Note #1: Ben Connable is a champ. His writing is methodical, thoughtful, and thought provoking. (referencing the War on the Rocks article posted by Grable. Excellent summary of how we got here and the issue of relevance to the Joint Force for the USMC today. Connable is not a fan of the implementation of FD, but takes the standpoint of 'here we are' let's move forward)
Note #2: I suspect the shipping container concept will turn out to be one of those ideas that briefs well on first pass, but falls apart the deeper one goes into serious implementation (especially, but not only for conventional ops).
I concur—he raises valid concerns with the implementation of Force Design. Those issues are real and deserve acknowledgment.
That said, he clearly supports the underlying concept. As he states, “I am put off by the explosive and often unseemly public debate that ensued. In the next two installments of this series, I accept the stand-in force with some modest recommended improvements and move forward to address broader concerns.”
I especially appreciate how he laid out how we got here—tracing the strategic and institutional factors that shaped Force Design. His reflections on the corrosive effect of the public debate are important.
A sensible solution and analysis. Just like everything else in the inventory, we’ll require operators, maintenance, resupply, etc. In the final analysis, however, it will come down to a knock down, drag out fight with Infantry, Armor and Artillery to occupy the enemy territory.
I’m reminded of a quote in William Corson’s outstanding book “The Betrayal”. “Presidents pay your money and make a choice of Generals. If the choice is correct you get a victory; if not, you get promises from of things to come and alibis for past failures.”
He could have been writing about the present crops explanations about Force Design and for not meeting today’s commitments. Semper Fi
Ben is very dismissive of Force Design 2030 in his recent book on ground combat; you need to read it--"Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myth of Modern War." You are misreading his intent in this article; he believes that Force Design 2030 is a done deal and he wants to move on to what he considers more important issues.
I took it as Connable critiques the analytical foundations and rationale behind Force Design 2030, as well as its overarching methodology—but his critique isn’t rooted in opposition to modernization itself. Rather, he challenges how the modernization is being pursued.
What I do know is he said,
“It is time for all Marines on and off active duty to set aside their disagreements and focus forward, towards the vision articulated by current Commandant Eric M. Smith. And it is time for the allies of the Marine Corps to lean in and support this reorientation. The U.S. Marine Corps is facing a relatively slow moving but all too real existential threat.”
"...but his critique isn’t rooted in opposition to modernization itself...". You're killing me. Nobody in the 'FD smells like poop' side is opposed to modernization. That's a strawman, and bait. Which I took. Modernization ≠ selling my camping gear to buy a smartphone so I can digitally enhance my camping experience 'cuz tiktok.
He literally says, “I accept the stand-in force with some modest recommended improvements and move forward to address broader concerns.” Modest improvements. . . Such damming condemnation.
You challenge that, ok, got it.
Yet not one of you speaks of the elephant in the room. The method in which the anti-FD crowd waged their debate is a stain on the Corps. Just going to ignore that? Got that, too.
Your statement rankles my nose, as so much flag waving.
Just because there’s an overwhelming number of retired Marines who are against FD you state “the method in which the anti-FD crowd waged their debate is a stain on the Corps”. EVERY retired Marine who’s against FD loves the Corps and believes that dissent is not a stain, but a duty. It’s the duty of those Marines to “call them as they see them”. When EVERY former Commandant, other the Berger, is against FD, when numerous 3 star, 2 star, and 1 star are against FD, that’s telling and alarming, and should be raising all sorts of warnings at HQMC.
Beginning with Berger and continuing on with Smith, the entire bedrock founding assumptions, and decision documents have been shrouded in secrecy. If HQMC is so sure of their assumptions, decisions and supposed wargame outcomes why the NDAs. NDAs immediately tells me that it’s all BS. You don’t need NDAs if your wargame outcomes support your plans.
If HQMC is so sure of FD, put it to a 3 part test. Let Lt. Gen. Van Riper head up the red force, with no restrictions on courses of action, and put FD to the wargame test. My guess is that the outcome will be the same as the last time Gen. Van Riper headed up a red force. Next, put an FD configured force, whatever size you want, and run them through a Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation program and lastly culminating with an in the field live-fire exercise under combat conditions.
