Imagine if the senior military leadership decided they needed to seize and hold Bandar Abbas or the Port of Aden. The Marine Corps could do neither. What if the leadership decided to place a potent combat Brigade into Lithuania in response to Russian threats? It could not do it. Imagine that Iceland requested a military force be stationed there to send a signal to Russia. What could the Marine Corps send? What exactly can today’s Marine Corps do?
The Corps gave itself a mission to sink ships with short range missiles in one specific geographic location and in that target fixation discarded its ability to be able to do what it is tasked by law to provide. This unilateral disobedience of the law most certainly should result in consequences for those who executed this rouge charge into irrelevance.
Imagine this scenario. A Regimental commander orders a Bn to seize and hold a mountain pass and the Bn Commander issues orders to his companies to support his scheme of maneuver. One Company responds that they had expected to stay in a local village to defend it and had traded in the rifles, machine guns and mortars for shotguns better suited to this self assigned mission. The machine gunners and Mortar men have been sent to the rear. Nor do they have hand grenades and they plan to forage for food and water in the village. They believe the enemy is unaware they are in the village. The Company Gunny and two platoon leaders had reservations and were sent to the rear with the machine gunners and mortar men. The sitrep reveals that they have no shotgun ammunition. The shotguns have no ability to affix a bayonet. The Company Commander further reports that he has no cold weather gear as he was unfamiliar with the local climate and did not expect the arriving cold front.
How is this example different from what the Marine Corps has done over the last six years?
According to the USNI Fleet Tracker, as of June 16 only the 31st MEU was forward deployed. The ARG/MEU was in the vicinity of Sydney, Australia. The East Coast and West Coast MEUs were still at home stations. I’m not sure how many SIFs III MEF has in position deterring the PLAN. Readers can draw their own conclusions about relevancy. You can read the Fleet Tracker at: https://news.usni.org/2025/06/16/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-june-16-2025
I am fully certain that in a future conflict our young Marines will run to the sound of the guns and fulfill their mission. Because that is what they have been trained to do! However, the last and current CMCs have done our Nation and our Marines a disservice. The divestment has left the Marine Corps with very little offensive firepower. Tanks are gone and most artillery batteries have been eliminated. I will suggest that the MLR & SIF are not robust enough to fulfill their expeditionary duties. Similarly, we now have a force which does not now, have the major end-item weapons system: the NMESIS. We got rid of real combat power, for a weapons system which in reality, does not exist! Five years into this missile program, and we don't even have an operational battery. Thus the ground combat element is a large infantry force with very little supporting weapons. Seven 155mm batteries and some 81mm mortars. That's it. To me, this almost renders the Marine Corps as combat ineffective.
Lest we forget, it’s all about the once and future world war with as Dick Nixon would say “Chiner.” There would never be low, mid or high intensity situations or conflicts like say a NEO from a fragile and collapsing regime where a MEU, plus would need to mount out fast and secure a large semi commercial airfield, hold for several weeks and conduct various on ground operations. Certainly nothing in the Middle East has ever risen to such occasion. No, its first island chains, stand in forces, MLR’s (as opposed to MRE’s but forget food for the first island chains)
If anything in the last several years has been so, it is the absolute volatility of the global environment, the need for potential crisis response. Even stock markets are highly volatile, but nope, island chains. Maybe review of John Ford’s “They Were Expendable” could be on the watch list at the oldest standing structure in Washington, DC! It explains a bunch in vivid black and white. Oh well Island chains and missiles on are the menu so belay that…
But gee, “Trump picks Marine to be next Joint Chiefs vice chairman”! So what will the new Marine Vice Chairman recommend his “one trick pony” contribute to the joint fight? Who will replace him another FD Fanatic?
Ha! LOL…I told myself that I was no longer going to reply directly to Cpl Garble. My perception of “Cpl G’s” debate arguments is they are one dimensional and akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the sinking Titanic. Basically, his argument against Chowder 2 is; the retire general officers are wrong and they should not be arguing against FD2030. His argument for FD2030 is basically the Commandant holds a seat of “infallibility” and he can ignore the MAGTF doctrine nailed to the front door of HQMC. Hey! My opinion and like Cpl G, I am entitled to comment.
