The Flt ll LPDs are gold plated in cost as is the LHA. The same total amount of money could build five (possibly 6) LHDs. The LHD projects more aviation combat power capability than the the LPD with more cube for embark. If cube is an issue, in-stream support with a maritime prepositioned ship is an option. Two LHDs would be suficient for each MEU thus reducing the total amphibious assault ship total required even further for a 2 MEF requirement. As the prevalence of drone warfare enters the defense and offense considerations of the MEU, a greater aviation capability for MEU support should be a requirement. The LHD vice LPD does this. Finally, reducing the various types of amphibious assault ships is cost effective for new ship buys and their subsequent maintenance. PS: At least the LSM isnt mentioned in the buy.
I recently read a “study” “Stopping a Taiwan Invasion” completed by a committee of senior military leaders in 2022. At only 82 pages it makes for a quick read and it makes 34 clear recommendations to deter the CCP from invading Taiwan. The first two recommendations that raised questions in my mind are: “31. The Marine Corps, using long range fires and operating independently or with local partners can help close off key straits (‘maneuver” spaces) to the immediate north and south of Taiwan in which PLA forces intend to operate in the event of an assault on Taiwan.” And “24. The Army’s relatively new Multi-Domain Forces are designed to synchronize precision effects and precision fires in all domains against adversary anti-precision fires in all domains against adversary anti-access/area denial (A2AD) networks. They provide unique opportunities for shaping during competition such as the Multi-Domain Effects Battalion’s ability to exploit space and cyber while the “doors are still open” prior to crisis.”
The US Army is developing, enhancing, and planning to field their Multi-Domain Task Force in the 2025 – 2040 timeframe and the “Multi-Domain” mission includes the Maritime Domain. https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/MDB_Evolutionfor21st.pdf The Marine Corps is developing long range anti-ship missiles for the MLR’s in order to close the ocean gaps both north and south of Taiwan . My money is on the US Army to not only win the land based long range anti-ship missile competition but also the design and fielding of “synchronize precision effects and precision fires in all domains against adversary anti-precision fires in all domains against adversary anti-access/area denial (A2AD) networks.” Land based missiles is a US Army expertise and not a specialty of the Marines.
The other recommendation that got me thinking is “5. To deter China from invading Taiwan and defeating them, if they should attempt any such invasion, the number one priority is to be able to gain, maintain, and sustain air superiority over both Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.” If the CCP invades Taiwan they are not only going to need air superiority but also they need to isolate Taiwan from their SLOCs. Doesn’t that mean the CCP needs to control those Japanese and Philippine “gap” Islands? The situation on the southern Taiwan side would be especially concerning if the CCP closes the Bashi Strait. If the CCP gets A2AD missiles on those Islands first how and who is going to get them back? This is basically the US Marine Corps MLR strategy in reverse.
If an air superiority operation is number one priority, the air campaign for Taiwan, like Desert Storm, is going to take a period of time. What is the best US military service to provide “911” combat forces to Taiwan during the initial air campaign?
The CCP has a history of amphibious operations, primarily seizing coastal islands in 1949 and 1950 in order to secure their mainland ports. In each case, the Communist first seize the nearby islands to isolate their objective and then destroy and capture the Nationalist Chinese Army Units. The current defensive strategy for Taiwan is based on the assumption that the CCP shows their hand before the invasion and we (US and allies) heed the early warning signs. But what happens if the CCP does something we don’t expect, like penetration the First Island Chain by seizing and controlling the islands we plan to use to close the gaps?
The article is spot on. Not only do we need to maintain freedom of navigation patrols to deter China, but also to let the sea-going nations in the area, know they can count on the US. A strong, robust MEU presence is also needed in the area. The Darwin Rotational Force is a good starting point. Using the SIF in this context, or any context, is laughable.
The ship building news is the best I've heard in a long time. Now if we just "git-er-done" as planned we may be able to meet our forward-deployed commitments.
Looking forward to seeing one or more articles on the July report of the Commission on the National Defense. The commission was led by Jane Harman and Eric Edelman. It addresses, in 132 pages (read the 6-page summary), all elements of national defense. In particular (on page 37), the USMC as follows: "U.S. Marine Corps
Of the services, the Marine Corps deserves the most credit for embracing the 2018 NDS’s direction to refocus on great power competition and the nature of future warfighting. Despite the
controversy, the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 offers a coherent way for the Marine Corps
to operate in the Indo-Pacific against the pacing threat while retaining the ability to serve as
the nation’s emergency response for crises as they materialize.16 The service deserves high marks
for displaying the agility that DoD often yearns for but rarely achieves. As the United States
confronts an increasingly tumultuous and unpredictable world, the Marine Corps’ role remains
as important as ever, and the service needs to preserve its ability to respond quickly outside the
The Flt ll LPDs are gold plated in cost as is the LHA. The same total amount of money could build five (possibly 6) LHDs. The LHD projects more aviation combat power capability than the the LPD with more cube for embark. If cube is an issue, in-stream support with a maritime prepositioned ship is an option. Two LHDs would be suficient for each MEU thus reducing the total amphibious assault ship total required even further for a 2 MEF requirement. As the prevalence of drone warfare enters the defense and offense considerations of the MEU, a greater aviation capability for MEU support should be a requirement. The LHD vice LPD does this. Finally, reducing the various types of amphibious assault ships is cost effective for new ship buys and their subsequent maintenance. PS: At least the LSM isnt mentioned in the buy.