I know your response, “it’s coming, just wait”. We, every Marine, retired, former, and active duty have been waiting OVER 6 YEARS, and what does HQMC and the rest of the Corps have to show for it? A photo of a dummy launcher which HQMC touts as taken in the Philippines but according to some have identified the launcher sitting on a beach at Camp Pendleton. A launch of a dummy missile. Where are the ships, the logistic trains , the reinforcing and supporting units, the operational guidance manuals, etc.?
You call the method that we anti-FD “crowd” a stain on the Corps, well if I had my way (which I don’t), not withstanding some of your good comments in support of FD, for that dishonorable statement alone, you’d be banned from this blog.
I’ll ALWAYS be true to my oath, my duty as a Marine, and SEMPER FIDELIS.
Thank you for the continued advice, Skipper. I’m very familiar with the FPF and am confident our Marines are still ready and able to deliver.
Here is some advice for you. Please review the Marine Officer Guide and refresh yourself on the expectations of USMC Officers.
To assist you, I provided a few highlights.
“As a Marine Corps Officer, you represent the Corps. Conduct yourself with dignity, courtesy, and self-restraint.
Avoid any show of importance. Do not bluster, especially towards civilians or enlisted personnel.
Be weary of situations beyond your depth. . . (this is an important one for you).
Avoid the habit of complaining or whining . . .
In your relations with your fellow officers, avoid joining factions or, if there is any bad feelings others, avoid taking sides. Do not gossip; gossip always finds it way back. Only say of a fellow officer what you would say to his or her face.
Never, under any circumstance, speak ill of the Corps, or of your own organization, in the presence of civilians or members of the other services. Before you voice any criticism, however merited or carefully thought out, be sure it cannot be construed by outsiders so as to derogate the Corps.”
I look forward to you being a shinning example of Ductus Exemplo in future posts.
Hey- I've been here for a while. First, Connable isn't trying to get in the mud pit. He sees some sense in what the USMC was looking at with regard to the Pacific et al, but isn't going to put his face on the official FD Wheaties' box either. I can see the sense in aspects of the underlying theory. I was a Recon Marine in the Far East. Amphibious Reconnaissance, low signature, and long range fires were around long before the salvation of Force Design decided to make it a service wide imperative at the expense of other capabilites.
The cost to relevant, current capability was serious. The communication from the USMC was terrible regarding FD2030. The joke about the big 3 answers to any questioning of Force Design was funny because it was true (Big 3: 1. Secret cannot be released, even to former CMCs. 2. Campaign of Learning to determine how to achieve a capability not currently in evidence. 3. The Army will provide that capability if needed). In fact, it was so standardized, even a knuckledragger contrarian like me could be the official spokesman for FD(2030) just by following the big 3 script.That was the stain on the 'Corps. This is 2025, the pro-FD was in full 'meme war' in 2020 to 2022. That is a stain also.
As far as stains, another stain is the fact that the USMC played patty cake with the USN over the abysmal failure of USN Shipbuilding and Repair for way too long in the spirit of gentlemanly conduct and going along to get along. The USMC was hand in hand with CNO while selling an update that depended on available shipping capability. Not a peep from the USMC over 2020 to 2022 as MEU rotations went away.
And what is the tremendous capability the USMC has gotten out of FD that they couldn't get otherwise, and without losing capability? sUAS/FPVs? Missile Launchers? AN/TPS-80? MQ-9? What? EABO?(oh sorry, that's not real...I should say HN contracting and sourcing).
And, in 2025, what is the value of the USMC to the Joint Force? Connectivity, sensing, and fires? LCpl cfrog was doing that in the Philippines in 1990...we even had rudimentary cyber and space capability. I guess I was a unique JF SIF asset all along. Drinks on the house.
FD is a terrible brand, but my theory is we are stuck with it. So better to make lemonade out of lemons at this point, and I think Connable is coming from the same angle. However, he can speak for himself. At this point, it doesn't matter. We had the fist fight in the Patrol Base...now it's time to Continue Mission.