Then I catch this Cpl G comment that is a copy and paste from “polarbear’s” (that’s me) reply to Cpl G announcing the POTUS appointment of General Mahoney’s as Vice Chairmen of the JCOS on CP-Bunker Buster.
To clarify, I think that General Mahoney’s appointment is a good move for the Joint Staff because of his experience as a pilot (5000 flight time hours is nothing to sneeze at). If we get into it with the CCP in a Pacific war, I think aircraft is going to be the decision maker. Yes, in a Pacific Ocean fight (2027 - 2030), missile and drone waves will occur, but airpower will be the decision maker and certainly not the MLR.
I then looked at General Mahoney’s public appearances and speeches. I posted this transcript because of the Q&A Session it contains.
The General got some good questions about FD2030. I posted this article without my comment along with the old farmer “We’ll See” Proverb, in order to let folks make up their own mind. I was wondering if General Mahoney will help with the move away from FD2030. Maybe I am wrong, but he seems to deflect and danced around the FD2030 issues...not a good sign. However, he was the Asst. Commandant so…”We’ll See”.
I should mention that Cpl G does seem to enjoy my arguments against FD2030. I like to post historical examples to support my arguments. On the CP-Drones and Arty page, Cpl G posted a linked article written by a Marine Officer’s “epiphany” (definition - a manifestation of a divine or supernatural being) switching his support to FD2030 based on the WW2 Battle/Siege of Malta. I posted a counter article on CP – Drones & Arty that the Battle of Malta was a “bad example” for FD2030 when it came to the WW2 SLOC Battle of the Mediterranean Sea. The Battle of Malta was less about military strategy and more about a “hardnose” and hectoring UK Prime Minister and Minister of Defense facing an Axis on slot.
In any event, I am hoping that Cpl G’s “copy and paste” of the “We’ll See” Proverb and General Mahoney’s discussion is a sign that some narrow-mined resistance to Chowder 2 is moving in the right direction.
I brought this forward from a few days ago. Posted it to Cfrog after another 24 hour suspension.
It shows my biggest argument is against the anti- FD crowd (especially the retired generals, is not their arguments. It is their method. The personal attacks. The slander. The decisiveness.
///
Regret the delay. Had to serve my time on another 24 hour suspension.
Appreciate this take—and amen to “Continue Mission.”
I’ll start with context. I started speaking up on this forum not because I think Force Design is flawless, but because of how the conversation about it evolved. Somewhere along the line, healthy debate got overtaken by a mix of misinformation, slander, and inertia. That kind of dialogue doesn’t sharpen the Corps—it dulls it. If we’re going to be honest stewards of our institution, we owe it to each other to get beyond that. This forum, I assess, needs a counter narrative to what had become very one sided.
Here are a few comebacks.
It’s fair to point out that Recon Marines and many others were practicing low-signature, dispersed operations long before FD2030 gave those concepts formal structure. Force Design didn’t invent that—it tried to scale it, systematize it across the force, and orient the institution toward the threats ahead. To not be low signature in a near pear fight is suicide. So yes, it is a service wide imperative.
Force Design was a gamble—no question. The Corps divested legacy equipment and accepted near-term risk to align with strategic guidance and secure a more meaningful role in future conflict. This wasn’t just about equipment—it was about relevance. It was about ensuring the Marine Corps had a seat at the table doing more than refueling P-8s (if you know, you know). That gamble paid off in the OPLANs. Today, the Corps holds key tasks and responsibilities that arguably never would’ve been assigned under the old model. And now, under General Smith, the vision is continuing to evolve. He’s pushing to grow the Corps in size and strike a balance between modernization and crisis response, a priority that’s remained consistent throughout his tenure. The Corps bought maneuver room—and it’s using it.
You mention FD was a secret that other Commandants were kept out of? General Van Riper recently stated some were given a TS brief. I do not think your accusation is accurate.
Was every decision perfect? Of course not. Was the communication clear? Often, no. But when it comes to adapting the Marine Corps for operations inside a contested environment against a pacing threat, inaction simply wasn’t an option.
