Deterring Chinese adventurism in the region of the South China Sea is much, much more than a sail past, fly by strategy. It requires a nuts and bolts approach to stationing ships, squadrons, submarines and advanced bases across the region to work with allies. Deterrence does not come cheaply. Think of the US Army and US Air Force presence in Europe for almost 50 years which we, against all logic downsized. The results are obvious.
It is time to recreate SEATO with members Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Australia and the United States. ( I do not include New Zealand as their foreign policy is bankrupt and Canada has nothing to offer.) Future consideration for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
One portion of this should be the permanent deployment of an Amphibious Ready Group and a Carrier Battle Group on station 365 days a year. The MEU must have teeth and be versatile enough for many missions. Their current configurations add little to give the Chinese any true concern.
Very little of this is possible with the current size and state of DoD. The Chinese do not look at budgets or research or personnel expenditures. They calculate by ships, planes, combat units, the logistics to support them and the training of those operational units.
Nothing in our posture will create concern.
Ultimately, the ability to keep China contained will fail if they remain our trading partner where profit trumps values. We are making them wealthier and stronger by the day as we complain about their expanding influence. The Chinese understand every aspect of the competition. We fail to understand most of them and are impotent relative to the rest.
I agree 100%. I’d also add that the Corps needs to reconstitute III MEF as a true MAGTF. We also should have at a minimum 1 MEB forward based, and at least 2 MEUs/ARGs afloat 24/7/365. The MEB and at least 1 MEU/ARG should come from I MEF/1st Marine Brigade.
I realize that’s a lot of combat/logistical strength forward based, but if the country/Corps really believes that China is our largest threat then we need to posture like it. Sitting back CONUS doesn’t project strength, it projects complacency.
Now if we only had the amphibious lift/MPS to get us/keep us there.
You are correct. The Corps’ operational capacity is shrinking and it is not all because of a lack of Amphibious shipping. MPS shipping reductions further restrict the supportability of MAGTFs. Our relationship with the Navy has been in decline for decades. Previous Senior Navy leaders used to interact with Marines through out their development. Today, many have never interacted with Marines. There is a non quantifiable cost when you close Marine Barracks, remove the sea going detachments and do not place Marines in every Navy HQ and staffs. There are too few Navy Officers at AWS and C&S college. Modern senior Admirals, in many cases have never interacted with a Marine at any level.
The Corps doesn’t seem to do much of anything well today. Constant yammering about things to come with no focus on operational excellence.
The acceptance of the ACV and dumping tanks, artillery and engineering assets borders on criminality but is more likely laziness and unwillingness to accept the responsibility that goes with heavy, hard hitting weapons.
Special operations are not game changers and appeal to dilettantes, not serious Marine officers. Semper Fi
I believe Douglas Rape’ has nailed several points we must repair if we really plan on being a player in the China scenario - I support his point of view. But, to ensure we don’t get the cart before the horse, DOD must insist that the CinC have a policy on which a sustainable strategy can be built on. Obviously, that is a “whole of government” requirement; without that essential piece, we are made blind & will shoot in the dark. Semper Fi!
I agree with all the above positions. We cannot act rashly, but we need to act. Failure to act will only encourage China to keep moving the ball. One thing I believe we can do, is when the Philippines needs a resupply mission of their post, turn it into a training mission with other nations being involved. That may send a message that this is indeed a multi nation effort. I also like the idea of having, in a post FD Marine Corps, a littoral strike group, with maybe CB90 vessels to attack Chinese ports outside of China.
On a side note, do Commandants Amos and Neller oppose FD?
Deterring Chinese adventurism in the region of the South China Sea is much, much more than a sail past, fly by strategy. It requires a nuts and bolts approach to stationing ships, squadrons, submarines and advanced bases across the region to work with allies. Deterrence does not come cheaply. Think of the US Army and US Air Force presence in Europe for almost 50 years which we, against all logic downsized. The results are obvious.
It is time to recreate SEATO with members Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Australia and the United States. ( I do not include New Zealand as their foreign policy is bankrupt and Canada has nothing to offer.) Future consideration for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
One portion of this should be the permanent deployment of an Amphibious Ready Group and a Carrier Battle Group on station 365 days a year. The MEU must have teeth and be versatile enough for many missions. Their current configurations add little to give the Chinese any true concern.
Very little of this is possible with the current size and state of DoD. The Chinese do not look at budgets or research or personnel expenditures. They calculate by ships, planes, combat units, the logistics to support them and the training of those operational units.
Nothing in our posture will create concern.
Ultimately, the ability to keep China contained will fail if they remain our trading partner where profit trumps values. We are making them wealthier and stronger by the day as we complain about their expanding influence. The Chinese understand every aspect of the competition. We fail to understand most of them and are impotent relative to the rest.
Douglas:
I agree 100%. I’d also add that the Corps needs to reconstitute III MEF as a true MAGTF. We also should have at a minimum 1 MEB forward based, and at least 2 MEUs/ARGs afloat 24/7/365. The MEB and at least 1 MEU/ARG should come from I MEF/1st Marine Brigade.
I realize that’s a lot of combat/logistical strength forward based, but if the country/Corps really believes that China is our largest threat then we need to posture like it. Sitting back CONUS doesn’t project strength, it projects complacency.
Now if we only had the amphibious lift/MPS to get us/keep us there.
You are correct. The Corps’ operational capacity is shrinking and it is not all because of a lack of Amphibious shipping. MPS shipping reductions further restrict the supportability of MAGTFs. Our relationship with the Navy has been in decline for decades. Previous Senior Navy leaders used to interact with Marines through out their development. Today, many have never interacted with Marines. There is a non quantifiable cost when you close Marine Barracks, remove the sea going detachments and do not place Marines in every Navy HQ and staffs. There are too few Navy Officers at AWS and C&S college. Modern senior Admirals, in many cases have never interacted with a Marine at any level.
The Corps doesn’t seem to do much of anything well today. Constant yammering about things to come with no focus on operational excellence.
The acceptance of the ACV and dumping tanks, artillery and engineering assets borders on criminality but is more likely laziness and unwillingness to accept the responsibility that goes with heavy, hard hitting weapons.
Special operations are not game changers and appeal to dilettantes, not serious Marine officers. Semper Fi
I believe Douglas Rape’ has nailed several points we must repair if we really plan on being a player in the China scenario - I support his point of view. But, to ensure we don’t get the cart before the horse, DOD must insist that the CinC have a policy on which a sustainable strategy can be built on. Obviously, that is a “whole of government” requirement; without that essential piece, we are made blind & will shoot in the dark. Semper Fi!
I agree with all the above positions. We cannot act rashly, but we need to act. Failure to act will only encourage China to keep moving the ball. One thing I believe we can do, is when the Philippines needs a resupply mission of their post, turn it into a training mission with other nations being involved. That may send a message that this is indeed a multi nation effort. I also like the idea of having, in a post FD Marine Corps, a littoral strike group, with maybe CB90 vessels to attack Chinese ports outside of China.
On a side note, do Commandants Amos and Neller oppose FD?