Wow... outstanding perspective, insight, and a proposal that DoD definitely should immediately look at as a viable option to address our critical shortage of ships!
Regret the delay. Had to serve my time on another 24 hour suspension.
Appreciate this take—and amen to “Continue Mission.”
I’ll start with context. I started speaking up on this forum not because I think Force Design is flawless, but because of how the conversation about it evolved. Somewhere along the line, healthy debate got overtaken by a mix of misinformation, slander, and inertia. That kind of dialogue doesn’t sharpen the Corps—it dulls it. If we’re going to be honest stewards of our institution, we owe it to each other to get beyond that. This forum, I assess, needs a counter narrative to what had become very one sided.
Here are a few comebacks.
It’s fair to point out that Recon Marines and many others were practicing low-signature, dispersed operations long before FD2030 gave those concepts formal structure. Force Design didn’t invent that—it tried to scale it, systematize it across the force, and orient the institution toward the threats ahead. To not be low signature in a near pear fight is suicide. So yes, it is a service wide imperative.
Force Design was a gamble—no question. The Corps divested legacy equipment and accepted near-term risk to align with strategic guidance and secure a more meaningful role in future conflict. This wasn’t just about equipment—it was about relevance. It was about ensuring the Marine Corps had a seat at the table doing more than refueling P-8s (if you know, you know). That gamble paid off in the OPLANs. Today, the Corps holds key tasks and responsibilities that arguably never would’ve been assigned under the old model. And now, under General Smith, the vision is continuing to evolve. He’s pushing to grow the Corps in size and strike a balance between modernization and crisis response, a priority that’s remained consistent throughout his tenure. The Corps bought maneuver room—and it’s using it.
You mention FD was a secret that other Commandants were kept out of? General Van Riper recently stated some were given a TS brief. I do not think your accusation is accurate.
Was every decision perfect? Of course not. Was the communication clear? Often, no. But when it comes to adapting the Marine Corps for operations inside a contested environment against a pacing threat, inaction simply wasn’t an option.
The shipbuilding shortfall is real—and one of the most glaring vulnerabilities. The Corps could and should have been louder, sooner. MEU rotations have dwindled. Amphibs are delayed. But to be fair, let’s not revise history: this slide didn’t start with Force Design. Amphib numbers have been falling across multiple Commandants. One of Force Design’s earliest and loudest (although recently silent) critics—General Conway—was at the helm when the fleet dropped from 38 to 32 ships without serious objection.
General Berger inherited 32 (only 31 operational) and held the line. More importantly, he led the push for statutory reform to ensure the number never drops below 31—which is now the law. General Smith is pushing even further, not only to increase amphib capacity but to do so with congressional backing. That’s not surrendering to the Navy—it’s leadership.
In 2025, the value of the Marine Corps is beyond a global crisis response force. Today, it also serves as a forward-deployed, sensing, striking, and networked forces—one capable of persisting inside the WEZ and holding adversaries at risk in support of naval maneuver and the broader Joint Force. This is not the end state. The Corps is still transforming, now focused on rebalancing modernization with the crisis response capabilities that were previously divested. That’s the hard but necessary work of refining a force—not reinventing it. And it’s where this forum could make a difference—by moving past debates about what was, and toward serious conversations about what’s next. I will unpack this more later. . . “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.”
And that’s where this forum could be genuinely helpful: by shifting from re-litigating the past to engaging in meaningful debate about how to move forward.
Too many comments here remind me of the “if Stonewall hadn’t been killed, the South would’ve won” crowd. Well—Stonewall died. Force Design is here. Now what? Keep arguing over the past? Or move forward, stronger and smarter?
The recent article published by all former and living Commandants calling out the need to fix shipbuilding was a positive—and dare I say, classy—step. More, please. That’s the kind of unified, principled advocacy the Corps deserves.