The shipbuilding shortfall is real—and one of the most glaring vulnerabilities. The Corps could and should have been louder, sooner. MEU rotations have dwindled. Amphibs are delayed. But to be fair, let’s not revise history: this slide didn’t start with Force Design. Amphib numbers have been falling across multiple Commandants. One of Force Design’s earliest and loudest (although recently silent) critics—General Conway—was at the helm when the fleet dropped from 38 to 32 ships without serious objection.
General Berger inherited 32 (only 31 operational) and held the line. More importantly, he led the push for statutory reform to ensure the number never drops below 31—which is now the law. General Smith is pushing even further, not only to increase amphib capacity but to do so with congressional backing. That’s not surrendering to the Navy—it’s leadership.
In 2025, the value of the Marine Corps is beyond a global crisis response force. Today, it also serves as a forward-deployed, sensing, striking, and networked forces—one capable of persisting inside the WEZ and holding adversaries at risk in support of naval maneuver and the broader Joint Force. This is not the end state. The Corps is still transforming, now focused on rebalancing modernization with the crisis response capabilities that were previously divested. That’s the hard but necessary work of refining a force—not reinventing it. And it’s where this forum could make a difference—by moving past debates about what was, and toward serious conversations about what’s next. I will unpack this more later. . . “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.”
And that’s where this forum could be genuinely helpful: by shifting from re-litigating the past to engaging in meaningful debate about how to move forward.
Too many comments here remind me of the “if Stonewall hadn’t been killed, the South would’ve won” crowd. Well—Stonewall died. Force Design is here. Now what? Keep arguing over the past? Or move forward, stronger and smarter?
The recent article published by all former and living Commandants calling out the need to fix shipbuilding was a positive—and dare I say, classy—step. More, please. That’s the kind of unified, principled advocacy the Corps deserves.
Where’s the MAGTF in the Eastern Mediterranean? Where’s the MAGTF in the Western Mediterranean? Where’s the MAGTF in the Indian Ocean? Where’s the MAGTF in the Red Sea? Where’s the MAGTF in the Arabian Sea?
The Nation needs a Corps that is ready and able to deploy and effectuate its foreign policy. We don’t have that, and we need it now. I hear of no Combatant Commander asking for a MAGTF, most likely because our current Commandant has neutered the Corps of its “Crown Jewel”, the scalable MAGTF, and they know it’s a waste of time to ask. The Commandant would probably send a back channel P4 to him saying sorry bud we’re too busy standing up targets for the PLA to worry about our Title X mission.
And what do we have to show for it…ONE MEU forward deployed in AUSTRALIA, and absolutely no operational NAM units with a full T/E, or a full Class V basic load.
Today’s Middle East situation will ultimately show how Berger and Smith have totally emasculated the Corps’s combat capabilities.
A professional, timely execution of a MEU SOC mission by an omnipresent EGA MAGTF. No finer Marine in the Corps’ History, Marine Colonel/Lieutenant General Marty Berndt ! Hand Salute! May this legendary Marine Officer RIP! May God save us from Force Disaster and return us to the highly trained superbly capable always deployed MEF Centric MAGTF!
Had the privilege to work for General Berndt as his Battalion S3 and XO. Superb BN Commander providing exceptional leadership. We were at the BN pre-deployment CAX when he received the word on his orders to USEURCOM shortly after his selection to Col. The BN deployed to 3rd MARDIV (June 90) shortly after his transfer and promotion. In August the BN deployed to Saudi Arabia for Desert Shield/Storm. We were eventually transfer to the 6th MARS and the 2nd MARDIV Breaching Force. The BN’s performance during the Breaching Operation and charge to Kuwait City was exceptional. 1-6 was still Marty Berndt’s BN in spirit and my regret is he was not present to observe its outstanding performance. General Berndt was definitely in the same league as Chowder 2. Semper Fi General.