Now if they could also increase the bottom threshold from 31 ships, to 34 or so, that would even be more credible.
Re-Thinking the Taiwan Invasion
I recently read a “study” “Stopping a Taiwan Invasion” completed by a committee of senior military leaders in 2022. At only 82 pages it makes for a quick read and it makes 34 clear recommendations to deter the CCP from invading Taiwan. The first two recommendations that raised questions in my mind are: “31. The Marine Corps, using long range fires and operating independently or with local partners can help close off key straits (‘maneuver” spaces) to the immediate north and south of Taiwan in which PLA forces intend to operate in the event of an assault on Taiwan.” And “24. The Army’s relatively new Multi-Domain Forces are designed to synchronize precision effects and precision fires in all domains against adversary anti-precision fires in all domains against adversary anti-access/area denial (A2AD) networks. They provide unique opportunities for shaping during competition such as the Multi-Domain Effects Battalion’s ability to exploit space and cyber while the “doors are still open” prior to crisis.”
The US Army is developing, enhancing, and planning to field their Multi-Domain Task Force in the 2025 – 2040 timeframe and the “Multi-Domain” mission includes the Maritime Domain. https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/MDB_Evolutionfor21st.pdf The Marine Corps is developing long range anti-ship missiles for the MLR’s in order to close the ocean gaps both north and south of Taiwan . My money is on the US Army to not only win the land based long range anti-ship missile competition but also the design and fielding of “synchronize precision effects and precision fires in all domains against adversary anti-precision fires in all domains against adversary anti-access/area denial (A2AD) networks.” Land based missiles is a US Army expertise and not a specialty of the Marines.
The other recommendation that got me thinking is “5. To deter China from invading Taiwan and defeating them, if they should attempt any such invasion, the number one priority is to be able to gain, maintain, and sustain air superiority over both Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.” If the CCP invades Taiwan they are not only going to need air superiority but also they need to isolate Taiwan from their SLOCs. Doesn’t that mean the CCP needs to control those Japanese and Philippine “gap” Islands? The situation on the southern Taiwan side would be especially concerning if the CCP closes the Bashi Strait. If the CCP gets A2AD missiles on those Islands first how and who is going to get them back? This is basically the US Marine Corps MLR strategy in reverse.
If an air superiority operation is number one priority, the air campaign for Taiwan, like Desert Storm, is going to take a period of time. What is the best US military service to provide “911” combat forces to Taiwan during the initial air campaign?
Taiwan’s island defense is based on its mountains on the east side of the island. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NARE4PdYXIY&t=191s The last time the CCP fired their missiles over and near Taiwan they also dropped a few missiles east of Taiwan. https://www.graphicnews.com/index.php/en/pages/43067/military-china-fires-missiles-over-taiwan There is a group of five sizeable Japanese islands west of Taiwan. If the CCP occupies these islands Taiwan is completely isolated.
The CCP has a history of amphibious operations, primarily seizing coastal islands in 1949 and 1950 in order to secure their mainland ports. In each case, the Communist first seize the nearby islands to isolate their objective and then destroy and capture the Nationalist Chinese Army Units. The current defensive strategy for Taiwan is based on the assumption that the CCP shows their hand before the invasion and we (US and allies) heed the early warning signs. But what happens if the CCP does something we don’t expect, like penetration the First Island Chain by seizing and controlling the islands we plan to use to close the gaps?
The article is spot on. Not only do we need to maintain freedom of navigation patrols to deter China, but also to let the sea-going nations in the area, know they can count on the US. A strong, robust MEU presence is also needed in the area. The Darwin Rotational Force is a good starting point. Using the SIF in this context, or any context, is laughable.
The ship building news is the best I've heard in a long time. Now if we just "git-er-done" as planned we may be able to meet our forward-deployed commitments.
Looking forward to seeing one or more articles on the July report of the Commission on the National Defense. The commission was led by Jane Harman and Eric Edelman. It addresses, in 132 pages (read the 6-page summary), all elements of national defense. In particular (on page 37), the USMC as follows: "U.S. Marine Corps
Of the services, the Marine Corps deserves the most credit for embracing the 2018 NDS’s direction to refocus on great power competition and the nature of future warfighting. Despite the
controversy, the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 offers a coherent way for the Marine Corps
to operate in the Indo-Pacific against the pacing threat while retaining the ability to serve as
the nation’s emergency response for crises as they materialize.16 The service deserves high marks
for displaying the agility that DoD often yearns for but rarely achieves. As the United States
confronts an increasingly tumultuous and unpredictable world, the Marine Corps’ role remains
as important as ever, and the service needs to preserve its ability to respond quickly outside the
Indo-Pacific as the need arises"
Peter Badger, LtCol USMC (Ret.)