I would embrace this within certain parameters. I have long advocated for the purchase of ships outright in light of our impotent ship building capacities. Icebreakers from Finland, large commercial ships for a variety of purposes, frigates from Italy, Cruise ships converted to hospital ships, ships as dormitories at naval installations… I would augment the submarine fleet with Diesel Electric submarines and forward deploy them. The downsizing of the MPF squadrons bordered on criminal behavior.
We should covert the luxury yachts we confiscate from Drug Lords, criminals and Russian kleptocrats for military or Coast Guard use. They are fast, long range, open ocean and have all of the most modern technology on board. You could militarize them in under 90 days.
We keep putting things off via paralysis through analysis. Just do it. Haze Grey and underway.
Greek mythology gives us the deceptive container known as the Trojan Horse. During the U.S. Civil War , the most costly war Our Republic has fought, the use of Civilian Railroads by the Union Army could be compared to transporting military personnel and equipment etc via container ships. Yes the Ukrainian war provides unique applications of Special Operations Forces hiding drones inside commercial trucks etc.. The Israelis spent years infiltrating Iran w commercial vehicles filled with drones and other missile systems to be ready for a”Trojan like surprise in a box”. Their Lethal Beeper Operation against the Iranian proxy Hezbollah began years ago. Our clandestine forces have used numerous black operations and must certainly have many ready to be activated upon order.
Great to think outside the box and just wondering about what the crew of the ship would think of it. I suspect that it would have to be a Navy ship, disguised as a Merchantman, as the Germans did during WW II. These ships had German Military crewing them. Can't see this working with civilian crews from different countries and say Panama registered. Could have false or even real merchant ship registration, but still need Navy crew. I suspect that Ukraine had Ukraine truck drivers on those trucks and they disappeared after they finished deliveries. As to defense against this type of warfare, aggressor country's could do the same thing. Another interesting problem for Compass Points to ponder.
Note #1: Ben Connable is a champ. His writing is methodical, thoughtful, and thought provoking. (referencing the War on the Rocks article posted by Grable. Excellent summary of how we got here and the issue of relevance to the Joint Force for the USMC today. Connable is not a fan of the implementation of FD, but takes the standpoint of 'here we are' let's move forward)
Note #2: I suspect the shipping container concept will turn out to be one of those ideas that briefs well on first pass, but falls apart the deeper one goes into serious implementation (especially, but not only for conventional ops).
I concur—he raises valid concerns with the implementation of Force Design. Those issues are real and deserve acknowledgment.
That said, he clearly supports the underlying concept. As he states, “I am put off by the explosive and often unseemly public debate that ensued. In the next two installments of this series, I accept the stand-in force with some modest recommended improvements and move forward to address broader concerns.”
I especially appreciate how he laid out how we got here—tracing the strategic and institutional factors that shaped Force Design. His reflections on the corrosive effect of the public debate are important.
Looking forward to his next two articles.
A sensible solution and analysis. Just like everything else in the inventory, we’ll require operators, maintenance, resupply, etc. In the final analysis, however, it will come down to a knock down, drag out fight with Infantry, Armor and Artillery to occupy the enemy territory.
I’m reminded of a quote in William Corson’s outstanding book “The Betrayal”. “Presidents pay your money and make a choice of Generals. If the choice is correct you get a victory; if not, you get promises from of things to come and alibis for past failures.”
He could have been writing about the present crops explanations about Force Design and for not meeting today’s commitments. Semper Fi
https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/we-need-a-marine-corps-part-i-a-corps-in-crisis/
Great article.
And timely.
Ben is very dismissive of Force Design 2030 in his recent book on ground combat; you need to read it--"Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myth of Modern War." You are misreading his intent in this article; he believes that Force Design 2030 is a done deal and he wants to move on to what he considers more important issues.
I took it as Connable critiques the analytical foundations and rationale behind Force Design 2030, as well as its overarching methodology—but his critique isn’t rooted in opposition to modernization itself. Rather, he challenges how the modernization is being pursued.
What I do know is he said,
“It is time for all Marines on and off active duty to set aside their disagreements and focus forward, towards the vision articulated by current Commandant Eric M. Smith. And it is time for the allies of the Marine Corps to lean in and support this reorientation. The U.S. Marine Corps is facing a relatively slow moving but all too real existential threat.”