Speaking of TARP...Who can remember the 1995 TARP mission conducted to rescue US Air Force F-16 pilot Scott O’Grady. “On June 2, 1995, he was shot down over Bosnia and Herzegovina by a 2K12 Kub (NATO designation SA-6 "Gainful") mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) and forced to eject from his F-16C into hostile territory. US Marines from heavy-helicopter squadron HMH-464 and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit eventually rescued O'Grady after six days of evading the Bosnian Serbs. He was previously involved in the Banja Luka incident when he had fired upon six enemy aircraft. The 2001 film Behind Enemy Lines is loosely based on his experience.”
“Just after midnight on June 8,[14] O'Grady spoke into the radio. An F-16 pilot, Captain Thomas "T.O." Hanford, from the 510th responded and, after confirming his identity, the rescue was set in motion. At 0440 local time, USAF General Michael Ryan and Navy Admiral Leighton Smith, commander of NATO Southern Forces, called US Marine Corps Colonel Martin Berndt aboard USS Kearsarge with orders to "execute".[11]
Two CH-53 Sea Stallions with 51 marines from the 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines within the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit lifted off USS Kearsarge to rescue the pilot. The two helicopters were accompanied by two Marine Corps AH-1W Supercobra helicopter gunships and a pair of Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier jump jets, one piloted by Captain Ronald C. Walkerwicz. These six aircraft had support from identical sets of replacement helicopters and jump jets as well as two Navy EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare planes, two Air Force EF-111A Raven electronic warfare planes, two Marine F/A-18D Hornets, a pair of anti-tank Air Force A-10 Thunderbolts, an SH-60B from USS Ticonderoga, and an RAF AWACS E-3D.”
Now that’s how you plan and execute a TARP Mission.
“At 0635, the helicopters approached the area where O'Grady's signal beacon had been traced. The pilots saw bright yellow smoke coming from trees near a rocky pasture where O'Grady had set off a flare. The first Sea Stallion, commanded by Major William Tarbutton, touched down and 20 Marines jumped off the aircraft and set up a defensive perimeter.[11] As the second Sea Stallion, commanded by Captains Paul Fortunato and James Wright, landed, a figure with a pistol who turned out to be the missing pilot appeared running towards the Marines and immediately went to the Sea Stallion. As the side door opened, he was pulled in before the second 20 Marines poised to leave by the rear ramp could even move. They were called back to their seats, and those who had formed the defensive perimeter reboarded the other helicopter. After a quick head count, the Stallions took off. They had been on the ground no more than seven minutes.”
The Marines, with O'Grady, flew low over Serb-held Bosnia. However, American aircraft detected a Serb missile radar along the Croatian coast, scanning for targets. An American plane recommended destroying the Serb radar, code-named Giraffe. The request was denied, partly out of concern that a strike could spark wider conflict.[14]
Minutes later, the Marines reported they were under fire. Three shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles had been fired at them but missed, as the helicopter pilots—flying 150 feet (46 m) off the ground at 175 mph (282 km/h)—jinked to evade them. Serb small arms pocked both helicopters; the Marines aboard heard the bullets hit inside the fuselage.[10][14] One door gunner returned fire. One round hit some communication gear in the chopper and hitting Sergeant Major Angel Castro Jr.'s armor without injuring anyone. At 0715 local time, 30 minutes after picking up O'Grady, the rescuers reported "feet wet", meaning they were over water.[10][14] O'Grady was back aboard the Kearsarge at 0730.[13] All of the aircraft landed without further incident." S/F
As you said “that’s how you plan and execute a TARP mission”. So I’ll ask the obvious question, would the Corps be able to execute an assigned TARP mission today, anywhere in the world?
Imagine if the senior military leadership decided they needed to seize and hold Bandar Abbas or the Port of Aden. The Marine Corps could do neither. What if the leadership decided to place a potent combat Brigade into Lithuania in response to Russian threats? It could not do it. Imagine that Iceland requested a military force be stationed there to send a signal to Russia. What could the Marine Corps send? What exactly can today’s Marine Corps do?
The Corps gave itself a mission to sink ships with short range missiles in one specific geographic location and in that target fixation discarded its ability to be able to do what it is tasked by law to provide. This unilateral disobedience of the law most certainly should result in consequences for those who executed this rouge charge into irrelevance.
