this matter squared away. Semper Fi!
A lighthearted addendum to my reference to “Risky Business.” After discussing with my wife, it appears I took some liberties with tying that plot line to the idea of the kids running amok while the adults are out of town.
In the movie, Tom Cruise’s house is ransacked after being victimized by prostitutes and ne’er-do-wells, and he solves the problem by turning the house into a brothel to raise money, in order to buy all his furniture back.
I insist my pop culture reference still relates. Is there a similar strategy to buy back tanks and artillery? Was Tom realizing the dangers of divest to invest? Is this a COA for cfrog’s question of what we can do in the short term?
Sorry for the comedy addendum, but it gave me a laugh again, like in Fallujah in 2007.
Alright sir, here is the concept for COA 4.7:
We build a team with Fat Leonard (he's available), the Fire Island guy (google it), the guys from Silicon Valley bank (they are looking for new opportunities), and LCpl Jones (he's on restriction again for going to off limits establishments, so he's solid to be on the team). That's management. We get seed money from SoftBank (they'll fund anything). We are financing the rebuild of the USMC, to include the first Lunar Infantry Bn (stuff in space sells! Don't worry, a few computer renderings or pictures of MasterChief is all we ever actually need to accomplish for the lunar thing). As part of the rebuild, we are hosting a retreat with great music, luxury tents, strippers, beer, and emotional support dogs (with beer). Target is Congressional staff, DoD staff, DHS staff, and industry staff (any industry). We say Taylor and Travis are hosting (they won't return our calls...not our problem). All on a full deposit. No really sir, I am serious. We are capturing efficiencies here through a model that compounds other successful money raising models. Just be patient...look, we only support it enough that at least they get old GP tents and some 30 year old in flight MRE's(we found at a base that we forgot to BRAC) when they show. We'll throw a screen up and show some music videos if nothing else. They'll be happy enough to get out alive, they'll forget about the money. So, that should get us enough for a tank platoon, a maintenance/recovery section, and Jone's bar tab.........
You forgot the sponsorship. Sounds like an Association dinner.
Now I’m really in trouble.
I agree with the comments on the Compass page. My first four years of active duty were as a platoon commander at Camp Pendleton where my platoon sergeant and I were in the barracks every day. We had "field day" cleaning parties regularly. The next two years aboard ship as a Combat Cargo Officer were more challenging because the 50+year old ship--an LPA (troop transport) showed its age in the troop compartments. But when the Marines were aboard, they had to clean them daily. It was the NCO's and SNCO's who were the first line of responsibility. Then the officers had to inspect what was expected as the saying goes.
It is disheartening to read what is going on with our Marine Corps--and all services. The slope is very slippery and we are losing traction.
WHAT THE F***! As, a LCpl I was in charge of my Squad, I would check there gear, and make sure they were taken care of. When I became a NCO, I did the same thing. Then as a SNCO and Senior SNCO I would drop in on my Marines at their Barracks. I went to my Granddaughter's Barracks onboard Camp Hansen and I couldn't believe my eyes. The Barracks Duty was sitting at a desk and there were cases of empty beer bottles and pizza boxes stacked near his desk. When I went into my Granddaughter's room I yelled at her to square her room away. Her roommate had a male Marine staying in the same room. My Granddaughter complained that when she got off duty early in the morning it was bad. I did make my observations made to her SNCO, who just told me it was a "New" Marine Corps. My Granddaughter was an MP so I thought that was the way MP's lived. While I was in Okinawa she called me and said that we would have to postpone our sightseeing tour because her MSgt coming up to Camp Hansen to inspect the Barracks. Evidently her MSgt didn't open the wall lockers, because my Granddaughter said she just shoved her stuff in the wall locker. I would open lockers and confiscate beer. WHAT THE HELL happened to our Marine Corps!
Marines take care of their own! Leadership does not take breaks, nor does end at the end of a “normal work day”. Stay engaged or find a place that allows one to turn off at the end of work. (No CEO does that in the world of commerce, they are always thinking about business)
I was heart broken to read that the response of Marine leadership to this barracks issue was to bring in civilian resident advisors. I was a mediocre at best company grade officer but I always inspected the enlisted living quarters in Okinawa, Lejeune, aboard ship and in Beirut. It’s basic leadership that squad leaders understood back in the day. Today, our senior Field grade officers seem to have forgotten it.
The Battle of Rabaul New Guinea …a “Neutralization” Campaign (1943 – 1945)
(BTW get your camp stools and break out your maps)
Any Pacific Ocean military strategy should have started with a study of the WW2 Pacific Campaigns. One campaign set the strategy for most of the Pacific War. The Japanese established Rabaul as the major supply, communications and air dome hub. “The Rabaul port facilities were excellent, and the harbor big enough to hold the entire Imperial Japanese Navy, its fleet train, and enough transports and supply ships to carry and maintain an army corps.” Rabaul could support not only the Japanese efforts in New Guinea and the Southern Solomon Islands but also the Central Pacific Gilbert and Marshall Island Chains. In January 1942 the Japanese captured Rabaul and immediately started turning it into a fortress.