I sincerely hope you lean in, sir.
The rest of you, too.
"...but his critique isn’t rooted in opposition to modernization itself...". You're killing me. Nobody in the 'FD smells like poop' side is opposed to modernization. That's a strawman, and bait. Which I took. Modernization ≠ selling my camping gear to buy a smartphone so I can digitally enhance my camping experience 'cuz tiktok.
He literally says, “I accept the stand-in force with some modest recommended improvements and move forward to address broader concerns.” Modest improvements. . . Such damming condemnation.
You challenge that, ok, got it.
Yet not one of you speaks of the elephant in the room. The method in which the anti-FD crowd waged their debate is a stain on the Corps. Just going to ignore that? Got that, too.
Your statement rankles my nose, as so much flag waving.
Just because there’s an overwhelming number of retired Marines who are against FD you state “the method in which the anti-FD crowd waged their debate is a stain on the Corps”. EVERY retired Marine who’s against FD loves the Corps and believes that dissent is not a stain, but a duty. It’s the duty of those Marines to “call them as they see them”. When EVERY former Commandant, other the Berger, is against FD, when numerous 3 star, 2 star, and 1 star are against FD, that’s telling and alarming, and should be raising all sorts of warnings at HQMC.
Beginning with Berger and continuing on with Smith, the entire bedrock founding assumptions, and decision documents have been shrouded in secrecy. If HQMC is so sure of their assumptions, decisions and supposed wargame outcomes why the NDAs. NDAs immediately tells me that it’s all BS. You don’t need NDAs if your wargame outcomes support your plans.
If HQMC is so sure of FD, put it to a 3 part test. Let Lt. Gen. Van Riper head up the red force, with no restrictions on courses of action, and put FD to the wargame test. My guess is that the outcome will be the same as the last time Gen. Van Riper headed up a red force. Next, put an FD configured force, whatever size you want, and run them through a Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation program and lastly culminating with an in the field live-fire exercise under combat conditions.
I know your response, “it’s coming, just wait”. We, every Marine, retired, former, and active duty have been waiting OVER 6 YEARS, and what does HQMC and the rest of the Corps have to show for it? A photo of a dummy launcher which HQMC touts as taken in the Philippines but according to some have identified the launcher sitting on a beach at Camp Pendleton. A launch of a dummy missile. Where are the ships, the logistic trains , the reinforcing and supporting units, the operational guidance manuals, etc.?
You call the method that we anti-FD “crowd” a stain on the Corps, well if I had my way (which I don’t), not withstanding some of your good comments in support of FD, for that dishonorable statement alone, you’d be banned from this blog.
I’ll ALWAYS be true to my oath, my duty as a Marine, and SEMPER FIDELIS.
I’ll just repost my response to you from a few days ago IRT me sticking to squad tactics. It’s just as applicable here.
https://openlibrary.org/books/OL26947090M/The_Marine_Officer's_Guide
Thank you for the continued advice, Skipper. I’m very familiar with the FPF and am confident our Marines are still ready and able to deliver.
Here is some advice for you. Please review the Marine Officer Guide and refresh yourself on the expectations of USMC Officers.
To assist you, I provided a few highlights.
“As a Marine Corps Officer, you represent the Corps. Conduct yourself with dignity, courtesy, and self-restraint.
Avoid any show of importance. Do not bluster, especially towards civilians or enlisted personnel.
Be weary of situations beyond your depth. . . (this is an important one for you).
Avoid the habit of complaining or whining . . .
In your relations with your fellow officers, avoid joining factions or, if there is any bad feelings others, avoid taking sides. Do not gossip; gossip always finds it way back. Only say of a fellow officer what you would say to his or her face.
Never, under any circumstance, speak ill of the Corps, or of your own organization, in the presence of civilians or members of the other services. Before you voice any criticism, however merited or carefully thought out, be sure it cannot be construed by outsiders so as to derogate the Corps.”