Imagine this scenario. A Regimental commander orders a Bn to seize and hold a mountain pass and the Bn Commander issues orders to his companies to support his scheme of maneuver. One Company responds that they had expected to stay in a local village to defend it and had traded in the rifles, machine guns and mortars for shotguns better suited to this self assigned mission. The machine gunners and Mortar men have been sent to the rear. Nor do they have hand grenades and they plan to forage for food and water in the village. They believe the enemy is unaware they are in the village. The Company Gunny and two platoon leaders had reservations and were sent to the rear with the machine gunners and mortar men. The sitrep reveals that they have no shotgun ammunition. The shotguns have no ability to affix a bayonet. The Company Commander further reports that he has no cold weather gear as he was unfamiliar with the local climate and did not expect the arriving cold front.
How is this example different from what the Marine Corps has done over the last six years?
According to the USNI Fleet Tracker, as of June 16 only the 31st MEU was forward deployed. The ARG/MEU was in the vicinity of Sydney, Australia. The East Coast and West Coast MEUs were still at home stations. I’m not sure how many SIFs III MEF has in position deterring the PLAN. Readers can draw their own conclusions about relevancy. You can read the Fleet Tracker at: https://news.usni.org/2025/06/16/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-june-16-2025
Senior leaders need to be held accountable for the mess they have made. They must pay for what they broke.
Well, Marines are in Los Angeles.
Sad state of affairs. SecDef needs to get it fixed.
I am fully certain that in a future conflict our young Marines will run to the sound of the guns and fulfill their mission. Because that is what they have been trained to do! However, the last and current CMCs have done our Nation and our Marines a disservice. The divestment has left the Marine Corps with very little offensive firepower. Tanks are gone and most artillery batteries have been eliminated. I will suggest that the MLR & SIF are not robust enough to fulfill their expeditionary duties. Similarly, we now have a force which does not now, have the major end-item weapons system: the NMESIS. We got rid of real combat power, for a weapons system which in reality, does not exist! Five years into this missile program, and we don't even have an operational battery. Thus the ground combat element is a large infantry force with very little supporting weapons. Seven 155mm batteries and some 81mm mortars. That's it. To me, this almost renders the Marine Corps as combat ineffective.
Lest we forget, it’s all about the once and future world war with as Dick Nixon would say “Chiner.” There would never be low, mid or high intensity situations or conflicts like say a NEO from a fragile and collapsing regime where a MEU, plus would need to mount out fast and secure a large semi commercial airfield, hold for several weeks and conduct various on ground operations. Certainly nothing in the Middle East has ever risen to such occasion. No, its first island chains, stand in forces, MLR’s (as opposed to MRE’s but forget food for the first island chains)
If anything in the last several years has been so, it is the absolute volatility of the global environment, the need for potential crisis response. Even stock markets are highly volatile, but nope, island chains. Maybe review of John Ford’s “They Were Expendable” could be on the watch list at the oldest standing structure in Washington, DC! It explains a bunch in vivid black and white. Oh well Island chains and missiles on are the menu so belay that…
But gee, “Trump picks Marine to be next Joint Chiefs vice chairman”! So what will the new Marine Vice Chairman recommend his “one trick pony” contribute to the joint fight? Who will replace him another FD Fanatic?
We'll See!
https://impossiblehq.com/well-see/
https://www.acmc.marines.mil/Speeches-and-Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3728948/gen-mahoney-at-the-hudson-institute/
Copy and Paste
https://marinecorpscompasspoints.substack.com/p/compass-points-bunker-buster/comments
Ha! LOL…I told myself that I was no longer going to reply directly to Cpl Garble. My perception of “Cpl G’s” debate arguments is they are one dimensional and akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the sinking Titanic. Basically, his argument against Chowder 2 is; the retire general officers are wrong and they should not be arguing against FD2030. His argument for FD2030 is basically the Commandant holds a seat of “infallibility” and he can ignore the MAGTF doctrine nailed to the front door of HQMC. Hey! My opinion and like Cpl G, I am entitled to comment.