Isolating Rabaul required looking at the tactical situation as a triangle. The first leg started at Port Moresby on the southern tip of New Guinea held by the allies and ended at the Japanese held base at Wewak on the North side of New Guinea (550 miles). This leg also included the strategically important Vitiaz Strait between New Guinea and New Britain. The second leg was Port Moresby to Rabaul (550 miles). The last leg was the north side of the triangle from Wewak to Rabaul (600 miles).
The Joint Staff Directive established three tasks. “Task One directed the seizure of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and the Santa Cruz Islands. Task Two called for the recapturing the remaining Soloman Islands and northeastern coast of New Guinea. This included Japanese held New Guinea ports of Lae, Salamaua, and points north. Task Three called for the occupation of New Britain, including Rabaul.” These tasks were issued to the two regional commanders, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz.
In March 1943, the Japanese attempt to reinforce Lae, New Guinea from Rabaul with a convoy of eight destroyers and eight troop transport carrying 6900 troops. The Japanese convoy sailed into the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. The combined US Army 15th Air Force and allied Royal Australian Air Force jumped the convoy east of Lae and sunk all eight transports and four of the destroyers with only 1200 of the Jap soldiers making it to Lae. The Allied Air Groups were also engaged by enemy aircraft losing 102 of the 150 Japanese planes. A great 2 days for the allies and a complete disaster for the Japanese.
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea raised the question: Can Rabaul be neutralized and by-passed using air power? The Commander of the US 5th Air Force, General George Kenny, credited with the Bismarck Sea victory and reported to General MacArthur, said yes, but I am going to need some more airfields either captured or built.
MacArthur was the Southwest Pacific Area commander responsible for Australia, New Guinea, Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, New Britain (Rabaul), New Ireland and the water around them. Admiral Halsey, assigned by Admiral Nimitz, was the Southern Pacific Area Commander. The boundary between the two areas split the Solomon Island Chain, however, both MacArthur and Halsey, could penetrate into the others area with permission. This command arrangement set up Rabaul for a classic double envelopment.
MacArthur would start with his wing of the double envelopment taking the Islands of Kiriwina and Woodlark south of New Britain securing the SLOCs to the Solomon’s and Australia. Next Lae, on the north side of New Guinea, would be taken by Australian troops attacking from Salamaua. The first air born assault in the pacific war was execute by a US Army parachute drop cutting off the Japanese retreat from Lae. The drop was uniquely covered by a smoke screen provided by US Bombers. Trapped between two forces, the Japanese commander retreated his forces through the Saruwaged Mountain range.
Next MacArthur secured the Huon Peninsula and the Vitiaz Strait in order to make his amphibious assaults on New Britain. The Australian 9th Infantry Division conducted an amphibious assault to capture and secure the port town of Finschhafen to complete his Huon Peninsula Campaign. Finschhafen would be turned into a major base and port with three airfields.
New Britain was next. In Dec 1943 the 1st Marine Division conducted amphibious assaults at Cape Gloucester and Arawe to seize, improve and build airfields. The airfields at Gatsama and Talasea were captured in January. MacArthur would later close one of the back doors to Rabaul with the seizure of the Admiralty Islands (and the stationing of bombers) located 620 miles north of Cape Gloucester, New Britain.
The same tactics would be applied to the Solomon Island side of the double envelopment. From Guadalcanal the amphibious assaults would continue north to the Russel Islands, Vella Lavella Island, New George and the Battle of Munda Point, the deception amphibious raid on Choiseul by the 2nd Marine Parachute Battalion, in preparation for the Bougainville amphibious assaults and the construction of three airfields. At the end of the Solomon drive was the Green Islands. Again airfields were seized, improved and/or built at each one of these objectives. The final nail to close the back door was delivered by the 4th Marine Regiment with the capture of Emirau Island just north of the northern tip of New Ireland.
While this march of amphibious assaults, airfield seizures and construction was occurring, the USA 5th Air Force, Admiral Halsey’s carrier raids and ComAirSols made continuous (daily) air raids and sweeps on Rabaul. ComAirSols was all ground based aircraft on the Solomon Area of Operations and a Joint Organization make up of US Navy (19 Squadrons: 274 planes), US Marine (14 Squadrons; 181 planes), Royal New Zealand Air Force (2 Squadrons; 57 planes), and the US Army 13th Air Force (16 Squadrons; 216 planes).
The Japanese Rabaul “Fortress” consisted of five air fields with over 300 aircrafts, and these were later reinforced after heavy losses with another 100 planes. When the Japanese withdrew their planes there was less than a dozen planes that could fly out. In addition to 500+ small boats and barges, 20 destroyers, 10 submarines, 30 naval vessels, 154 large cargo vessels, and 70 small cargo ships were sunk. All dock facilities were destroyed. Of the over 110,000 military personal, approximately 60,000 surrender to Australian Forces two weeks have Japan’s surrender. The Australians found over 100 Japanese operational medium and light tanks and over 350 miles of tunnels. The neutralization of Rabaul was accomplished by 29,354 Allied sorties and 20,584 tons of bombs.
After looking at this campaign I am concern about the needed re-constitution of the Marine Air Wings. Acquisition and MOS training time lines are much longer for Marine aviation than for an infantry battalion or even a tank battalion or two. Something to think about. Semper Fi.
References: History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II by Robert Sherrod and Rabaul 1943-1945: Reducing Japan’s great island fortress by Mark Lardas