I look forward to you being a shinning example of Ductus Exemplo in future posts.
Hey- I've been here for a while. First, Connable isn't trying to get in the mud pit. He sees some sense in what the USMC was looking at with regard to the Pacific et al, but isn't going to put his face on the official FD Wheaties' box either. I can see the sense in aspects of the underlying theory. I was a Recon Marine in the Far East. Amphibious Reconnaissance, low signature, and long range fires were around long before the salvation of Force Design decided to make it a service wide imperative at the expense of other capabilites.
The cost to relevant, current capability was serious. The communication from the USMC was terrible regarding FD2030. The joke about the big 3 answers to any questioning of Force Design was funny because it was true (Big 3: 1. Secret cannot be released, even to former CMCs. 2. Campaign of Learning to determine how to achieve a capability not currently in evidence. 3. The Army will provide that capability if needed). In fact, it was so standardized, even a knuckledragger contrarian like me could be the official spokesman for FD(2030) just by following the big 3 script.That was the stain on the 'Corps. This is 2025, the pro-FD was in full 'meme war' in 2020 to 2022. That is a stain also.
As far as stains, another stain is the fact that the USMC played patty cake with the USN over the abysmal failure of USN Shipbuilding and Repair for way too long in the spirit of gentlemanly conduct and going along to get along. The USMC was hand in hand with CNO while selling an update that depended on available shipping capability. Not a peep from the USMC over 2020 to 2022 as MEU rotations went away.
And what is the tremendous capability the USMC has gotten out of FD that they couldn't get otherwise, and without losing capability? sUAS/FPVs? Missile Launchers? AN/TPS-80? MQ-9? What? EABO?(oh sorry, that's not real...I should say HN contracting and sourcing).
And, in 2025, what is the value of the USMC to the Joint Force? Connectivity, sensing, and fires? LCpl cfrog was doing that in the Philippines in 1990...we even had rudimentary cyber and space capability. I guess I was a unique JF SIF asset all along. Drinks on the house.
FD is a terrible brand, but my theory is we are stuck with it. So better to make lemonade out of lemons at this point, and I think Connable is coming from the same angle. However, he can speak for himself. At this point, it doesn't matter. We had the fist fight in the Patrol Base...now it's time to Continue Mission.
No thank you!
Wow... outstanding perspective, insight, and a proposal that DoD definitely should immediately look at as a viable option to address our critical shortage of ships!
Cfrog
Regret the delay. Had to serve my time on another 24 hour suspension.
Appreciate this take—and amen to “Continue Mission.”
I’ll start with context. I started speaking up on this forum not because I think Force Design is flawless, but because of how the conversation about it evolved. Somewhere along the line, healthy debate got overtaken by a mix of misinformation, slander, and inertia. That kind of dialogue doesn’t sharpen the Corps—it dulls it. If we’re going to be honest stewards of our institution, we owe it to each other to get beyond that. This forum, I assess, needs a counter narrative to what had become very one sided.
Here are a few comebacks.
It’s fair to point out that Recon Marines and many others were practicing low-signature, dispersed operations long before FD2030 gave those concepts formal structure. Force Design didn’t invent that—it tried to scale it, systematize it across the force, and orient the institution toward the threats ahead. To not be low signature in a near pear fight is suicide. So yes, it is a service wide imperative.
Force Design was a gamble—no question. The Corps divested legacy equipment and accepted near-term risk to align with strategic guidance and secure a more meaningful role in future conflict. This wasn’t just about equipment—it was about relevance. It was about ensuring the Marine Corps had a seat at the table doing more than refueling P-8s (if you know, you know). That gamble paid off in the OPLANs. Today, the Corps holds key tasks and responsibilities that arguably never would’ve been assigned under the old model. And now, under General Smith, the vision is continuing to evolve. He’s pushing to grow the Corps in size and strike a balance between modernization and crisis response, a priority that’s remained consistent throughout his tenure. The Corps bought maneuver room—and it’s using it.
You mention FD was a secret that other Commandants were kept out of? General Van Riper recently stated some were given a TS brief. I do not think your accusation is accurate.