Then I catch this Cpl G comment that is a copy and paste from “polarbear’s” (that’s me) reply to Cpl G announcing the POTUS appointment of General Mahoney’s as Vice Chairmen of the JCOS on CP-Bunker Buster.
To clarify, I think that General Mahoney’s appointment is a good move for the Joint Staff because of his experience as a pilot (5000 flight time hours is nothing to sneeze at). If we get into it with the CCP in a Pacific war, I think aircraft is going to be the decision maker. Yes, in a Pacific Ocean fight (2027 - 2030), missile and drone waves will occur, but airpower will be the decision maker and certainly not the MLR.
I then looked at General Mahoney’s public appearances and speeches. I posted this transcript because of the Q&A Session it contains.
https://www.acmc.marines.mil/Speeches-and-Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3728948/gen-mahoney-at-the-hudson-institute/
The General got some good questions about FD2030. I posted this article without my comment along with the old farmer “We’ll See” Proverb, in order to let folks make up their own mind. I was wondering if General Mahoney will help with the move away from FD2030. Maybe I am wrong, but he seems to deflect and danced around the FD2030 issues...not a good sign. However, he was the Asst. Commandant so…”We’ll See”.
I should mention that Cpl G does seem to enjoy my arguments against FD2030. I like to post historical examples to support my arguments. On the CP-Drones and Arty page, Cpl G posted a linked article written by a Marine Officer’s “epiphany” (definition - a manifestation of a divine or supernatural being) switching his support to FD2030 based on the WW2 Battle/Siege of Malta. I posted a counter article on CP – Drones & Arty that the Battle of Malta was a “bad example” for FD2030 when it came to the WW2 SLOC Battle of the Mediterranean Sea. The Battle of Malta was less about military strategy and more about a “hardnose” and hectoring UK Prime Minister and Minister of Defense facing an Axis on slot.
In any event, I am hoping that Cpl G’s “copy and paste” of the “We’ll See” Proverb and General Mahoney’s discussion is a sign that some narrow-mined resistance to Chowder 2 is moving in the right direction.
I brought this forward from a few days ago. Posted it to Cfrog after another 24 hour suspension.
It shows my biggest argument is against the anti- FD crowd (especially the retired generals, is not their arguments. It is their method. The personal attacks. The slander. The decisiveness.
///
Regret the delay. Had to serve my time on another 24 hour suspension.
Appreciate this take—and amen to “Continue Mission.”
I’ll start with context. I started speaking up on this forum not because I think Force Design is flawless, but because of how the conversation about it evolved. Somewhere along the line, healthy debate got overtaken by a mix of misinformation, slander, and inertia. That kind of dialogue doesn’t sharpen the Corps—it dulls it. If we’re going to be honest stewards of our institution, we owe it to each other to get beyond that. This forum, I assess, needs a counter narrative to what had become very one sided.
Here are a few comebacks.
It’s fair to point out that Recon Marines and many others were practicing low-signature, dispersed operations long before FD2030 gave those concepts formal structure. Force Design didn’t invent that—it tried to scale it, systematize it across the force, and orient the institution toward the threats ahead. To not be low signature in a near pear fight is suicide. So yes, it is a service wide imperative.
Force Design was a gamble—no question. The Corps divested legacy equipment and accepted near-term risk to align with strategic guidance and secure a more meaningful role in future conflict. This wasn’t just about equipment—it was about relevance. It was about ensuring the Marine Corps had a seat at the table doing more than refueling P-8s (if you know, you know). That gamble paid off in the OPLANs. Today, the Corps holds key tasks and responsibilities that arguably never would’ve been assigned under the old model. And now, under General Smith, the vision is continuing to evolve. He’s pushing to grow the Corps in size and strike a balance between modernization and crisis response, a priority that’s remained consistent throughout his tenure. The Corps bought maneuver room—and it’s using it.
You mention FD was a secret that other Commandants were kept out of? General Van Riper recently stated some were given a TS brief. I do not think your accusation is accurate.
Was every decision perfect? Of course not. Was the communication clear? Often, no. But when it comes to adapting the Marine Corps for operations inside a contested environment against a pacing threat, inaction simply wasn’t an option.
The shipbuilding shortfall is real—and one of the most glaring vulnerabilities. The Corps could and should have been louder, sooner. MEU rotations have dwindled. Amphibs are delayed. But to be fair, let’s not revise history: this slide didn’t start with Force Design. Amphib numbers have been falling across multiple Commandants. One of Force Design’s earliest and loudest (although recently silent) critics—General Conway—was at the helm when the fleet dropped from 38 to 32 ships without serious objection.
General Berger inherited 32 (only 31 operational) and held the line. More importantly, he led the push for statutory reform to ensure the number never drops below 31—which is now the law. General Smith is pushing even further, not only to increase amphib capacity but to do so with congressional backing. That’s not surrendering to the Navy—it’s leadership.
In 2025, the value of the Marine Corps is beyond a global crisis response force. Today, it also serves as a forward-deployed, sensing, striking, and networked forces—one capable of persisting inside the WEZ and holding adversaries at risk in support of naval maneuver and the broader Joint Force. This is not the end state. The Corps is still transforming, now focused on rebalancing modernization with the crisis response capabilities that were previously divested. That’s the hard but necessary work of refining a force—not reinventing it. And it’s where this forum could make a difference—by moving past debates about what was, and toward serious conversations about what’s next. I will unpack this more later. . . “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.”
And that’s where this forum could be genuinely helpful: by shifting from re-litigating the past to engaging in meaningful debate about how to move forward.
Too many comments here remind me of the “if Stonewall hadn’t been killed, the South would’ve won” crowd. Well—Stonewall died. Force Design is here. Now what? Keep arguing over the past? Or move forward, stronger and smarter?
The recent article published by all former and living Commandants calling out the need to fix shipbuilding was a positive—and dare I say, classy—step. More, please. That’s the kind of unified, principled advocacy the Corps deserves.
That’s all you have as a response, “we’ll see”?
Where’s the MAGTF in the Eastern Mediterranean? Where’s the MAGTF in the Western Mediterranean? Where’s the MAGTF in the Indian Ocean? Where’s the MAGTF in the Red Sea? Where’s the MAGTF in the Arabian Sea?
The Nation needs a Corps that is ready and able to deploy and effectuate its foreign policy. We don’t have that, and we need it now. I hear of no Combatant Commander asking for a MAGTF, most likely because our current Commandant has neutered the Corps of its “Crown Jewel”, the scalable MAGTF, and they know it’s a waste of time to ask. The Commandant would probably send a back channel P4 to him saying sorry bud we’re too busy standing up targets for the PLA to worry about our Title X mission.
And what do we have to show for it…ONE MEU forward deployed in AUSTRALIA, and absolutely no operational NAM units with a full T/E, or a full Class V basic load.
Today’s Middle East situation will ultimately show how Berger and Smith have totally emasculated the Corps’s combat capabilities.
We’ll see!
And . . Ummmm. . Combatant Commanders routinely ask for MEUs.
Combatant Commands Made Clear Their Demand
General Smith noted that the geographic Combatant Commanders are “asking for … 5.5 [MEUs], and we can only deliver 1.0 right now”, highlighting a clear demand for more continuous MEU deployments. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/5/1/amphib-availability-biggest-challenge-to-marine-corps-north-star?utm_source=chatgpt.com
A professional, timely execution of a MEU SOC mission by an omnipresent EGA MAGTF. No finer Marine in the Corps’ History, Marine Colonel/Lieutenant General Marty Berndt ! Hand Salute! May this legendary Marine Officer RIP! May God save us from Force Disaster and return us to the highly trained superbly capable always deployed MEF Centric MAGTF!
HEAR, HEAR!
Had the privilege to work for General Berndt as his Battalion S3 and XO. Superb BN Commander providing exceptional leadership. We were at the BN pre-deployment CAX when he received the word on his orders to USEURCOM shortly after his selection to Col. The BN deployed to 3rd MARDIV (June 90) shortly after his transfer and promotion. In August the BN deployed to Saudi Arabia for Desert Shield/Storm. We were eventually transfer to the 6th MARS and the 2nd MARDIV Breaching Force. The BN’s performance during the Breaching Operation and charge to Kuwait City was exceptional. 1-6 was still Marty Berndt’s BN in spirit and my regret is he was not present to observe its outstanding performance. General Berndt was definitely in the same league as Chowder 2. Semper Fi General.