Was every decision perfect? Of course not. Was the communication clear? Often, no. But when it comes to adapting the Marine Corps for operations inside a contested environment against a pacing threat, inaction simply wasn’t an option.
The shipbuilding shortfall is real—and one of the most glaring vulnerabilities. The Corps could and should have been louder, sooner. MEU rotations have dwindled. Amphibs are delayed. But to be fair, let’s not revise history: this slide didn’t start with Force Design. Amphib numbers have been falling across multiple Commandants. One of Force Design’s earliest and loudest (although recently silent) critics—General Conway—was at the helm when the fleet dropped from 38 to 32 ships without serious objection.
General Berger inherited 32 (only 31 operational) and held the line. More importantly, he led the push for statutory reform to ensure the number never drops below 31—which is now the law. General Smith is pushing even further, not only to increase amphib capacity but to do so with congressional backing. That’s not surrendering to the Navy—it’s leadership.
In 2025, the value of the Marine Corps is beyond a global crisis response force. Today, it also serves as a forward-deployed, sensing, striking, and networked forces—one capable of persisting inside the WEZ and holding adversaries at risk in support of naval maneuver and the broader Joint Force. This is not the end state. The Corps is still transforming, now focused on rebalancing modernization with the crisis response capabilities that were previously divested. That’s the hard but necessary work of refining a force—not reinventing it. And it’s where this forum could make a difference—by moving past debates about what was, and toward serious conversations about what’s next. I will unpack this more later. . . “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.”
And that’s where this forum could be genuinely helpful: by shifting from re-litigating the past to engaging in meaningful debate about how to move forward.
Too many comments here remind me of the “if Stonewall hadn’t been killed, the South would’ve won” crowd. Well—Stonewall died. Force Design is here. Now what? Keep arguing over the past? Or move forward, stronger and smarter?
The recent article published by all former and living Commandants calling out the need to fix shipbuilding was a positive—and dare I say, classy—step. More, please. That’s the kind of unified, principled advocacy the Corps deserves.
I would embrace this within certain parameters. I have long advocated for the purchase of ships outright in light of our impotent ship building capacities. Icebreakers from Finland, large commercial ships for a variety of purposes, frigates from Italy, Cruise ships converted to hospital ships, ships as dormitories at naval installations… I would augment the submarine fleet with Diesel Electric submarines and forward deploy them. The downsizing of the MPF squadrons bordered on criminal behavior.
We should covert the luxury yachts we confiscate from Drug Lords, criminals and Russian kleptocrats for military or Coast Guard use. They are fast, long range, open ocean and have all of the most modern technology on board. You could militarize them in under 90 days.
We keep putting things off via paralysis through analysis. Just do it. Haze Grey and underway.
Allow me to add my entry to the genre, that was published in 2016:
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160630_art011.pdf
Greek mythology gives us the deceptive container known as the Trojan Horse. During the U.S. Civil War , the most costly war Our Republic has fought, the use of Civilian Railroads by the Union Army could be compared to transporting military personnel and equipment etc via container ships. Yes the Ukrainian war provides unique applications of Special Operations Forces hiding drones inside commercial trucks etc.. The Israelis spent years infiltrating Iran w commercial vehicles filled with drones and other missile systems to be ready for a”Trojan like surprise in a box”. Their Lethal Beeper Operation against the Iranian proxy Hezbollah began years ago. Our clandestine forces have used numerous black operations and must certainly have many ready to be activated upon order.
Great to think outside the box and just wondering about what the crew of the ship would think of it. I suspect that it would have to be a Navy ship, disguised as a Merchantman, as the Germans did during WW II. These ships had German Military crewing them. Can't see this working with civilian crews from different countries and say Panama registered. Could have false or even real merchant ship registration, but still need Navy crew. I suspect that Ukraine had Ukraine truck drivers on those trucks and they disappeared after they finished deliveries. As to defense against this type of warfare, aggressor country's could do the same thing. Another interesting problem for Compass Points to ponder.
Excellent idea. Nothing like thinking "out of the box"