Speaking of TARP...Who can remember the 1995 TARP mission conducted to rescue US Air Force F-16 pilot Scott O’Grady. “On June 2, 1995, he was shot down over Bosnia and Herzegovina by a 2K12 Kub (NATO designation SA-6 "Gainful") mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) and forced to eject from his F-16C into hostile territory. US Marines from heavy-helicopter squadron HMH-464 and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit eventually rescued O'Grady after six days of evading the Bosnian Serbs. He was previously involved in the Banja Luka incident when he had fired upon six enemy aircraft. The 2001 film Behind Enemy Lines is loosely based on his experience.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_O%27Grady
“Just after midnight on June 8,[14] O'Grady spoke into the radio. An F-16 pilot, Captain Thomas "T.O." Hanford, from the 510th responded and, after confirming his identity, the rescue was set in motion. At 0440 local time, USAF General Michael Ryan and Navy Admiral Leighton Smith, commander of NATO Southern Forces, called US Marine Corps Colonel Martin Berndt aboard USS Kearsarge with orders to "execute".[11]
Two CH-53 Sea Stallions with 51 marines from the 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines within the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit lifted off USS Kearsarge to rescue the pilot. The two helicopters were accompanied by two Marine Corps AH-1W Supercobra helicopter gunships and a pair of Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier jump jets, one piloted by Captain Ronald C. Walkerwicz. These six aircraft had support from identical sets of replacement helicopters and jump jets as well as two Navy EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare planes, two Air Force EF-111A Raven electronic warfare planes, two Marine F/A-18D Hornets, a pair of anti-tank Air Force A-10 Thunderbolts, an SH-60B from USS Ticonderoga, and an RAF AWACS E-3D.”
Now that’s how you plan and execute a TARP Mission.
“At 0635, the helicopters approached the area where O'Grady's signal beacon had been traced. The pilots saw bright yellow smoke coming from trees near a rocky pasture where O'Grady had set off a flare. The first Sea Stallion, commanded by Major William Tarbutton, touched down and 20 Marines jumped off the aircraft and set up a defensive perimeter.[11] As the second Sea Stallion, commanded by Captains Paul Fortunato and James Wright, landed, a figure with a pistol who turned out to be the missing pilot appeared running towards the Marines and immediately went to the Sea Stallion. As the side door opened, he was pulled in before the second 20 Marines poised to leave by the rear ramp could even move. They were called back to their seats, and those who had formed the defensive perimeter reboarded the other helicopter. After a quick head count, the Stallions took off. They had been on the ground no more than seven minutes.”
The Marines, with O'Grady, flew low over Serb-held Bosnia. However, American aircraft detected a Serb missile radar along the Croatian coast, scanning for targets. An American plane recommended destroying the Serb radar, code-named Giraffe. The request was denied, partly out of concern that a strike could spark wider conflict.[14]
Minutes later, the Marines reported they were under fire. Three shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles had been fired at them but missed, as the helicopter pilots—flying 150 feet (46 m) off the ground at 175 mph (282 km/h)—jinked to evade them. Serb small arms pocked both helicopters; the Marines aboard heard the bullets hit inside the fuselage.[10][14] One door gunner returned fire. One round hit some communication gear in the chopper and hitting Sergeant Major Angel Castro Jr.'s armor without injuring anyone. At 0715 local time, 30 minutes after picking up O'Grady, the rescuers reported "feet wet", meaning they were over water.[10][14] O'Grady was back aboard the Kearsarge at 0730.[13] All of the aircraft landed without further incident." S/F
https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,983055-5,00.html
S/F
As you said “that’s how you plan and execute a TARP mission”. So I’ll ask the obvious question, would the Corps be able to execute an assigned TARP mission today, anywhere in the world?
You are right. They could not do a TARP because nobody knows what a TARP is.
Now if you talking a TRAP, well yes. The Corps can do that very well.